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A crisis of confidence and effectiveness
has con-

fronted the American welfare state for more than a
decade.
This dissertation contributes to assessments
of the crisis
by exploring how the very mission of the welfare
state has

helped disrupt and politicize traditional cultural

sources of political legitimacy.

I

initially develop this

position by counterposing liberal, Marxist, and hermeneutic theories of legitimacy.

I

focus on the debts of these

theories to sharply divergent concepts of social structure
and culture, and analyze the social and epistemological

commitments which shape these concepts.
considered include liberal

S.

M.

Lipset

The major authors
,

Marxist James

O'Connor, and Jurgen Habermas, who incorporates a hermen-

eutic element into his critical theory.
I

argue that none of these theories adequately cap-

tures the particularly American form of the historical

erosion of tradition, and develop this argument by examining one aspect of this erosion, the relationship between
IV

legitimacy and racial segregation.

Widespread public

acceptance of the welfare state depended
in large part
upon its image of providing security
at work and in the
family.

Yet major theories of welfare state
crisis do

not pursue the ways in which the welfare
state’s halting

embrace of integration symbolically threatened
these

commitments to work and to family.

I

explore the histori-

cal connections of segregation to the
motivations which

have traditionally sustained intense modern work
patterns
and the patriarchal family, the special debt of these

connections to the sexual aspects of racial ideology, and
their wider implications for the emergence of conservative

challenges to welfare liberalism.

v
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CHAPTER

I

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LEGITIMACY
Introduction

This opening chapter will set out the development
of scientific liberalism in the political
science profes-

sion,

and efforts within this mainstream to treat the

legitimacy of political and social institutions.

The major

task of this review will be to clarify the social and

epistemological commitments which have shaped the mainstream and limited its treatment of legitimacy.

I

will do

this by focusing on, and suggesting connections between,
the mainstream's scientific approach to explanation and
its professional-managerial status within the social divi-

sion of labor.

In this appraisal,

different perspectives:

I

will draw on two

Marxist theory, and a cultural

hermeneutic approach to social explanation.

This appraisal

thus anticipates a fuller examination of these perspec-

contributions to legitimacy theory later in the

tives'

dissertation
I

shall argue, in sum, that interwoven epistemologi-

cal and social commitments have limited the mainstream's

appreciation of the interwoven and mutually constraining

1

2

nature of state, economy, and culture.

I

shall also argue

that these commitments have limited the
mainstream's grasp
of social beliefs and of the vital
expressive dimension of

social activity.

These deficiencies are exhibited not only

directly in studies of legitimacy, but also in the
entire
corpus of scientific liberal study from 1950 to
1970, a
body of work which functioned in part to legitimate
the New
Deal state in that period.

The effect of these deficiencies

has been to preclude the mainstream's anticipation of
the

legitimation problems to confront the state after the mid1960' s,

as well as its understanding of these problems once

they arose.

I.

Overview of Political Science

Prior to the hegemony of behavioral political science,
the notion of the state was a major organizing principle
of political inquiry.

In political philosophy,

the theory

of the state organized thought on the "right order" of

social life and the politics necessary to achieve it.

The

ends proper to a social order, the interests of a life in
common, political ethics, how we might know the good, and

theories of obligation:

the state (or political community),

however conceived, touched on all of these themes in classical political philosophy, quite openly and consciously in

the best of it.

3

Apart from Marx's critique of philosophy,
since at
least the early 1900's political philosophy
has come under
recurrent intellectual attack within the university.
An

increasingly dominant force within the study of
politics
since then, the adherents in each wave of what
David Truman
has called "the new realism" have swamped the
tradition
of

political philosophy.

The result is that virtually all of

the institutional positions and support available today
for

political study are dominated by representatives of
dition of thought barely half a century old.

a tra-

How is this

change to be understood?
I

will basically argue that it derives from profound

developments in the social division of labor fostering the
growth of professional occupations.

These developments

brought together people in and out of the university on the
basis of mutual, though not identical, political and social
concerns.

In post-1900 America,

professional occupations

typically combine scientific or expert knowledge with a
direct or indirect function of social management.

Political

science, dominated by scientific liberals, embodies these

qualities in ways

I

shall clarify below.

Pre-scientism and early realism

.

Alongside the classical

tradition of political philosophy grew up, in the late 19th
century,

an approach to political study which incorporated

many of the concerns of the classical approach--classical

4

philosophy was its acknowledged ancestor.

The beginning of

this "formal-legal" approach to political
study is associated
in histories of the discipline with
the immigration
of

German intellectuals to this country and
reflects the close
ties political science has always had to legal
education 1
.

Studies in this tradition have usually been quite
open
in avowing opinion on the right order of
political life,

though not as concerned with justifying their claims as

classical philosophy.

Rather, the emphasis in these studies

could be said to rest more on Aristotle's formal cause of
the polity:

a

description of the state under scrutiny, a

classification of states from the point of view of certain
notions of the good state, most often the liberal-democratic

Woodrow Wilson, whose Congressional Government is often

one.

cited as an early "realist" work, is actually a transitional
figure to the early realism.

His text, The State

good example of the formal-legal approach

—a

,

is a

classification

of governments, the organic metaphor for society, the state
as government and government as legal force organized for
,

common ends.

2

A better representative of this approach is the work

of Ernest Barker,

an English political theorist.

His essay,

"The State," represents both the contributions and limita-

tions of the formalist tradition which early "realists"

revolted against.
law."

3

It

For Barker the state is "essentially

is "in its primary and abstract sense,

the

5

status or position, common to us all,
of being the members
4
of a legal association ."
The state is
one face of the

Nation, which "acts in a social or
voluntary way, as a
social order or Society," and "acts in
a legal or compulsory
way, as a legal order or State ." 5 Law
exists to promote
the general good to ensure "to the
greatest possible number
of persons" that they have the "external
conditions required
by every citizen for the development of his
capacities ." 6

These conditions are, in sum, rights which the
individual
has against society

—a

legal "persona" or "mask ." 7

Rights

as liberty carve out a realm of personal expression
and

development

the principle of voluntarism; a realm of eco-

— "whether with hand or brain" and
liberty — the "positive legal right of

nomic freedom

a realm of

political

constitut-

ing and controlling government

."

8

One recognizes in Barker the abstract state of Marx's

early critiques

— the

illusory community where individual

freedom is defined in opposition to society, where commu-

nality is imposed as an external condition, in which indi-

viduals must actually put on masks to have interests in
common, where a people's unity is in the abstraction of law

imposed ultimately by the sanction of force.

One also

recognizes the ground for the criticism both Marx and the

scientific liberals could make against Barker:
as the legal description might be,

as correct

it lacks the animation

and substance of actual human interests, of "sensuous

.

6

human activity"~it is ’’unreal"
in that sense, a legal
formalism, not the stuff of "actual
politics."
One manifestation of early
"realism" was Arthur
Bentley S ghg Pro cess of Government
the early pluralist
work which was self-consciously
realist, scientific, and
highly critical of the traditional
approach to political
study.
Bentley's work was a harbinger of a new
political
science which based itself on the
logical-positivist
'

,

attack within philosophy on "metaphysics."
by R.

Schmidt,

a

As understood

contemporary of Bentley’s, "the new politi-

cal science frees itself from the speculative
viewpoint,

leaves the metaphysical question of the State to one
side,
and confines itself to the world of experience
On Bentley's account, the formal^-legal approach too

often resulted in a "formal study of the most external

characteristics of governing institutions," all the more

unpalatable because "when it is necessary to touch up this
barren formalism with a glow of humanity, an injection of

metaphysics is used."

"The state as discussed in politi-

cal science is usually the 'idea of the state,’
is not good raw material for an investigation."

— which on
institutions — as unduly

and that

Bentley

thus attacks the focus on the state

his reading

means only government

restricting

the definition of politics and thus the "raw material" to
be investigated.

7

On his account, the
state-as-government is a group,
an association different
only in degree from other
groups.

Because politics, for Bentley, is
essentially a matter of
the balance of power among interests,
if pushed Bentley
would simply define the state as the
"sum of the activities
comprised within government," government
understood
as the

p r o cess of

mutual group adjustment in or out of
actual
13
legal institutions
Because Bentley saw the legalists
paying too little attention to politics and
because
.

he saw

them as limiting politics to the
state-as-government,

Bentley "expanded” the definition of politics
and government
to power relations among interests.
"Expanded" is used

advisedly

,

because essential to that expansion is the

contraction or disappearance of overt normative
concerns.
Another part of this early realist trend important
for the discipline's self-definition was the practical-

reformist impulse behind the founding of the APSA and the

National Municipal League

— an

impulse which also had roots

in the more traditional approach to political study.

Its

prominent concerns were to bring political study down from
the level of formal abstraction to the level of "practical

knowledge" and thereby to make political study more relevant to public officials 11
.

This point brings us to an

examination of the scientific liberals' social context.

.

8

T h e professiona l- managerial
background

.

If we are to

clarify the shift to "realism”
and scientism, we must
address the social context of this
transformation.
Changes
in class and economy are a
crucial part of this context.

And,

to make them clear,

an historical argument about

literalism and science is in order.
Liberal thought originally emerged in a
context of
social revolution, a revolution propelled
in part by
changes in social class relations which allowed
and fostered

new productive techniques.

In

appraising the development

of these technologies, men like Francis
Bacon became

philosophers of the new science they found in craftsmen's
empirical, experimental tinkering.

The empirical, mathe-

matical, and mechanical sensibilities of these new men
of

science influenced liberal thought in profound ways.

They

helped infuse the intellectual climate with a standard to
be applied in knowing not only nature, but also society,

and a standard by which we could not only know society
a l so

,

but

improve it through the material progress it would

inform.

That is, they helped shape a major claim of

liberal thought, that science might ameliorate or solve

age-old social problems, especially those rooted in material
.

scarcity
.

15

This claim of liberal ideology emerged in somewhat

altered form, and with renewed force, by the end of the

—
9

19th century.

As it had been originally,

it was shaped in

complex ways by the development of
social class relations
and technology.
in a series of struggles over
roughly a
forty-year period (1880-1920), capital
broke
the craft

organization of production remaining inside
many industries.
By seizing control over production
itself,
capital "freed"

the mental aspect of production, and
science itself, as
forces in both the abstraction and degradation
of labor and
in the expansion of production.
This degradation and

abstraction of labor exacerbated the social problems
of
poverty and unemployment endemic to capitalism, at

the same

time that it helped to undermine the craft
organization of

many working class communities.
In the context of this turmoil,

occupations evolved

or emerged in the social division of labor concerned pri-

marily with planning and social control in production
(i.e.,

engineers), and social control and reform outside

production (i.e., social workers, cultural workers, positions related to advertising, lawyers).

These occupations

developed largely under the pressure of capital's need to
intervene directly and continuously in the work process,
and increasingly in the everyday life of the working class

raising the rate of exploitation, fostering attitudes

amenable to capitalist work requirements, socializing
immigrant labor, dealing with social disorder.

The dominant

self-images of this emerging class, and the activities they

10

informed, were both accepting and
critical of capitalismin part because of pressure
from the left, and in part

because of genuine revulsion from
what appeared as the
"excesses" of capitalism.
These self-images included the
task of bringing order and rationality
to
social life,

reforming capitalism and mediating the
disputes between
capital and labor, and the application
of scientific/
technical expertise to the surrounding world.
These selfimages express the mediate position of
these occupations in
the class structure, and are in effect
modern statements of
the liberal vision

I

summarized above.

This vision is of

a

society improved and run by men of science and
knowledge,

overcoming material scarcity and its attendant social
conflicts.

Any account of the new science of politics

gestating in this period, or of its subsequent development
and content, would be radically incomplete without an

account of these visions, and without an account of the

relation of these scientific aspirations to the social
division of labor and the problems it spawned.
The rise of scientism

.

After Bentley the renewed impetus

for a science of politics came during the 1920 's through a

series of books, graduate programs, and conferences.

Books by Charles Merriam and

G.

E.

1

7

Catlin on the scientific

study of politics, and by Stuart Rice on quantitative

methods in political study were key works in setting out

11

the intellectual grounding and
framework of the new profession.
Merriam s graduate seminars trained
many of the
later important behavioral
scientists, including V. o. Key
and Gabriel Almond.
Merriam was also a co-founder of
the
'

Social Science Research Council, an
interdisciplinary
association of behaviorists seeking to
promote and refine
training and research in their fields. 18
The implication of this surge for the
study of the
state was a sharper restatement of the
Bentley critique.
An example of this critique is a 1934
book, The State as

Concept of Po litical Science

,

a

whose author writes of "strong

reasons for entertaining serious doubts as to
the poten-

tialities of a science which 'begins and ends with
the
state.'"

On the author's view,

apart from the problems

internal to the idea of the state (i.e., its
"metaphysical"
nature), the number of contemporary states was entirely
too
limited.
data,

Even drawing on historical states as additional

"from such meager materials brilliant results can

scarcely be expected."
on this score:

He quotes G. E. Catlin approvingly

"Politics, if it is to be a science, must

be based on the study of some act which is repeated count-

less times a day, not on the study of sixty states," 21

Political science has perhaps been best

presaging its own future practices.

a

prediction when

Here, bound up with

the scientific approach and typical of later practice,

method determines the substance of study.

The utility of

12

an "expanded" definition
of politics is not simply
lts
greater "reality," but just as
importantly its serendipi-

tous creation of unlimited raw
data.
Yet despite the attack on
"speculative” and formallegal study, realists prior to
WW II were not in control
of the discipline.
Political studies was still "a
disci-

pline without a clear intellectual
identity," and still
lacked that "central, organizing
set of concepts or body of
theory which the realists saw as
necessary to their
science. 22 The post-war "behavioral
revolution" provided
the basis for this dominant paradigm,
and the "revolution"
required itself the confluence of several
factors.

In addi-

tion to the underlying need for a
professional identity and
the dovetailing of scientism with that
need, it required a

refinement of technique,

a

definition of the movement's

overall concerns, and an array of financial and
institutional support to push the third and triumphant
wave of

realists to dominance in political science.
The refinement of techniques took place in part

through early marketing and advertising studies, which may
help account for subsequent financial backing of private

foundations.
The

In fact,

People's Choice

,

Lazarsfeld's pioneer voting study,
was done "piggyback" on a marketing

survey he was doing at the time.

Techniques were also

given great impetus by WW II, as evidenced by Samuel

Stouffer's vast work on draftees for the U.S. Army, later

.

13

published as The American_Soldier 24
this regard was the 1930'

s

Also important in

group of German immigrants to

U.S.

universities who helped develop survey
techniques and
added to the weight of science
advocates at schools like

Columbia and the New School.
A sense of the political concerns
of post-WW II

political science may be gained from Gabriel
Almond's argument that empirical studies and the
political events of the
first half of the twentieth century had
helped undermine

classical and legal theory's analyses of modern
politics
and democracies, as well as a common Enlightenment
heritage
of faith in education as a civilizing force. 25
of Weimar,

The collapse

the Great Depression, fascism, World War II,
and

the developing cold war all contributed to a
general concern
for the stability of Western polities.
the prefaces,

A quick glance at

dedications, and hypotheses of post-war

behavioral studies is sufficient to confirm this observation
It

was not until the late 1940’

s,

when corporate

foundations funded the behavioral science movement, that

political scientists could successfully dominate the study
of politics.

These foundations were open to the profes-

sional claims of behavioralists in large part because of
the success of applied science's social control and produc-

tive roles in the work process.

The foundations had, for

instance, already created and funded new universities such
as Rensselaer,

and funded existing universities, to supply

.

14

the required basic research and
engineering manpower; they
had also funded the development
of industrial sociology
and various other managerially-oriented
sciences.
The funding of behavioral political studies
in the late 1940 s was
a logical extension of these
management concerns to broader
social and political issues, especially
in the context of
'

Depression-era disorder and the attractions of
left-wing
movements
Ford generously financed many Social Science
Research
Council operations, and through its own agencies
and the

SSRC it was responsible for funding:

various APSA commit-

tees on research into political behavior; research,
books,
and articles which became models for the field and
propelled

their authors to academic prominence; research institutes
at Stanford, Michigan,

Princeton, North Carolina, and

Columbia; training seminars in scientific techniques; inven-

tories of political knowledge, etc.

In short,

foundation

money was the material cause which set in motion and sustained the behavioral revolution; it was fundamental in

establishing the institutional and research network which
girds and sets the intellectual tone for the discipline.
In Robert Dahl's words:

27

If the foundations had been hostile to the behavioral approach, there can be no doubt it would
have had very rough sledding indeed.

What were the immediate concerns which Ford and other

foundations brought to their funding programs?

The

15

immediate post-war era threatened
a return to the economic
problems and social turmoil of the
1930' s:
maintenance of
wartime levels of investment and
production was not an
assured thing, waves of strikes spoke
of working class
militancy, racial uprisings and conflict
over civil rights
loomed on the horizon, left-wing
parties still had significant organizational strength in the
U.S. and were making
impressive showings in Europe, and turnout
for elections
(elections being a central element in the
legitimation
process) was at an all-time low.
In the face of these

circumstances, the Ford Foundation sought explanations,

reliable indicators of social problems and unrest,
and
revamping of legitimating ideology for the political
process.

a

With this context in mind, here are some represen-

tative sentiments from a Ford Foundation report on
the need
for behavioral political studies.

These statements indicate,

to a considerable degree, the mutual concerns of
corporate

planners and professional experts: 28
the committee's attention was also directed to
the widespread apathy, misunderstanding, and
ignorance concerning political issues, personalities, and public needs.
This poses a great
danger to self-government.
It is evidenced not
only in the failure of many citizens to exercise
their rights as voters with interest and intelligence, but also their neglect of many opportunities
for participation in public affairs.
In a most realistic and practical manner, intergroup hostilities weaken our democratic strength
by dissipating important resources of energy in
internal conflicts, and by swelling the ranks of
malcontents who constitute the seed bed for
undemocratic ideologies.

.

16

At the same time, the committee
was impressed with
the struggie of thoughtful and
informed persons to
nd a meaningful,

contemporary and useable definit!on of democracy.
Without such a definition
millions of Americans remain confused in
their
analysis of crucial problems.
What the new profession of political
science produced,
within the pressures of corporate funding,
was a body of

political knowledge bearing the imprint of both
corporate
concerns an d the technocratic/managerial ideology

so con-

stitutive of the PMC life-world.
turn,

These imprints bear in

though in a manner epistemologically unconscious of
itself, corporate and PMC concerns with the

ability of subordinate populations to disrupt the social
agenda of elite groups.

Peter Bachrach has aptly described

these concerns as a "revolt from the masses."

The revised

theory of democracy produced by this revolt held, for
instance, that elites were the guardians of democratic
values, that apathy is functional for democracy, and so
29
on
As

I

shall argue in the next two sections, in order

to reach such conclusions, the new science of politics had

first to do away with inherently normative and politically

suggestive terms such as class and state, and then to
reduce absolutely necessary concepts like power and interest
to highly behavioral/operational definitions.

These defini-

tions created, in the revised theory of democracy,

a

startling likeness to the social relations in production

17

resulting from capital's seizure
of the work process.
The
great mass of people could only
engage in the operational
equivalent of democracy— pulling the
voting lever— while
elites themselves possessed the values,
ideas,

and techni-

cal expertise to manage the democratic
state.
By assuming this behavioral stance,
political science

could ratify

a

system which discarded older aspirations
for

participation in decision making, or for an
active citizenry
as unsuited to ind ustrial society— much
as their engineering
counterparts like F. W. Taylor did with social
relationships

m

Production. 30

Yet,

this was no conspiracy on the part

of political scientists.

Rather, it was the result of

internally-woven class and epistemological pressures to
abstract the social world into routine and creative labor,
and as mental labor, to regard the body politic objectively,

much as an engineer regards a machine
II.

— or

a worker.

Political Science and Legitimacy

The self-image of the realists who came to dominance

after WW II was largely one of builders of a science of

politics, modeled on their understanding of the physical
sciences:

covering law explanation. 31

The general goal

which united those in the forefront of the movement was
discipline dedicated to the search for "systematic,
ordered, predictive propositions" and to a "long struggle
to put

'is'

in place of

'ought to be.'"

32

Developing an

a

18

elite-pluralist paradigm within these
epistemological concerns, the mainstream of the
discipline arrived

at a virtual
equation between political stability
and legitimate
authority.
This equation derived from a
general concern,
nurtured by the behavioral revolution,
for the stability of
political hierarchy and the management
of social conflict
and disorganization.
For the purpose of later comparison
with Marxist and hermeneutic theory,
it will be useful to
explore this concern for stability from two
perspectives:
the scientific liberals' treatment of
social structure and

of cultural beliefs.

Regarding social structure, the mainstream developed
a

picture of "modern industrial society" with two major

facets.

One is a usually implicit political economy accept-

ing of capitalist economics, largely committed until

recently to the project of New Deal economic and social
management.

The other has been a functionalist account of

the stratification required in "modern industrial society."

Both facets involve an account of relations of influence
and constraint among state, economy, and social stratification.

Regarding cultural beliefs, the mainstream has

relied on a social psychology built around the externality
of beliefs to activity and the top-down transmission of

beliefs from elites to subordinate populations.

This

externalist treatment can be seen particularly in scientific
liberal studies of value consensus and in voting studies.
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My account of these
features is abstracted from
a
number of nominally different
works sharing the elite-

pluralist perspective.

No one work fits this
synopsis

completely, though Lipset s The
First New Nation and
Almond and Verba's The Civic
Culture come quite close 33
In my synopsis, I have not
confined myself to works which
directly analyze legitimacy. The
reason is that, shaped
by the interplay of forces
internal and external to the
discipline, such research shared with
the rest of the elite
Pluralist corgus the articulation of
legitimating ideology
for "modern industrial society,"
and also shared the task
of producing indicators of
(instability for social management.
Treatments of social structure and ideology
by the
'

.

mainstream thus bear the imprint of the PMC
in its relation
to corporate and subordinate interests,
as discussed
in

Section

I.

Social structure.

The search for science in the discipline

entailed a certain commitment to what could be known
and
how it might be known.
cism,

With its roots in "logical empiri-

the mainstream firmly grounded its search for the

real in the traditional liberal tenet of the self-contained

individual.

This "methodological individualism " 34 has

sharply defined and constricted the nature of inquiry.

Research also took place within an unexamined,

a

usually

tacit commitment to Keynesian economics and the idea of

a
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welfare state.

Given the acceptance of this
framework,

political science documented the activities
of the New
Deal State:
electoral politics, "fine-tuning” the
economy,

regulating its excesses, and organizing an
array of social
programs to cope with the problems generated
by capitalist
development.
These methodological and social
commitments,

I

would argue, weakened the mainstream's perception
of

structural relations between the state and its social-

economic context.

Moreover, the behavioral revolution

entrenched itself so successfully that its methodological
commitments formed the unexamined ground of political
debate (especially through the mid-1960's) in the discipline.
The major debate during the 1950's and 1960 's which

subsumed the relation of the state to its social— economic
context was the debate between pluralist and elite interpre-

tations of American society.

The pluralist version of

society pictured an overlapping, shifting melange of groups
in which inequalities of wealth, power,

cumulative or systematic.
theory,

and status were not

A market version of social

it pictured no coherent power structure,

nor

consistent sources of structural pressure upon state
policy, but rather the dispersion of power among competing
groups.

Thus in the political market, pluralists presented

the state as a neutral and vulnerable arbiter which set
the rules of competition and which reflected as closely as

possible the balance of forces current at any moment in

.
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the interest group system.

Even the interests of
unorgan-

ized people- -ghetto blacks
or migrant workers—
were represented by responsible elected
leaders.
With fragmented
elites competing for the support
of diverse publics, a
representative and responsible rule
of circulating elites
democracy was assured.

—

Using a monopoly theory of power,
elite theorists
denied this pleasing picture, one
which was deeply

influ-

enced by corporate funding of behavioral
political studies.
Instead, critics pictured a crystallized,
interlocking,
coherent elite, occupying positions of
command in the major
institutions of society, representing their
own interests
consistently against the interests of a largely
unorganized,
subordinate public.
From this perspective, the elite

competition so central to the pluralist version
of democracy existed only at what C. Wright Mills
termed
the

"middle levels of power."

And, the elite monopoly of

political power, critics agreed, was representative and
responsible to the masses only by chance.

Thus the state,

from this perspective, was an instrument in the hands
of a

ruling elite which physically occupied key positions and
offices
There was some "give" by pluralists in the course of
this debate, but the debate itself reveals as much in the

way of shared assumptions among pluralists and elite
critics as it does in divergent opinions about American

.

22

democracy.

Basic among these shared
grounds,

would argue,
were the epistemological
assumptions of methodological
individualism.
Decisions, nondecisions,
recruitment of
personnel into the state and
political parties, campaign
I

contributions— all these individual
nodules of reality,
things in themselves, were piled
up by most elite critics
and searched for patterns 35
Yet, shared standards of
evidence and a non- relational view of
reality made it
possible for pluralists to undermine,
in a logical way,
some of the devastating and incriminating
patterns of
access to the state documented by elite
theorists.
.

Elite theory challenged the pluralist
assertion that
competing elites assured responsible,
representative government.

Their challenge was based on the thoroughly
docu-

mented, continuous, insular control of key
institutions by
coherent, interlocking elite.
However, 36
In raising this challenge, elite theorists
have
ignored the basic assumption of pluralism: that
control of government implies control of policy.
Having demonstrated elite control of government,
they have then been saddled with the impossible'
task of demonstrating that every social policy
serves the elite.
And this has been the main
point on which the pluralists have hung their
counter-critique

The pluralist counter-critique, of course, was then enabled
by assumptions it tacitly shared with elite theory to

caricature elite theory as conspiratorial and to correctly
criticize it as an overblown picture of the actual exercise
of power.

.
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What would an alternative
view of society have to
say
about this debate? Both Marxist
and hermeneutic analysis
would point out that class, as
social stratification, is
not simply a collection of
individual inequalities, but is

fundamentally a relation which is
itself internally connected
to other institutions and relations
of society.
A Marxist
would go on to say. that because
class is an unequal, contradictory relation, class has built
into it tension,

conflict,
and struggle, even when accommodated
to by subordinate members of the relation.
As such, it is an historical

phenomenon whose history is this struggle.

As a relation,

class does not exist outside this history.

Anticipating the discussions of chapter two,
this
view would enable us to articulate a theory
of state power
which accommodates elite theorists- documentation

of insti-

tutional command, pluralist critiques that elite
theorists

overestimate instrumental elite power, and the dynamic
quality of social antagonisms bound up with class-oriented
policy-making.

Mintz

et.

al.

capture especially well the

limits on elite power set by subordinate populations 37
:

Ruling class theory assumes an elite which is
unified by common economic interests and reinforced
by conflict with other classes.
As in elitism,
their power is by virtue of their positions, but
the role of the masses is quite different.
Rather
than an impotent public unable to influence policy,
the subordinate classes voice their interests
through their power to disrupt the major institutions of society by means of strikes, sit-ins, or
riots
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Instead of an elite which is
absolutely victorious on
every
issue in which it has a stake,
we have instead a class
which through its control of
major social institutes dominates-within the constraints imposed
by its

opposites-

state policy decisions.

Yet this picture of instrumental

control tempered by class structure
remains itself i„ need
of tempering through an appraisal
of other structural constraints upon the state and of the
simple, two-class model.
I will address these
issues as I examine Marxist James
0 Connor's work in chapter two.
The elite-pluralist debate, in due
time, succumbed
in the dead end into which it had
turned,

elite-pluralism largely intact.

leaving scientific

But we require a further

review of the mainstream's account of social
structure in
order to clarify its limitations, to note
the influence

upon it of PMC concerns, and to sharpen the
comparison

with O'Connor's alternative.

According to elite-pluralist theory, inequality exists
in the U.S.

but is not crystallized into coherent and

politically contending classes.
place through

a

OO
°

Instead, politics takes

melange of shifting interest group coali-

tions which express inequality yet cut across and mute

permanent class divisions.

This theory is compatible with,

and draws upon, behavioral sociological research which

describes inequality as a pyramid of occupations and
incomes, within which widespread social mobility helps

25

blur the class divisions that
might otherwise support
"extremist" politics.

Between 1950 and the late 1960's,
the mainstream also
tacitly relied on what seemed
to be the indefinitely expanding horizons of a fine-tuned
economy as a damper on "extrem
ism" from the lower orders of this
hierarchy-an expanding
pie even for those -with smaller slices.
In fact
the state,

it was

generally assumed, could and should rely
on economic
growth to provide revenue for redistributive
programs
aimed

at problem areas of the social hierarchy.

(The acute

problem of racial inequality which remained,

it was argued,

was not especially representative or revealing
about

inequality in general.

on

And sexual inequality was not in
itself a matter of scrutiny.) 40
It

is somewhat difficult,

coherent picture

ol

on the whole, to present a

mainstream views of inequality because

these views themselves were, are, often contradictory.

They are contradictory on the whole in that they attempt to

reconcile capitalism and democracy, as
argued.
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And,

C.

B.

MacPherson has

they are contradictory because they express

the contradictory position of the PMC in the class structure.

Thus on the one hand, according to the dominant

view, modern industrial society requires inequality.

On

the other, excesses of inequality are unfair, or at least

justifiably objects of the political process.

This tension

resolved itself in part through the mainstream's commitment

:
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to New Deal, and Initially
Great Society, social
programs,
and through ideological
overstatements of social mobility.
S. M. Lipset,
characteristically, articulates
these tensions 42
My own politics derive from
the belief that while
differences
the distribution of statue;
n„
and power (stratification) are
inLrenffn the
any C
X social system, such inequality
is
s unfair.
unlaid
And since I feel
though inevitable, is immoral I that inequality
support a?l measures
which would bring the utopian
"equality of status and
opportunity" closer to realization.
(his emphasis)

m

-j

’

.

°Tf

'

.

.

In

fact,

Lipset finds inequality to be highly
func-

tional for democracy if expressed
through the interest group
43
How? Because the interest group
system allows a
moderate amount of social conflict to surface. Seeking support from conflicting groups, political
elites compete for
office (the central trait of democracy,
according to scientific liberals), helping process the demands
of the interest group system (mediated inequality) into
state policy.
In this

rou t in izat ion of conflict" through groups,

parties, and the state, legitimacy is a result of two
basic
factors.

Directly, adherence by citizens to a value con-

sensus on political "rules of the game"

majority rule, etc.
power.

— legitimates

— minority

rights,

the exercise of public

Indirectly but equally important, legitimacy also

depends on the ability of political elites to process interest group demands into effective policy.
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Lipset

basic formulation is echoed
throughout the
mainstream, most obviously in the
"systems" approach to
politics which mainstream research
and texts have heavily
re led upon.
This schema represents inputs
into
the

political system as both interest
group demands and diffuse
public support for political leaders.
Diffuse public support derives from the democratic
value system
and a "feed-

back loop

of public opinion about
government output,

effectiveness.”
a

certain point.

i.e.

This basic formulation is plausible,
to
But it had crucial weaknesses in
its

treatment of values, which

I

shall deal with in the next

sub-section, and on the question of limits
to effectiveness.
Though systems theory explicitly addressed
the "links”
between the political system and its
social-economic environment, it had little sense of possible kinks
in these

connections, little sense of limits to effectiveness.
Instead,

formulated from

a

managerial perspective, and on

the assumption of continuous economic growth,

it

could not

even frame the question of a limited managerial capability.

The growth of political disaffection in the mid to
late 1960's, though, increasingly focused attention from
left and right on the limits to state effectiveness.
left,

The

influenced in part by the Marxist tradition, has

increasingly focused on the constraints imposed by capitalist economic and social relations.

The right, more self-

conscious about these relations but still accepting of

—
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them,

increasingly focused on forms of
democratic participation within which it included
the i nterest group system,
as constraints to state
effectiveness.
,

In ?he End of Lib e ralism and
its revised second edi-

tion, Theodore Lowi attempts to
come to terms with the
crisis of the welfare state from this

neo-conservative point

of view.

Explicitly accepting the capitalist
economy,

Lowi seeks a political order which can
deal effectively
with the deplorable social consequences
of the accumulation
process.
This effectiveness, he believes, is not
possible

within (what he agrees with the mainstream is)

a

pluralist

policy-making process.
Lowi accepts the welfare state principle in the
sense
that he does not think the economic market alone
can create

"human happiness."

The market is an engine only for the

creation of wealth, and so the state must be in the business
of applying administrative rationality to the problems

caused by the social irrationalities (or non-rationalities)
of the market.

The goal is not simply stability, but

a

stability based on the pursuit of a recognizable public
interest.

Taking the pluralist cosmology at face value,

Lowi argues that the interest group political market

integrated since FDR into the policy process--does not
automatically, or often, produce policies in the public
interest.

Rather,

it has produced an amorphous body of

administrative decisions which are the antithesis of
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coherent, implementable policy.

With government thus

unable to cope, social problems
grow worse while public
cynicism about authority and the
purpose of the welfare
state grows.
Like the mainstream, Lowi sees
legitimacy as a combination of values— democratic norms
of representation
which have been used to sanction interest
group influence
on public power— and of effectiveness.
The welfare state,
he believes, has tipped too far in the
direction of democracy.
He sees interest group participation in
bureaucratic

policy-making as an expansion of democratic forms
at the
expense of democratic purposes— effect ive public
policy in
the public interest.

His solution is to trade this inter-

est group democracy for:

1)

a

reliance on elections alone

as a democratic legitimating mechanism, and
2) a restruc-

tured policy process in which elected representatives

instead of bureaucrats will make law.

That is, the solu-

tion is to trade off ’'democracy" for effectiveness.
Lowi s work,
’

I

think, is in part an evolved statement

of the PMC concerns with planning, reform, and social

management which

I

explored earlier.

It

is important to

note that Lowi is critical of both subordinate and cor-

porate interest group activities that inhibit rational
policy planning.

And,

he embraces capitalism while at the

same time articulating the need for reforming and managing
its excesses.

Moreover, as one would expect, when faced

.
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with a choice between democracy
and effectiveness, or
democracy and planning, he
emphasizes effectiveness and

planning— in fact assumes that democracy

on the one hand,

and effectiveness and planning
on the other, are mutually
limiting in just the way he
describes.
Thus, like the
mainstream, he effectively articulates
a major contradiction of the capitalist state:
the need to maintain its

legitimacy through democratic forms
while insulating policy
makers from the demands of subordinate
populations (and
undisciplined corporate interests). His
focus on democracy
as the source of state ineffectiveness
has been increasingly
echoed in the Crisis of Democracy and other
neo-conservative
works

Blaming interest group democracy is an
insufficient

explanation for the state's legitimation dilemma,
for it
regards the restoration of effectiveness as simply
a matter
of will within prevailing economic relations.

Now, sub-

ordinate populations and particularistic corporate interests are in fact constraints on social planning.

The

claims of these interests themselves, though, represent

structural pressures on the state that are inherent in the
capitalist accumulation process, including the increasingly

interwoven and interdependent (social) nature of the
economy.

Neither the older mainstream nor its newer con-

servative critics grasp these and other pressures, their
sources, or how they might make legitimation problems an
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integral feature of the contemporary
American state.
In
chapter two I shall argue that
James O’Connor's The Fiscal
C risis of the State offers
a superior account of
these

pressures and their relation to
legitimation 47
.

Beliefs and values:

the soci al psychology of
legitimacy

In separating the scientific
liberal’s treatment,

and func

tion, of legitimation into social
structure and beliefs, I
am actually following an analytical
separation much more
congenial to their epistemology than
to mine.
I will suggest in this section, and in more
detail in chapter three,

why this separation is not tenable
as a starting point for
inquiry.
My appraisal of mainstream treatments
of beliefs
is thus a window onto, and partly a
repetition of, socialstructural issues.

Behavioral political science separates belief
from
action and studies them as two distinct, but
causally-

related realms:

attitudes which are external to behavior,

but linked in a causal chain of behavior--at t
itude--

behavior— etc.

Behavior is identifiable through analyti-

cally constructed definitions which isolate and describe
the physical operations involved in behavior.

Operational

definitions comprise the verifiable hypotheses that relate
types of behavior and attitudes and behavior.

Tested

against an existent real world of behavior, these hypotheses will eventually yield predictive laws of behavior.
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Within this scientific
framework, embodying an
immanent
relation between predictin
and managing

g

behavior, we can

discern the mainstream’s
treatment and function of
legitimation in two basic areas:
studies of the value consensus
and of electoral opinion and
behavior.
A long series of monographs,
articles,

and books at

the beginning of the behavioral
revolution documented the
"unreality" of the classical democratic
theory's view of
the citizen.
According to these studies, classical
demo-

cratic theory erred in expecting,
assuming, uniformly high
levels of citizen interest and
participation
in politics,

and beliefs in democratic values.

Instead, the behavioral-

ists found dangerous levels of
undemocratic beliefs among
lower social-economic strata.
Luckily, even though such
people were represented by responsible
elites, they were
by and large apathetic about the
political process and so
were unlikely to provide support for undemocratic
(fascist,

communist) movements.

These studies quickly ascertained

that classical theory's democratic consensus
existed if at
all at an abstract level, consisting of beliefs
in majority

rule, minority rights,

free elections, and the like.

When

pressed in hypothetical but concrete situations, though,
many people abandoned these beliefs.

Luckily, as it turned

out, political elites adhered much more consistently to

democratic values, acting as a reservoir for renewal of
these values and forming a vast potential group (in David
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Truman's phrase) which would
mobilize around any threats to
rules of the game.^^
Further work in the "political culture"
tradition refined the notion of consensus
developed by early behavioralists.
Almond and Verba’ s T he Civic Culture
is outstanding
this genre not only for its conclusions
but

m

also for its

role as model for future studies.
study,

As a cross-cultural

it compared the fit between political
belief and

political stability in five "western democracies."

Its

goal was not only a deeper understanding of
these societies,
but a model "for the transfer of the political
culture of

Western democratic states to the emerging nations.
In its ideal form,

the civic culture (as this model

was entitled) is a mix of neo-Weberian authority
models

embodied in three particular sub-cultures.

The participant

sub-culture corresponds to Weber's rational-legal, the
subject sub-culture to his charismatic, and the parochial
to his traditional model of authority.

The participant

sub-culture is an approximation of an acted-upon democratic
consensus.

Almond and Verba find that an appropriate mix

of these sub-cultures provides a balance of citizen input,

generalized support for political leaders, and acquiescence.
In other words,

it provides a sufficient amount of legiti-

macy while leaving political elites sufficient room to

maneuver without constant pressure from citizens.

In this

formulation, the civic culture also expresses quite well
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the contradiction of the
capitalist state:

the need to

maintain its legitimacy through
democratic forms while
insulating itself from actual
democratic pressures from
subordinate populations.
The social psychological approach
sought to establish
verifiable relationships between
attitudes to authority
and political stability, with an
eye to predicting political
behavior.
A great deal of effort in
this direction went
into the study of electoral behavior.
This effort expressed
aspirations among corporate and managerial
classes
to re-

strict popular influence on the state
to the periodic election of elites, and the indirect access
of the interest
group system.
This effort was itself part of a broader
one,

in the immediate post-war era,

to purge social institu-

tions (especially trade unions) of left and
popular influence.

Thus the Ford Foundation, a key force in the

behavioral revolution, placed high priority on the development and dissemination of a notion of democracy limited
to

periodic election of elites, and on survey techniques as
potential indices of popular discontent and building social
movements. 50

Armed with such predictive power as the

scientific liberals claimed to offer, corporate planners
hoped to be in an advantageous position to manage or

manipulate public opinion and social movements.
The scientific liberals, though, proved largely

unable to anticipate the legitimation problems of the

.
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Why?

s.

First,

I

have argued that an
insufficient

and tacit analysis of social
structure hindered their
clarification of structural limits
to state effectiveness.
and thus of basic causes of
lessened "diffuse support" for
the state.
With structural relations
downplayed, scien-

tific liberals also largely missed
important sources of
pressure from economy and state on
belief systems themselves, pressures I shall further
detail in chapter three.
Thus when legitimation problems arose,
they appeared to
scientific liberals as "simply" a crisis
of belief described
in various ways:
the result of a confluence of relatively
unconnected problems confronting the state
(the bulk of
electoral opinion analyses), and/or the result
of democratic
ideology hindering state effectiveness (Lowi),
and/or a

profound disregard for basic social values including
but
extending beyond democratic rules of the game (the

"demo-

cratic distemper" and "uncivilized youth" of other neo-

conservative analyses).
Second, the direct treatment of the value consensus
in studies like Almond and Verba' s,

and its indirect assump-

tion in public opinion studies, suffered important weaknesses.

These can be summarized as:

as external to activity,

by treating beliefs

scientific liberals could then

picture the consensus as a pyramid of belief transmitted
downward from elites to masses.
summary

51

Let me unpack this
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Survey analysis as a scientific
tool demands the
uniform posing of large numbers
of set questions to
large
numbers of respondents.
It is a highly limited
tool of
analysis, for when these
questions are posed, people
tend
to respond (and this is
the correct word) within
the framework of dominant beliefs
(hegemonic ideology) diffused
in
the culture.
This methodology is therefore
insensitive, in
a way that indepth, trust-based,
dialogue interviews are
not, to respondents' self
interpretations of their situations; it does not call them up.
This methodology is therefore also insensitive to the deep
sources of differentiation
(by class, gender, race, etc.)
among these self interpretations in the life worlds of those being
interviewed.
Its

individualist orientation also obscures the
truly social
and intersubject ive nature of these
beliefs,

the fabric of

culture they form.

These interpretations, of course,

inevitably percolate into survey responses, but
only their
surface is usually recorded.
In missing these
self

interpretations, scientific survey analysis slights the
crucial expressive dimension and depth of everyday
experience, a dimension comprising purposes and aspirations
that

are partly constitutive (not causal) of social activity as
such.

Precisely because norms do allow of reasoned dis-

course, or dialogue, the survey method of recording them
as brute data does not suffice for their analysis or

clarification.

Finally, "pyramid" consensus studies
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Pictured the values of modern
industrial society, as
whole, as essentially
non-contradictory

a

or not in tension:

accumulation and affluence,
achievement, social mobility,
individual privacy, stable and
private family iif e and
so on.
One might conclude, with Harry
,

Braverman, that such

surveys tend to measure the
social consciousness, not
of
the respondents, but of the
social scientist.
Survey analyses compare unfavorably
to the sensitive
work of Sennett and Cobb in The
Hidden Injuries of Cl agc
a study of the

emotional and social burdens for
working

class persons of an ethos emphasizing
individual responsibility and social mobility through
education.
Interpreting
and acting within the social world
partly through
the lens

of dominant values,

these persons must nevertheless con-

sistently maintain an important substratum
of working class
interpretation at odds with dominant values.
Thus,

for

example, it somehow both is and is not a
manual worker's
fault

(m

his mind) that he never gained the education

which seems so necessary for economic security
and social
esteem.

Self-esteem, in fact, is always precarious in

this setting, a consistent victim of this bind.

Denied

security and esteem by an incompletely-acknowledged class
system, working class parents may succeed in propelling one
or more children a short distance up the social ladder,

only to reap painful rejections, separations, and strains

between family, child, and community.

.
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Illustrations from congenial
analyses could be multiplied; and what Sennett and
Cobb make clear for
aspects of
working class culture, others
have done for women
and non-

whites of various classes.

One of the crucial points
about

comparing Sennett and Cobb's
work to that of the
mainstream,
though, is to bring out the
tacit elite identification
which
shapes mainstream research,
desensitizing it to the life-

worlds of subordinate populations.

The scientific survey

stance is desensitized in part
because it is rigidly managerial, allowing no interchange
between respondent and
analyst to shape the questioning and
the categories of
interpretation.
Its point is in fact to avoid
this mutual
influence in favor of an attempt to
predict behavior under
certain conditions.
The irony of course is that this
mana
gerial stance would itself have to be
transcended in order
for an accurate appraisal of beliefs and
activity
to take

place

Conclusion
On its own terms, the scientific liberal mainstream

failed as a predictive science to anticipate, and then
to
fully grasp, the legitimation problems of the state after
the mid 1960's.

Why?

Self-identified as elites, having painted

a

picture

of the just and stable society, and epistemologically

unequipped to deal with either the logic of moral issues

39

or the interconnected
structures of the political
economy
the mainstream was
ill-positioned to anticipate
and conceptualize the growing problems
of the welfare
state.

it

suffered, as John Schaar
put it from a perspective
somewhat
different from mine, from the
blindness of the eye perceiving itself.
Treating legitimacy as a
matter of mere belief
about authority, this
mainstream could record but
not
clearly conceptualize the
expressive depth of a crisis
in
socially constituted standards
of right.
And by embraclng
welfare state capitalism as tacit
background, this mainstream could not be fully aware
of developing structural
pressures either on the state, or
on the cultural beliefs
which help ground political
authority.
In the next two chapters

to legitimacy which improve,

I

shall examine approaches

respectively, on the social-

structural and ideational weaknesses
of scientific liberalism.
Chapter two appraises Marxist James
O'Connor's
theory

of structural pressures from the
economy upon state effectiveness, and thus upon legitimacy.
Chapter three appraises
a hermeneutic approach to culture,

and the connections such

an approach helps us make between social
meaning,

identity, and social authority.

social

In each of these chapters,

the social role of the PMC figures importantly
in my

appraisal.

Also key among the concepts

I

bring to legiti-

mation theory, in chapter three, are explicit treatments of
gender, patriarchy, and nationalism.

In chapters four and
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then apply the general
framework established
through
the first three chapters
to an analysis of race
and legitimation, focusing on the
sexual aspect of race.
I explore
the intimate connections
of sexual/racial social
identity
to the motivations which
help sustain capitalist
work life
and patriarchy, to the meaning
of racial segregation,
and
thus to a range of purposes
and social "right" which
state
legitimacy has traditionally rested
upon.
I

.
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CHAPTER
MARXISM AND LEGITIMACY:

II
JAMES O'CONNOR’S

FISCAL CRISIS THEORY
ng ° bsessed b y Property.
The
truth 15 the other way around.
It is the societv
Y
and the culture which is so
obsessed.
Yet to an
S ° bses ® ion al ways seems
to be the
nature'off ^h
th gS and so is not recognized
for
what

^

it

John Berger 1

Until the late 19th century, the relation
of private
property to the state was one of the
central questions of
social theory, directly addressed and
dealt with.
Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau, and Hegel all found the
question of property central to their discussions of the
state.
This

relation was a central question for social theory
because
liberal society, and emerging capitalism itself,
put the

matter on the agenda— made it clear that questions of participation in the state and of social identity could not
be fully addressed without addressing class relations.

Marx was in a way a culmination of these inherited treatments.

However, he helped render the forthright treatment

of class quite untouchable for liberal thought;

liberal

theory and social science since that time form, to

a

con-

siderable degree, an unacknowledged debate with his work.
45

.

,

46

The disappearance of the
question of property from
the agenda of liberal social
studies also required the
abstraction of social studies into
different disciplines,
in which the unity of a
perspective offered by a notion
such as class is fractured and
redistributed, in market
fashion and with market content,
to various
fields.

Its

disappearance from modern social science
does not mean,
however, that modern society has
made property superfluous,
but rather that by its very nature
(as
PMC activity, in

part) modern social science cannot
clearly focus on the
matter
The conclusion of modern social science,
that a
diverse, technocratic elite has assumed
control of the

reins of major institutions and thereby
obviated the his-

torical antagonisms between propertied and
unpropert ied
is in fact an age-old liberal vision.

The appearance of

this conclusion in the realm of academic and
political dis-

course is a sign that the liberal vision has come full
circle and is in danger of exhausting its meaning.
in effect,

yet,

played its trump card.

It

has,

Liberal society has not

however, exhausted its power, for its power is in part

rooted in the antagonisms of class which have been dis-

placed through social life.

One of the arenas of this

displacement has clearly been the state, and this chapter
will focus on a theory which seeks to explain this dis-

placement and its effect upon legitimacy.

.
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James O'Connor's account
of state fiscal crisis
moves
significantly beyond liberal
legitimation theories by
clarifying the extent to which
the state is structurally
captive of capital's accumulation
needs 2 Properly amended,
his analysis pushes us to
realize the constraints on
"new"
market-incentive policies, and on
institutional change confined to the state, in resolving
the state's legitimacy
.

problems
O’Connor argues that the increasingly
interwoven and
interdependent nature of our capitalist
economy has required the state to finance an array
of capital's collective
productive and social control needs.
That is, to
a con-

siderable degree, the parameters of
state spending are not
simply a matter of political choice,
but rather of necessity
--a necessity beyond the conventional
appreciation
of the

level and categories of spending mandated
by public law.
No constitutional amendment or "sunset"
clause in any legislation could appreciably offset this trend.
But as O'Connor points out,

in responding to these

pressures to aid private accumulation the state must
present its actions as those of an independent

tution operating for the general welfare.

,

public insti-

This it can

generally do as long as the economy performs well.
in expanding,

However,

the economy requires increasing state spending

(reflecting growing interdependence) to support collective
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productive needs and to
control the surplus
populations
shed by capitalist
development.
And, the increase
in this
spending has been exacerbated
by an entrenched
network of

particularistic corporate
interests and by the
decentralized, overlapping, and
uncoordinated branches and
levels of

the U.S.

state.

One major result, as
predicted by
O'Connor, has been the
politicization of the budget
around
tax revolts and around
elite attacks on the state's
"social
wage." O'Connor sees the
unplanned nature of this accumulating spending as a major
cause of the stagflation
which
Plagues the economy, a situation
threatening the state's
legitimacy in two ways:
by undermining its claim
to economic management, and by
contributing to a general fiscal
politicization which menaces the
state's appearance as an
independent, public institution.

think that O'Connor makes a basic
contribution to
legitimation theory, one that moves
us beyond the scientific liberals' conception of state
power and effectiveness.
Scientific liberal theory pictures the
state as a neutral
arbiter not "captured” by any particular
set of interests,
whose effectiveness through social programs
is essentially
I

a

matter of will.

But O'Connor persuasively argues that

the state is not, cannot be, neutral,
that it is in fact

structurally captive of the needs of an economy
dominated
by a particular form of property, monopoly
capital.

It

overall, the growing socialization of the economy which

is,
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renders the state, as

social institution, the
li kel y
Place to locate various
collective needs of capital
and
labor.
this sense, contrary to
Lowi the problems
caused
by interest groups
are not onl* a failure
of an ideology
of participation;
contemporary interest groups
themselves
are an expression (but
not only this) of the
structural
process of socialization.
With this basic insight,
O’Connor
helps us formulate how a
state captive of this
structural
dynamic may, in the very
process of responding to the
uncoordinated demands generated
by the dynamic, actually
help undermine its own
long-term effectiveness, the
longterm performance of the economy,
and thus legitimacy itself.
Yet amendments to O’Connor’s
account are crucial.
He
actually understates, in my opinion,
the constraints on
the state as an economic manager.
This shortcoming is
related to his perhaps unwitting
embrace of what I call
the liberal problematic of public
power, a problematic
tfi.

m

,

which both expresses and shapes his
inadequate account of
the class structure.
By assuming and even embroidering
this perspective, he glosses over the
crucial question of
whether a crisis of the state, even as he
explains it,
will necessarily be a crisis of capitalist
relations.

Finally, he underestimates other cultural
constraints on
the state through an external view of ideology
similar to
that which handicaps behavioral theories in
explaining

crises of belief.

He thus suffers nearly the mirror image
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of their problem:

unable to grasp the
experience people
have of structural change,
behavioral theories failed
to
p redict the legitimation crisis,
while 0 Connor encounters
problems explaining the persistence
of the social order in
the face of the crisis.

L

Summary of O'Connor's Position

O'Connor sees his theory as "rooted
in the basic economic and political facts of late
capitalist
." 3

society
He describes late capitalism as
a three-sector economy,
divided into monopoly, competitive,
and state areas.
Each
sector organizes the production of
specific types of goods
or services, and each displays
characteristic capital to
labor ratios, productivity rates, labor
force compositions,
and methods of wage-price determination.
In the last analysis, the interrelationships between
these three sectors

depends on their relative economic strengths.

Within the private economy, monopoly capital is
the
superior productive force.
It is "the engine of capitalist

accumulation and growth ." 4

monopoly

s

This dynamism springs from

capacity for technological innovation

a kility to plan,

,

from its

from the position it is in with respect

to administering market prices,

symbiosis with the state.

and from its developing

The capacity for technological

innovation, as well as other important consequences, is

"

:

.
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given free expression
by a class compromise
between m onopol y
management and labor unions: 5
have agreed that^orkers 1 ^!!!"^ 0

^^^

*" dustries

c °st Of living,
even
the P
price
ice of
ot Ionalong-run ?
technological unemplo yme nt

The heart of O’Connor's
theory concerns a developing
relationship between monopoly
capital and the state.
While
it is possible to
describe this in terms of
structural
imperatives, O’Connor in fact
emphasizes the role of the
state as an arena of transferred
private power relation6
ships
r

uctget as
bu2eris

e
ditUreS and programs and the
whoi
a whole
are explicable

only in terms nf
power relationships within
the private economy.
In O'Connor's view the
state reflects the distribution
of
private power, and since the
private sector is dominated
by monopoly capital and
monopoly labor as interests, their
interests are widely realized in
the state.
The result is
this:
"the growth of the monopoly and
state sectors is a
7
single process
.

In the theory of monopoly
capitalism,

the stability

of the class structure is threatened
by the very success
of capitalism itself. 8 Monopoly's

tremendous productive

capacity is the problem.

exchange results in
on the one hand,

a

Uncoordinated production for

general tendency to overproduction

and to underconsumption on the other.

52

Having solved in its own
way the historical
problen, o,
producing enough tor society,
the monopoly donated
system
1S fa ° ed Wlth thS
Pr ° blem of sel li"S and
distributing what
it produces.
Despite their monopoly
powers, monopoly
industries do not systematically
control exchange and cannot
insure that what they
produce will be bought. Without
assured markets, production
is cut back and productive
capacity is underutilized.
Underutilized capacity means
that fewer workers than
possible will work, aggravating
the
already existing tendency to
technological unemployment.
The result is a potential
spiral of falling aggregate
demand
or consumption within the
economy, and an ever present
tendency to stagnation.
The solution in Keynesian economics
to the problem of
aggregate demand is an ensured market
or consumer and an
overall coordinator of savings and
investment.
What private
consumers will not buy, spend or invest
in, the state
through its taxing power assures will
be spent and bought
and invested in.
Public expenditures through the state,
the tax structure, and the monetary
supply all play a major
role in maintaining economic stability and
growth.

O'Connor agrees that the state in late capitalism
has tried to play this role, but holds that
the manner in

which it has done so has ultimately been
self-defeating.
Thus while it is true that "whether the growth of
productive capacity runs ahead or behind the growth of demand
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thus depends on the
composition of the state
budget," the
fact is that the growth
of the state's role
is "a contradictory process which
creates tendencies toward
economic,
social, and political
9
."
crises

O'Connor approaches the
state budget with categories
which define state activity
within the economy.
Prom the
Marxist point of view, the
production process of capitalism
creates a certain amount of
wealth (value) above and
beyond
that required to maintain
(reproduce) conditions
for the

existing level of output.

This surplus can either be
con-

sumed on luxuries, saved, or
plowed back into expanded production through the purchase of
additional machines, labor,
and raw material (corresponding
roughly to constant and
variable capital, and raw material).
The state, however, taxes this
surplus, and then
reallocates or distributes through
its budget the portion
of the surplus it has appropriated.
O’Connor proposes
through his budget categories to show
how this state spend
mg is shaped by, and contributes to, the maintenance
and

expansion of capitalist production.
The basic categories which he develops
are those of

social capital and social expenses 10
.

The first category

includes public investments in physical and
human capital
which indirectly lower the unit costs of
production for

private business and make expanded production
possible.
It

also includes expenditures which represent a
collective
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wage and thus appear in
hls
as fowling or
contalning
the wages and benefits
which private firms make
Soclal
expenses as a budget category
represent additional necessary, but basically
unproductive, costs which are
external
to the calculations of
private firms. We shall
treat this
category first.
.

O'Connor argues that from the
point of view of
tal, social expenses are
those which do not directly
indirectly contribute to
profitability but which are
required to maintain existing
and future patterns of
mulation.
These are most obviously expenses

capior

still

accu-

of social con-

and little else.

Welfare and warfare expenditures,

broadly considered, are social
expenses of production.
And, each is related to both
the stagnation and expansionary tendencies of monopoly
capital.
How is this so?

Warfare expenditures help mop up
unemployment among
the underclass while protecting
the foreign interests
which monopoly capital creates in
its drive
for cheap

labor and expanded markets.

Military expenditures repre-

sent wages and goods bought, and thus
contribute to aggregate demand.
They represent a portion of the private

surplus taxed by the government which is
spent on necessary
things, but which might not otherwise be
bought; the result

is to help demand keep up with productive
capacity.

Welfare expenditures share this double function, helping to maintain aggregate demand while stabilizing
its

L

^
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recipients above the threshold
of disruptive political
activity.
A cost of domestic
stability and an offsetter
of stagnation the
welfare budget buys the
peace which is
a precondition for
overseas expansion; they
allow efforts
to be focused abroad
and in defense of empire
rather than
on domestic unrest
,

1
1
rplUS Population foreign
marxets
markets must
must°he
“a and
be "e
expanded
controlled anrt °
expand and control foreign markPt
,
7
sur Plus
population must be controlled
Tf f
are not expanded anS°co«^??;
economic growth forces cutbacksd "eceJIiSi”"
in outlays on the

T

i^no^control led"

^ -rp^opuLtion

CllU " d

Political disorder
forces tne state to turn inward
and slow down
e
DUrlng th ® 196 °’ s these dialectifai tendenc?'
aPPeared t0 bS QUite Stron
«
in

^ Wted Ss

-

Seeing warfare/welfare expenditures
as internally
related, O'Connor offers a counter
explanation for the guns
and butter politics which Lyndon
Johnson practiced in the
mid-1960 s
Racial and civil rights unrest had
to be dealt
with in order to allow the intervention
in Indochina to
proceed.
And the intervention in Indochina
not only was a
direct defense of empire, but also
performed admirably in
heating up the economy to the point where
unemployment fell
'

.

to record lows.

The effort by LBJ to justify his policies

with rhetoric about "freedom” here and
abroad may have been
a genuinely felt interpretation on
his part, but
it

is

insufficient to explain the role and effect of such
policies
within a capitalist social structure and economy.
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Welfare and warfare
expenditures are therefore
necessary expenses of the
capitalist system,
They maintain a
relative surplus population
through income supplements
and
Military employment, and
an absolute surplus
population
through relief payments.
The relative and absolute
surplus
populations consist mainly of
competitive sector workers
and their dependents who
are, respectively,
permanently
underemployed and unemployed.
Where do these populations
derive from?
They derive from a combination
of class, sexual, and
racial patterns of labor allocation.
Because of its technological competence and high rate
of productivity,

monopoly capital employs only
one-third of the labor force
even while it far and away outstrips
the market sector in
the wealth it produces.
Slowly increasing
or even stagnat

ing employment levels in the
monopoly sector mean that two.
thirds of the labor force "must be
absorbed in part or in
whole by the state and competitive
sectors ." 12

This displacement falls most heavily
upon third-world,
and female, job seekers, and is associated
with skill/

education "deficiencies."

A large reserve army of the

unemployed affects only competitive sector wages,
because
this is the only sector of the economy where
wages
are

fixed according to market criteria of supply and
demand.

The result is an ever-present downward pressure on wages
there,

and a concentration of the less-skilled, those born
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into lower socio-economic
families, and third-world
and
female workers among whom
the problems of
unemployment
and underemployment are
endemic.
Th is population

accord^

expands,

<^C°nnor.

Moreover, its poverty
increases as state and
monopoly-fed inflation increases
both the costs of living
and the standard or
necessities of living 13
.

.

State employment therefore
also expands as the state
services this population:
"These workers depend more
and
more upon the state to meet
their needs and supplement
their incomes ." 14
I„ short,
stagnation-through-expansion
directly increases state outlays
on its own labor force and
on assistance, by multiplying
the persons with reasons for
state subsidies.

According to O’Connor, the state
exists not only as
an expense of production.
It also promotes expanded
production (which in turn increases the
need for
social

expense outlays) by investing in the
infrastructure required
by monopoly capital, and by
underwriting a portion
of the

wage bill.

These are, respectively, social capital
invest-

ment and the social consumption of
capital.

They are made

necessary by the increasingly social character
of capitalist production.

The expansion of the economy creates and

feeds off the increasingly interdependent and
intercon-

nected nature of social life.

How?
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our society,

fewer and fewer goods
and services
are produced and
consumed by the same
individual or produced and consumed within
a tiny local co^unity.
More
and more of the utilities
of life are produced,
,

not for

immediate use and consumption
by those who produce
them,
but for exchange within
geographically-expanded markets.
As this happens, and
for it to happen, more
and more investment costs in capital and
labor take on the character
of

collective goods:

goods which any one productive
unit may
use, but which it would
be irrational for any
one unit to
assume the costs of alone 15
:

Instead of private capital
plowing back a portion
1
Va ue * nto ex Panded
reproduction (net
capital
^
ir a Particular
corporation or
industry
austry the state plows
\
back that part of the
Value that
appropriated inS
expanded
expanded^!*?
,
social reproduction
(new social ccanitai
*Pital
formation) in industry as a whole.

^
,

“

Social capital investment includes
spending on highway con
struction and other transportation
facilities, urban renewal projects, and similar
physical construction; it

includes as well 16
:

teaching

administrative, and other services at
system and scientific
Lh RR &J iD services education
and
both inside and outside of the
education establishment.
G e S ° f the

In physical investment,

out as the best example.

the highway trust fund stands

Paid for by taxes, this socialized

infrastructure investment indirectly lowers costs
of production by decreasing the costs (and time) of
circulating

.
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goods, by increasing
the radius of territory
(land and
labor supply) which
capital may avail itself
of i„ expanded
Production, and by providing
incentives for automobile

consumption
Investment in what O'Connor
calls human capital is
especially important in the
e area
area of
nf toot,
technological research
and development.
In this respect
espect
for rvrv,
tor
0 Connor, monopoly
capital and the state
constitute an important
17
i

,

unity:

d
ermlne scientlfi <= and
technical
progress°andd ?n
ln reases ln productivity?
The
?
growth of
of social capital and the
state

sector.

And this is because:"^

S

both market expansion and
growth of productivity/
6
(
tne advancement of science
the
and technology and
r exploitation by
monopoly capital.

^

Social consumption expenditure
is the socialization
of monopoly capital's wage
bill, representing"^

goods and services consumed
collectively by the
working class and social insurance
against
1 eco
ecog
nomic insecurity.
Late capitalism requires social
consumption investment
because it has invaded, destroyed, and
rendered impractical
most of the non-commodified,
independent provision of food,
housing, waste disposal, culture and
recreation, and oldage care formerly to be found in the
interior of rural and
working class life. These were only possible
within a

network of community and family ties which
the development
of the commodity form has sundered and
atomized into

f
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individualized consumer units.
Although suoh serylces
have existed in rudimentary
form for a long time,
according
to 0 Connor they were
expanded especially after
the second
world war largely as a
result of the suburbanization
process and through a
political combination of
monopoly
capital and monopoly labor.
For instance, i„ this
latter
case, increases in OASI
coverage were due in large
part to
20
this process:
’

t0 nogotlate a Pension
plan with
the Big^Three That
retlred
workers
a
maximum of S100
-luo monthly.
monthlv^The
The companies were comnp i 1oH t
1 f ® rence between
y t;
OASI benefits
and the $loo
rhi s
tor the
86 *
° ASI ben «fits-which
,

jerporaSoL^^Lr^Irlu^^s^pTrr^
^
Co^ss

“ass^

Many of the laws which require
social consumption expenditure at the federal level are
written to favor betterplaced monopoly sector labor.
However, the provision of
social consumption in general is
a haphazard process at
best, because of the unplanned and
uncoordinated nature by
which it is undertaken,
A proliferation of overlapping
political jurisdictions, many with their
own fiscal base,
piles up expenditures and taxes
incrementally.
The upshot of the growing socialization
of invest-

ments and expenses is not only that "the
growth of the
state is both a cause and effect of the
expansion of

monopoly capital,"

pi

but more fundamentally that the

unplanned nature of the growth, and the continuing
private

.

.
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appropriation of most of the
surplus, result in a
built _ in
gap between revenues and
expenditures. There is a
"tendency for state expenditures
to increase more
rapidly than
the means of financing
22
23
them."
i

n short,

expense^is^^ighly^rrationai*

8^

“d

S ° Cial
*

16

f iscai
1

accumulation"^

Profitable private"

The structural gap between
revenues and expenditures
emerges as a crisis when the
economy slows down.
And
according to O'Connor, one major
source of the contraction
of the economy could be
exactly the same expenditures
which
P ovide an indirect basis for
monopoly growth. Why?
In his terms, it would be
because the growth of the
state budget at all levels has
been so unplanned that the
proper proportion between demand
and productive outlays
could not be maintained.
The state would thus be implicated
in the series of post-war
recessions.
And, one of these—
post 1970 stagflation" has been
the immediate cause of
the re-interpretation of the fiscal
gap into the fiscal
crisis
Here,

then,

is a summary of the fiscal crisis
from

the point of view of O'Connor’s theory:
1*

growing social nature of production and
the ultimate fiscal dependence of the state
upon private interests ground the interpenetration of the state and monopoly sector
Tlie

interests

.
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State
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Whether this transparency occurs
or not
the
he Stat
iS * threat to the monopoly
capital°Ld
P
monopol? y labor entente a lynchpin
of hnth
ol
both it
labor peace and the monopoly-state
relationship.
The entente permits the socialia
of production costs.
Stagnation threatens
h l°“
this
peace, requiring it to be shored up
or
entirely reconstituted.
,

8
*

^constitution seems to O'Connor the only hope.
But efforts

toward the creation of a "socialindustrial complex" will run into roadblocks
ot key interests, probably worsening
the political crisis and further exposing the
monopoly
capital-state relationship.
State employees
who service surplus populations are potential
radical actors in this situation, who nonetheless
ack a coherent interpretive framework in
which
to place their activity.

.

’
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The fiscal crisis, then,
involves a series of
possible outcomes politically,
A tax revolt, f irst
of all
against rising state
expenditures could be aimed
either at
programs serving the surplus
populations, or, given increasingly transparent power
relations, at monopoly
capital
State workers, accustomed
to measuring their
activity and
worth against human need
and not efficiency ratios,
might
come to a clearer understanding
of their role in the
system and become a radical
force for transforming it.
And
monopoly capital, seeking to
preserve its peace with
monopoly labor, might engage
in a rationalization of
portions of the state budget.
The most progressive form
of
this rationalization would
entail what O'Connor calls the
"social-industrial complex." This would
involve "adjusting
budgetary priorities to favor the
monopoly sector.
In
turn, this requires centralized
administrative control and

budgetary planning ." 24

Monopoly capital, then, would

become increasingly involved in current
social expenditures
such as education, mass transit, job
training,
etc.

Such

reform, however, will run up against
the constellations of
interests who have entrenched, particular
stakes in the

budget
I

want to leave aside for the moment a discussion
of

the political scenarios flowing from
O'Connor's theory,

returning to it only after we have clarified the
parts of
his analysis central to such a political discussion.

This

.

.

64

requires first a g ener al
review of hls notion of
fegitimatron, and secondly a
more extended look at his
overall
analysis
As far as a crisis of
legitimation goes, O'Connor's
analysis rests on the
assumption that the growing
interpenetration of monopoly capital
and the state will lead
to
the transparency of .class
power relations, with the
medium
of this transparency being
the politicized budget.
The

politicized budget can play this
role because legitimation,
in his theory, is tied to
material factors strictly
con-

ceived
The citizen, understanding
himself to be such,
relates to the state through taxes,
and through the material
advantages s/he expects from the
state in return; and the
citizen relates this way as a member
of a class-structured
group.
Portions of the state budget thus
represent prizes
to different sectors of the
population.
Monopoly capital
is the big winner; its dominant
position in the private
sphere enables it to benefit from practically
all budget
categories one way or another. Upper income,
monopoly

sector workers receive substantial social
consumption benefits.

State workers have their jobs.

is still important at the local level.

Competitive capital
And,

the booby

prizes go to the surplus populations, whose growth
is

generated by state-fed monopoly expansion.

.
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One way or another, the
budget is
in" to the system major
sections

a

means of 'locking-

of the population,
by

class,

through material rewards
which reflect their political strength.
The state thus helps to
stabilize or reproduce the class structure.

These material benefits serve
to lock in various
portions of the population.
Yet the pre-eminent position
of monopoly capital in this
arrangement is a problem for
the legitimacy of the state.
This problem is solved by
lies, obfuscation, distortion,
and secrecy about the actual
content and effect of the budget.
On O'Connor's view, this
mysti^ation of power relations will prove
less and less
effective as the state loses its
ability to lock
the rest

of the population into place
through its budget.

And this

inability will stem from the effect,
indirectly, which the
state budget itself has upon the social
structure through
the monopoly sector.
As growth falters due to the accumulation of state expenditures, the growing
politicization
of

the budget around tax, retrenchment, and
social-industrial

issues will limit the ability of the state
to explain its
relation to monopoly capital and to rectify the
problem of

stagnation
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II-

Appraisal

O Connor s theory
helps us to formulate
how the American
state, structurally
captive of the growing
socialization of
the economy, may in
the process of responding
to the un-

coordinated demands generated
by that dynamic actually
help
undermine its own long-term
effectiveness, the long-term
performance of the pcnnAmu
economy, andj hence state
legitimacy.
He
helps us focus in the
forefront of legitimation
theory the
structural relations and
dynamics which scientific
1

liberal
for social and epistemological
reasons, has difficulty in grasping.
Yet there are first of all,

theory,

I would
argue, some significant
problems internal to his account
of
the economic-managerial
role of the state.
In raising and

discussing these, briefly,

I

will be moving, in the next

two subsections, to a critique
from outside his theory.
I think that
O'Connor too readily accepts the
Keynesian view that the state can
act as regulator of the
economy.
The reader comes away from
O'Connor's book with
the strong impression that,
despite the contradictions
inherent in the monopoly-state relationship,
state budgets
are in the long run basically
positive for capitalism--the

prime source of growth and recovery.

State spending,

O'Connor argues, is the prime determinant
of investment
and consumption patterns in the economy,
and the driving

:
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force behind capital's
post-war expansion.
In contrast> :
would argue that the
growth of social spending
in a capitalist economy represents
a bigger contradiction
than O'Connor
recognizes.
In the first place,
the spending categories
he
outlines are neither clearly
investment, consumption,
nor
expense

Because of the social
character nf
expense.

1

+

consum Ption, and part social

Their es sential ambiguity
from this point of view
is
a problem for
understanding and controlling
their impact.
This as not to say, of
course, that the state budget
has
no impact,

it clearly has an immense
one.

But being able
to predict it, or being
able to rationalize the state
budget
for a new growth or recovery
policy-in the terms O'Connor
outlines is another matter.

—

O'Connor’s argument that certain
expenditures are
i ndirectly productive
is also therefore
at issue.

It

is

certainly plausible that certain
state expenditures are
indirectly productive because they
contain or lower unit
labor costs, or because they provide
investments which
capital as a whole requires.
Education and transportation
are the two most obvious examples.
Yet if it is true that much of
indirectly productive

expenditure is required because the increasingly
complex,
intertwined, and science-dependent nature of
capitalist
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production requires mo re
expenditure on coliective
(and
minimally risky) goods, it
is also true that
the need for
these collective goods
does not obviate the
need for all
the other investments
which private capital
traditionally
makes.

In this case, what we
might say is that the
state

Plays a necessary role in
investment, and that to the
extent it does it increasingly
functions as a basis for
monopoly growth.
This capital deepening,
so to speak, seems to be
unavoidable. However, it is
possible for the state to play
an increasingly important
role in this respect, and
at the
same time for this deepening
to express a negative trend
in the economy as a whole.
For, at the same time that
state
investment has been growing (post
WW II) as a percentage
26
of GNP
and as a percentage of total
investment 27 the
rate of growth of the GNP as well
as the rate of profit
have shown a steady, secular decline 28
,

.

Finally, by focusing so heavily on
the positive role
of the state budget for monopoly
capital, O'Connor underestimated the impact of the international
economy on the

growth of the state budget.

I

would argue even more

strongly than O'Connor does that the
structural position
of the U.S.

in the international economy had a
tremendous

influence on the economic surplus upon which the
state
could draw.

Policy makers had options, which they do not
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now have, given shifts
in this framework:
for directing
spending at subordinate
populations in order to
forestall
or stabilize social
disorder, and for spending
on what
O'Connor terms social
investment.
That is, this international framework also
exerts structural pressure
on the
state.
And, appreciating this
point would help make
O'Connor more sensitive to
the potential contribution
of
nationalist politics to the
'.solution', of the
legitimation
crisis, a potential
overshadowed in his theory by
the
state's predicted role in
fostering economic recovery
through a "social-industrial
complex."
and the PMC

O'Connor's
flawed view of the state's
economic managerial role reflects his embrace of what I
call the liberal problematic
of public power.
This problematic cannot be
understood
outside of the developing class
relations which have shaped
it, class relations which
O’Connor partially obscures by
dividing the economy into sectors.
Even though he goes
further than liberal theories in
clarifying the structural
economic constraints on state policy,
if his view entered
widely into public debate it would
insufficiently challenge
a widespread public resignation
about private power relations, would in fact encourage more
"blame" of the state
than is warranted, and would suggest,
incorrectly, that

reform of the state is the primary way of
solving the
current crisis.
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Liberalism's focus on public
power, as well as the
very institutional
distinction between state
and production, bear the imprint
of early bourgeois
struggles against
the entrenched aristocracy
of feudal and mercantile
states.
With this institutional
distinction, state power
becomes
relatively more visible than
class power in production
in

large part because the
taxes which the state levies
are so
transparently enacted and enforced,
and appear to be
matter of convention.
In contrast, the economic
surplus
is no longer extracted
as transparently as it was
under
feudal social relations.
Exploitation is mystified through
the labor market's ideology
of equal exchange, and class
relations appear not as conventional
or political in comparison to the state, but as natural.
Now, O’Connor’s theory is in
part an attempt to

understand how the expanded role of
the state may make
class exploitation both more transparent
and more the object of organized resistance.

Yet the very relative

visibility of the state, compared to
direct corporate
activity, may be a real limit to this
critical awakening.

O'Connor does not directly address the state’s
relative
visibility, but

I

can help clarify this liberal problematic

of public power through further discussion
of the contem-

porary class structure, and particularly the role
of the

professional-managerial class.
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In agreement with

the PMC as 29

Barbara and John Ehrenreich,

I

see

:

salaried mental workers whn
”°‘ °* the ">eans
Of production and whose I
„ functl
f
major
°n in the
social division nf
br ° adly
as the reproduction
of
CUlture and
capitalist class relations.

^piLlL^^! ^

Although this administrative
class bears many resemblances
to the working class
proper-the main one being the
sale of
its labor Power-it still
exists "only by virtue of
the
expropriation of the skills and
culture indigenous to the
30
working class .”
Within private and public
hierarchies
and between public
bureaucracies and their
clients, we find

system of direct, personal,
and often face-to-face control "at the heart of
PMC-working class relationships ." 31
The political dimension of
these relationships is thus
informed by "a complex mixture
of hostility and deference
the part of working class
people, contempt and paternal
ism on the part of the PMC ." 32
The PMC, that is, occupies
positions in private and public
hierarchies which put them
in a relationship of visible
influence over working class
people.
How does this visibility affect
legitimation
problems?
a

The PMC is recognizably engaged in
public politics
as non-official

movements.

,

political actors, especially in reform

As a political class in this sense, the
PMC

has historically participated in a
politicization of issues

which looks to the state.

In particular,

PMC actors
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(through foundations and
interest groups) visi
bly influence
the definition of
politicai issues which,
when embodied in
state policy often
impinge directly and
disproportionately
on working class life.
Por example, middle
class activists
have tended to define
pollution at the work place
out of
public debate; and, they
have until recently
neglected to
consult, or to propose
protection for, workers who
would be
dislocated by effective
environmental regulation. Or,
as
far back as the mid-1960’s,
early New Right ideologists
pointed out the class
hostilities wrapped up in
working
class resistance to integration;
resentments of "limousine
liberals" and "pointy-headed
bureaucrats" who supported
integration, but who could
personally opt out of it.
The upshot of this is that
the PMC in its political
incarnation, and the state, become
political targets of
the working class.
This is facilitated by two
factors.
First, the working class
especially regards its life outside of work as its human life,
as its realm of freedom,
so to speak; this has been true,
and increasingly so, since
before Marx commented on it in the
Manuscripts
Out of
necessity, working class people may
tolerate most of what
they have to bear inside of work.
But to tolerate similar
intervention and control outside of work by
recognizably
,

.

similar people (through the state) is not
thinkable.
Private life outside work is supposed to

be a realm of
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free aCtlVlty

and the State ls su
PPosed to Play a role
In
Protecting and realizing
this freedom.
Yet the state
apparently moves further
and further away
from its ideal
form.
Second, this political
frustration
ustration is compounded
by
ology of the
Professional-managerial class,
which
for over forty years
now has proclaimed
itself to be a rival
for, if „ot sole
possessor of, institutional
power, as well
as a promoter of
social justice through
the state.
’

Thus, both the visibility
of and frustration
with the
growth of the state are
generally compounded by the

reformist/managerial claims of
PMC ideology and activity.
In particular, the
managerial stance not only
informed state
economic policy, but invited
blame on the state for
the
failure of this
"managemenf-ideologically overdetermining
the legitimation problems
rooted in the structural
con-

straints on capitalist economic
planning.
i n the problematic of public power, PMC
occupations play an essential
role in reproducing the
social order through the
convenient
lightning rod they make for the
ruling class itself.
They
facilitate, through political
activity and self-image, the
d isplacement into the state
of conflicts deeply indebted
to
class relations in production.
But like their position in
the class structure, they play
a highly ambivalent
role in

this process:

helping create political problems
(resentment
toward the state) even as they deflect
from the deeper
property relations which shape them.
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toward chant.,.
Within a Marxist framework,
we can go this far i„
grasping
the rootedness of
legitimating ideology in
social (class)
-^"®ltitions.

But thorp
n some distance to
there iq
is r.4-,'
still
go in under-

standing the belief-suffused
experience we all have of
social relations, and in
applying this understanding
both
to internal connections
between authority

and social identity and to the tenacity
an d vulnerability of
various
beliefs which affect state
legitimation. O'Connor's theory
requires these dimensions, I
think, in order to make
clear
the impact on everyday life
of state activity.
In this,

he

shares some of the flaws of the
scientific liberals'
legitimation analysis.
In the Marxist tradition,
recent
works developing Gramsci s notion
of hegemony have started
to address these issues; Raymond
Williams, in fact,
'

has

eloquently and fruitfully explored
them. 33

But it was the

hermeneutic tradition in philosophy which
in earliest,
clearest, and most explicit fashion
laid

out what was at

stake in the internal link of beliefs
to activity.
I

will argue that it is the task of social
study,

and not only art or literature, to convey
the expressive

dimension of human experience.
a

To assume, on the contrary,

stance which necessarily or overwhelmingly
objectifies

social relations, however well intended, is to
participate
in the dynamic which divests the modern social
world of

meaning.

For, the scientific world view has not confined
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itself to the debunking
of mystical purposes
pu^es in the cosmos.
ather, shaped by and
i n fluencing
the poW0r
Whrch they are situated,
applied natural and
social science
have helped divest many
social activities of
purposes
internal to themselves-especially
for subordinate
populations.
That is, science as a
facet of domination
has
helped destroy the
expressive meanings embodied
in everyday
life by degrading the
human relations which
foster the
creation of this meaning-reducing
the number of those
who
can cooperate in shaping
their own activity, as
well as
the opportunities to do
so.
1

^

The obvious example of
this is contemporary work
life
With the dichotomization
of mental and manual
labor and
the

commodification of science, the
vast majority of people
must (today) engage in
abstracted, repetitive, and
intense
work processes beyond their
control.
Robbed of the opportunity to shape their labor
and products according to
their
own purposes, robbed even of
the opportunities to interact
a human way at work, they
give meaning to and legitimate
this bondage through external
reasoning; work

m

has little if

any meaning on its own.

Instead, most work in order to

live a human life ou tside work;
they work to sacrifice for
families and children, and project
a better future through
such sacrifice in part because work
and its wages cannot

justify the present.
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In chapter three,

will argue that
hermeneutics can
clarify the place of such
experience in legitimation
dynamics through a normative
"logic.' not available
to most
liberal and Marxist theories.
In the first place,
it reveals how the depth grammar
of our language establishes
a
prima f acie connection
between human wants and
purposes
and the appraisal of
".good," Because human
activity is in
Part constituted by rules
which embody purposes and
wants,
our social relationships
are essentially normative and
e xpressive

I

Rules are also generally
normative in that
they establish correct and
incorrect ways of acting; they
are social authority.
.

Because of these qualities of
rule-informed activity,
there are important internal
connections between how we

—

at a practical level to engage
in the institutions of

our culture, our expressive
experience and social identity
within the institutions of that
culture, and the authority
which that culture has over us.

To cast doubt upon, or to

render increasingly difficult, contradictory,
or utopian
the range of purposes that form the
expressive dimension
of these institutions would be to
undermine their authority
That is, I will argue that a crisis of
authority, whether
political or more broadly social, can be at one
level an

expressive crisis of social identity.
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Summary and Conclusion
have argued that James
O’Connor’s legitimation
theory improves upon that of
the scientific liberals in
perception of structural-economic
pressures on the
state, pressures which help
shape the welfare state’s
mission and growth.
He persuasively argues that
the state
is not, cannot be, a neutral
public institution, that it
I

structurally captive of an economy
dominated by monopoly
capital.
O'Connor helps us formulate how a
state captive
of this structural dynamic may,
in the very process of
responding to the increasing socialization
of the economy,

actually undermine its own long-term
effectiveness (become
captive of entrenched interests), undermine
long-term performance of the economy (through unplanned,
disruptive
spending), and thus undermine its own
legitimacy.
The
problem, in short, is not with the state
per se

,

but with

the terms of relation between state and economy.
But O'Connor's account also requires amendment.

One

comes away with the impression that state policy, in
the
long run, can be responsible for economic recovery.

emphasized other constraints on this outcome:

I

have

the essential

ambiguity and unwieldiness of budget categories for managing
the economy, the essential vulnerability of the state

budget to social struggles, and the dependence of post-war

growth on now-faltering international hegemony.
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have also argued that
the radical potential
of a
politicized state budget is
constrained by a liberal
ematic of public power,
an ideology which may
hinder
or defuse the perception
of connections between
state
policy an d capital.
I've argued that analysis
I

of the

class structure, and
particularly the role of the
PMC in
that structure, is essential
to understanding this
ideology
-how it makes contact with, enters
into, the immediate
experience of subordinate
populations, how it can affect
the relative visibility
of state and corporate
power.

Finally,

have argued that O'Connor
would deepen
his analysis by transcending
the externalist and potentially manipulative model of
ideology he largely shares
with the scientific liberals.
His account of tax revolts,
for instance, could be deepened
by relating increased taxes
(and their relative visibility)
to pressures upon the
aspirations and motivations of everyday
life.
I will explore this expressive dimension of
social reality in the
next chapter, and appraise Jurgen
Habermas' use of hermeneutic principles in his theory of
legitimation.
I
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CHAPTER

III

hermeneutics and legitimacy
Introduction
In the last

WhlCh rSlied

'

chapter

I

appraised a Marxist theory

^ ^ea

^

ot structural pressure
from the economy to
explain state legitimation
dilemmas.
O'Connor's account of the
spending demands upon a
capitalist
state represents an
important step beyond mainstream
behav'oral analyses which explain
the growth of the state
as
Primarily a matter of a muddling,
undisciplined form of
interest group politics.
Particularistic and coordinated
corporate demands, as well as
pressures from subordinate
populations, upon the state are
in fact a product of
the
growing socialization of our
economy inherent in capitalism's accumulation process.
The state grows and spends
not simply because of a
lenient public philosophy, nor
only
to solve the social problems
of economic expansion, but
because it must spend to aid
accumulation and because it is
the sensible place for capital
to centralize certain of its
common spending decisions.

Yet O'Connor's account of how this
process of

structurally-nurtured state growth affects political
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beliefs is, as

have argued, somewhat
less convincing
»e sees, in a shrinking
economy, less material
reward
available through the
state budget to "lock"
major classes
place socially.
Spending programs serving
working
dass and minorities will be
slashed, as well as
public
services which reach the
middle class, inviting
discontent
This will result, as
indeed it has to an extent,
in a
growing politicization of
the state budget.
The result is
less room for state
managers to bridge the
contradiction
between aiding accumulation
and appearing to serve
the
public interest-a contradiction
bridged in part by mystifications which obscure the
extent to which state activity
serves capital.
In assessing this
scenario, I have criticized O Connor s notion of
class structure and what
seems
to me to be an overestimation
of the state's role in economic planning in relation to
private financial centers.
But deserving of equal
attention is a remedy for the
truncated notion of ideology-as-mystification
which enters
at a critical point in
O'Connor's explanation of legitimacy problems.
I

O'Connor’s use of ideas and ideology
is in fact
representative of a substantial constituency

in social

analysis.

Behavioral social scientists by definition,
and
Marxist scholars with positivist or
strict structuralist
orientations, are also part of this constituency.
Wherever
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is found, this tendency
is a product of
particular

scientific attitudes toward
social analysis which
define
their materialism so as to
make ideas prima facie
external
to reality.
Philosophically, ideas and ideology
exist in
such perspectives as external
to activity itself, and/or
at the level of appearances,
as products of a more basic
reality.
As a consequence, practically
speaking,
these

perspectives almost without fail
treat popular belief systems and culture as simply
imposed or transmitted from the
top down by elites.

In

chapter one

I

detailed the effects

of this position on behavioral
theory's account of legitimacy.
Among Marxists, though, I would
argue that O'Connor's

position on ideology is a product of
the positivist and
liberal epistemology generalized in
our culture.
Structural Marxists like Althusser and
Poulantzas who selfconsciously avoid this positivism substitute
instead
another variety of scientific Marxism.
Seeking to avoid
economic determinism and to give ideology
a causative role
through notions like overdetermination, they
hold to
strict dichotomy between appearance and reality.

a

Accord-

ing to this view, the great mass of people
live reality
tdi rough

ideology

,

but are not structurally placed within

the division of labor to be able to distinguish between

appearance and reality.

This possibility falls only to

strategically placed political and intellectual roles
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within the state and left
nolit-ir-ai
ltical organizations.
P
wise, the function of
ideology 1

ing this structure.

Other-

activities support-

The pressure in such
scientific approaches to
society
to adopt a transmittal
notion of belief, culture,
and
knowledge rests in large part
on a denial of human
agency
especially in the lower strata
of society.
Human actors
are reduced only to vectors
of impersonal forces, to
Physiological machines, to pawns
of power, to re-actors
and imitators.
Though few social scientists,
of whatever
persuasion, would recognize it as
such, this reduction is
arguably a moral and political act.
Such a connection is
a strong contributing factor
to Hobbes' state, to Althusser's
elitism, to many excesses of left
vanguardism,
,

and to the

trend in liberal thought reducing
social policy to technocratic questions.
Deprived of agency, or viewed largely
as passive recipients of an
environment, people are not
fit for democratic political
arrangements,

in fact are fit

basically to be led or manipulated.
While such scientific perspectives may be,
as

I

shall explain later in this chapter, capable
of contributing
to legitimation problems,

they are not well equipped to

understand the internal dynamics of the crisis in belief
which is central to legitimation problems.

They are
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limited in plumbing the
exP^iente people have of a
social
crisis, the active dimension
on people's part of
such
experience, how that experience
is internally linked
to
beliefs and culture, and
most importantly, what
that

experience implies for political
judgments and action.
Hermeneutic political theory
presents an important
challenge to these shared
weaknesses of scientific perspectives.
The challenge which interpretive
theory raises is
this:
how and to what extent is it
true that ideas enter
into and constitute social
reality as such? In answering
this question, hermeneutic
theory, even when critically
amended, denies that there is a
level of social reality
un connected to belief systems
and to the intentions of
social actors.
In three following sections

I

will explore this

alternative to scientific knowledge,
focus on the matter
of human agency once again, and
treat issues from
the

first two sections in relation to Habermas'
Legitimation
Crisis

I.

1*

The Main Dimensions of Hermeneutic/
Interpretive Theory

we we re to cast a broad net, the features of

interpretive theory which fell within our grasp would con
stitute a family of impulses, purposes, and methods— no

single one necessarily adhered to by any representative
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thinker, yet all, collectively,
kindred.
Among th0se
CO "°„ threadS
the overarching concern
is, again, opposition to modeling the study
of society after the
physical
sciences.
Related concerns might include
a relatively
strong view of human agency
in social affairs and
a humanistic respect for persons,
a holistic orientation
’

to

analysis, and culture'as a
central, not derivative,
aspect
of social life.
In its methodology, the
interpretive
approach emphasizes a verstehen
immersion in the beliefs
and practices under study,
conceived variously as a dialogue between observer and
observed, as a socialization of
the observer into the culture
in question, or as interpreting a literary text over the
shoulder of one engaged in
writing that text. The primary
intent is to convey the
experience of subjects as they live
it, and this requires
intimate contact with, and the personal
confidence of,

those you seek to understand.

These in turn are not

possible without the fundamental respect
for persons mentioned above.
Contemporary analysts who have an interpre
tive dimension to their work and/or who
explicate this

approach include:

Peter Winch, Charles Taylor, Jurgen

Habermas, Sennett and Cobb, and Herbert Gutman.
In this section

I

will raise three related points:

the rule-governed nature of language and social
practice,
the internal relation of ideas and norms to activity,
and
the social creation of meaning.^

For reasons that will
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become clear in my
subsequent criticism
Qf lnterpretive
theory, a s impl e sporting
activity is a good way
to lllus .
trate these points.

Whether we define an
idea
aea, or tell someone
how to
engage in a Particular
activity, or ourselves
engage in that
activity, we are specifying
and following rules
which govern
the social acceptance
of particular speech
acts or practices
as instances of the
same thing. Moreover,
defining or giving the idea of a certain
practice verbally is tantamount
to giving instructions
or rules on how to engage
in that
activity.
In explaining the game
of baseball, we thus lay
out playing rules that
structure roles and connections
between various elements of
the game-players, fans,
umpires, management, bats,
balls, etc.
These connections
form a context of ideas and
practices.
Knowing these connections, this context, enables
you to identify a particular game as baseball rather
than (if you know their rules)
basketball or football, and to
engage in an approximation
of a game of baseball.
Knowing the rules, you know that
baseball is not the same thing
as football (except at the
general level of a sport).
In this sense,

then, the idea of baseball is
inter-

nal to the activity of playing
the game itself.
by participants,

the rules contained in the idea
enter

into and structure the game.
of the

Followed

game— the umpire,

In defining any one aspect

for instance— we can see that
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thlS aSP60t 18 interna
Hy related to other parts of
the
game--in effect, a window
on to the who!e.
Furthermore
when we explain how
baseball is played, we
are from
another angle describing
purposes which inform
particular
parts of the game and the
game as a whole.
These purposes
enter into the game, are
internal to it and its
constituent elements.
For example, what is
a sacrifice bunt in
baseball? it is a tactic by
which a batter seeks to
advance a baserunner at the
expense of her own chance
to
reach base safety, by
deliberately striking the ball
a
short distance into the
infield.
Recognized as a sacrifice
by the game's official
scorer, a tlme-at-bat is not
charged
to the batter and thus does
not harm her batting average.
This sacrifice bunt has no
intelligibility, no meaning, apart from its purpose—
advancing a runner into
scoring position-which is an
internal part of the meaning
of the sacrifice bunt itself.
On the other hand, a sacrifice is not awarded by the official
scorer unless
,

the

i ntention

to sacrifice is evident from the
batter's method

of bunting.

A bunt which is obviously attempted
for a

basehit is not scored as a sacrifice if
the batter is put
out at first base, and the batter is
then charged with a
time— at— bat for her effort.
To stress the internality of ideas and
intentions
to action is to deny a positivist argument
about causal

relations between ideas and activity, or on their
terms,
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ideas and behavior.

On positivist terms,
for something to
be a cause, it must be
separate and not logically
conjoined
to its effect.
Ideas and purposes
pubes cannot be causes
in the
positivist sense when they
exist in internal relation
i

to

activity, and in the
paradigm interpretive sense,
this is
exactly their status.
If we cannot speak
of causes in this
positivist sense, neither can
we speak of laws of
behavior
founded on such causal
relationships.
Instead, in an
unqualified interpretive
perspective, we have rules of
activity which inherently
reflect purposiveness on the
part of actors and which may
change-unlike electrons, say,
which have no choice about
their behavior.

egard language and activity
as rule-governed, and
to link meaning with purpose,
is to emphasize the inescapably
normative character of language
and activity.
Rules prescribe right and wrong ways of
doing things.
There is, for
example, a correct direction for
runners to circle the
basepaths.
This normative dimension is also
connected
with the "identity" or "sameness"
aspect of rule-governed
meaning.
A new fan who mistakenly describes
a certain
pitcher's wind-up as a balk is unfamiliar
with the contexts which specify the calling of a
balk by the umpire.
The same physical motion (behavior)
that is a balk in one
context (a full wind-up with a man on first)
is not a balk
in another (a full wind-up with a
runner on third base

only)
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The internal connection
between purpose and
meaning
,a k es rule-governed
activity essentially
normative because
prima facie connection
built into our language
between the notion of
"good”
good and
an
+h
uthat+ which
satisfies or
conduces to human needs,
wants, or purposes.
describing
a social situation
by g i vlng the rules
of
ri

m

eonduct^^

pnate

to it, we are also
necessarily evaluating it
from
the point of view of
certain needs, wants,
and purposes.
Descriptions of the game of
baseball are also, therefore,

essentially evaluations-and
this is particularly clear
when we describe real
games.

To say,

for instance, that a

Player did not get a hit in
four times at bat, with
runners
ln SC ° rlDg P ° Siti0n
each
to evaluate that player's
performance from the point of
view of the purpose of the
game-scoring more runs than your
opponent-and the purpose

-

of a

batter-to aid

in the scoring of runs.

The evaluation

is contained in the
description "hitless in four times
at
bat." To say, "This player
is hitless in four times
at
bat.
She s had a bad day," is, in
a sense, redundant.

Since players, management, and
fans intersubjectively
share the purpose of the game,
they know that "hitless" or
any other suitable description
is also a
judgment.

To deny
this judgment, one would have to
adduce overriding or miti-

gating reasons:
bat.

"She went hitless today in four times
at

Playing with that broken hand has made
hitting diffi-

cult for her.
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As norms,

rule-governed language and
activity are
-SIM creations embodying, to varying
degrees shared
Purposes and meanings.
Rules reflect interaction
on a
terrain of shared
purposes, interests
LS or necessity.
„
A
consequence, therefore
retore, of this social
nature of rules is
the possibility of
creativity, adaption, or
change in purposes and the activity
they inform.
Soclal practioes>
because they may change,
have a history.
Such change, like
,

’

>

mg

itself,

is not_an_ individual
creation because it

takes place only in light
of what has come before
and only
within the possibilities
left open by interaction
with
other individuals; even
acts of innovation and
creativity
draw upon such social
contexts-existing language and convention.
For example, as field
management and owners
sought to exploit every
defensive possibility in a highly
ompetitive sport, a vocabulary
and practice evolved in
baseball around relief pitching.
And, as relief pitching
seemed to contribute to a decline
in the offensive side of
the game, and thus in fan
interest, management in one
major league responded by introducing
permanent designated
hitters for pitchers, who are usually
weak hitters.

pure statement of this approach
works best for
small, simple societies or for
cultural activities like
baseball which are themselves, in large
part, interpretations or idealized celebrations of
experiences in the daily
A
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life of work and family.

Thus it is not surprising
that

interpretive methods have gained
a large foothold in
anthropology.
Anthropological investigators can
usuallythose they study--see or
experience something approaching the complete cultural
life of a small society.
Applied
to a complex society, though,
this view runs into some
problems, all of which bear on
a consideration of legitimacy
First, some of those who have
explicated the

hermeneutic position have insufficiently
clarified how
received beliefs may not only help
constitute social
reality, but also distort it, as well
as how received
beliefs may be contested within a society.
Peter Winch's
writings on cultural anthropology are
open to this criticism, I would argue.
In contrast, for example, Charles
Taylor's work on cultural interpretation is
more consistently open to the limits of self-interpretation
and the

social conflict which may take place within
and over the

intersubjective beliefs of a society

4
.

The difficulty of

making the distinction between social reality and
the
a PP earance °f that reality in the beliefs of
its partici-

pants is inherent in hermeneutic principles; yet, it is,
I

would argue, a difficulty which hermeneutics only under-

scores for social theory and investigation in general.
Second,

insufficient attention to this distinction may

result from a neglect of the effect of social structure
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and power relations
upon the creation ofc
meaning.
This
aspect of the problem,
I tnmk,
think is
iq clearly
n
not built into
interpretive philosophy in
the way
ay that thp
the appearance/
reality distinction
itself is.
Third, the internality
of
needs and purposes to
social meaning can be
construed in

an overwhelmingly

functional-rationalistic way.

if so

would pressure us to
overstate the transparency
of the
social world for its
participants, and to minimize
the
unconscious and non-rational
aspects of meaning.
Let me
discuss these briefly in
turn.

it

One aspect of the
ideas-as-appearance problem could
be put:
if meaning is rule
governed, if rules create
a
context of proper connections
between facets of an activity,
and if rules and purposes
are internal to activity,
what
limits the proper context for
judging the purposes internal
activity? Any activity we may
choose to examine,
such as baseball, is potentially
a window onto other
social
activities.
In looking at the game
of baseball, should we
stop at the playing rules or
should we also examine the
impact on the game of contract
relations between owners
and players, or the meaning of
the vicarious/passive spectator, or the sociological
composition of ball teams? Our
relational point of view, in fact,
should preclude us from
seeing such questions as external
to the meaning of the
game; there is no sharp dividing line
between the game in
it self and the game as influenced
from "outside." Thus
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there is a tension
built into the
interpretive method
relational thinking and
the methodological
rule
of beginning with the
self-images of participants
in a
social activity.
In fact, we may only
begin with those
self-images and must in
various ways go beyond
them.
Such self-images would
limit us to prominent
and conscious
aspects of meaning and risk
neglecting "background"
meanmgs such as market relations-which
are assumed as
natural, inevitable, and
thus not objects of ordinary
consciousness
But in judging the proper
context of meaning we face
the question of the
theoretical and cultural
perspective
of the investigator.
Peter Winch’s version of
verstehen
methods bridges the positivist
dichotomy between observer
and participant by picturing
the investigator as a

participant or newly-socialized
member of the culture in question.
By adhering to this position,
the investigator may simultaneously understand the culture
as its original members
do and, therefore, ideally,
escape the problem of misrepresenting the culture to other
interested persons.
But the
problem in this view of the investigator,
as Gadamer argues,
is that the investigator can
never really shed his previous
learning and concepts.
Rather than participating
as a

member in the culture, the investigator
engages in something more like a dialogue with members
of it, translating
their meanings into the landscape of his
own life world 5
.
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ThlS 18 Stl11 lnteraction
which bridges the
positivist
my, but it is
interaction at an
irreducible distance, and perhaps
inescapably with an
interest.
That is,
the investigator can
never simply represent
or reflect the
meanings of a different
culture-by staying wholly
or
largely within its self-i
mag es-but engages in
interpretation.
The stance of the
investigator obviously
acquires
more complications when
we move from
cross-cultural

anthropology to domestic
sociology.
The academic intellectual and his working
class subjects, for
instance, may
share a wide range of
language

and culture, but they
do not

£ha£e the distinct life-experiences,
interests, and worldviews typical of their class
positions.

What they share
with respect to those
positions, as Sennett and
Cobb among
others bring out, is a relation
between those distinct
positions.
This is a relation suffused
subtly but powerfully with deference, self-blame,
envy and resentment on
the one hand, and on the other
with authority, selfassurance, and what we might
characterize as the capacity
to render invisible or unheard
the lives of those who are
not their equals.
The point of emphasizing the
dialogueinterpretive nature of such studies
is to open
up,

as

Habermas does through Gadamer, the
distortive aspects of
social distance, structure, and
power upon dialogue and
meaning.
I will address this
more fully below 6
.
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...

A S6COnd aSPSCt
° f the appeara
nce/ reality problem
is
A SharP dlStinCti0n
appearance and reality

13 n0t aVailable

“

even a modest version
of

P ° Siti0n that ideas

-V

enter into reality,

social world, no social
reality, that is simply
'out there" at a
level distinct from
our ideas about it
against which we may
measure the accuracy of
our beliefs
The interpretive
position thus opposes not
only crude
empiricism, but also
epistemologies which posit a
dis.junc ture between appearance
and reality, theory
and ideology
Yet we must have some
standard for appraising the
relative
merit of various descriptions
of the social world.
Positions like Winch's on
interpretive theory pressure
us into
near-total relativism, into
neglecting the search
for

standards that apply across
cultures or within (complex)
cultures.
Strong statements of the
hermeneutic position,
like Winch’s and to a lesser
extent Charles Taylor's, pressure us to regard social
capacities of the

mind-language-

as the defining characteristic
of humanity.

In so doing,

they seem to adopt a dichotomy
between objects and persons
based on the possession of
consciousness, which does not
fully capture the links which
humanity has to the world of
objects, to "nature," nor the
constraints imposed
on us as

physical beings in a physical world,
creating a social
world within the constraints of
physical reality.
At a
minimum, because this dualism underestimates
these
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constraints, we cannot
not revarri
+
regard the internal
eoherenee of a
social theory as a
sufficie^ test of the
theory's validity.
At the same time, we
are precluded from
any simple correspondence test if even a
mild version of the
interpretive
Position is correct.
It should be said
at this point that
the problem of a sharp
distinction between appearance
and
reality is not a flaw in
interpretive philosophy itself
which only raises the
issue forcefully, but
rather a problem
for philosophy as a whole 7
Habermas proposes a certain
solution to the issue which
has direct bearings
.

on the

matter of legitimacy.
worked dualism which

I

Though his solution rests
on a refind difficult to accept,
his notion

of a truth standard for
social relations immanent in
the
capacity for communication
itself is a promising step
out
of this philosophical maze.
I shall deal with
this contribut ion in the next section
of this chapter.

This brings us to the matter
of social structure.
Because the interpretive position
stresses the social
creation of meaning, and because its
analysis of meaning
stresses the contextual and web-like
nature of language
(a holistic stance, as Charles
Taylor argues), it pressures
one to neglect the effects of social
structure.
When
Winch, for instance, discusses the
social creation of meaning, neither unequal participation
nor institutional constraints in that process are discussed. There
is,

relatedly

,

a

pressure to stress the common beliefs in a
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way of

Ufa

which may

as Taylor argues,

form the basis for
what more apparently
are conflicts within
that culture
This relative neglect
of structure also stems,
I
think
from interpretive
philosophy's respect for
human agency,
perhaps intensified by the
battle with scientific
sociologists and historians.
I would argue,
for instance, that
Herbert Gutman encounters
this problem in trying
to picture
American slaves, contrary
to Genovese, as culture-makers
and not culture-takers 8
,

.

Yet while these are
pressures within particular
statements of interpretive
epistemology, they are not

necessary results of the interpretive
mode.

Sennett and

Cobb,

for instance, go some distance
in situating the pains
of working class life within
a social-structural dynamic.
What we need to be able to ask,
with the sensitivity to

experience which interpretive theory
affords us,
do the unequal interests and
capacities built

is:

How

into social

structures affect the construction,
diffusion, and content
of social meaning? How may we
understand the relationship
of sub-cultures to each other and
to a dominant culture?
In what sense does human agency
originate, contribute to,
or sustain structures which have
9
dynamics of
their own ?

Later in this chapter

I

shall appraise Habermas' answers

to such questions.

Finally, to consider a criticism internally
related
to the appearance/reality distinction, we
must ask whether
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at can be meaningfully
said about a

^

^

can be conceived
in terms of
consclous or
6 PUrP ° SeS
h ° PeS
wants
The last two of
these terms, in fact,
can speah to states
„ hlch whUe
'

’

.

,

inevitably mediated
sociallyy, are still
still unquestionably
grounded in p hys ic al
behaviors> drives Qr
must therefore also
consider notions of
structure and causation hunt upon
non-conscious levels of mi

^

,

„ d or lan ua e,
g
g
and their impact on
other realms of meaning.
While such
questions, in psychological
terms, are beyond my
..expertise," they are still
questions which must be
raised and
tentatively answered within
a social theory of
legitimacy.
I rely on such
questions in chapters four
and five of this
my discussion of the
sexual constituent of
race relations and its
impact on state legitimacy
during
t he 1 960 s

m

'

Hi

Ex pressive Meaning and
Politics

Interpretive theory allows one
to explore the internal
dynamics of an essentially n
ormative subject-belief sysand their relation to activity

— with

a subtlety and

depth not open to more scientific
analyses.
Interpretive
philosophy argues that social
practices are not simply
physical behavior overlaid with

meanings-rationalizations-

but are to various and problematic
extents such human
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interpretations themselves.

Interpretive

accounts of socia!
aot lvity are not si m
pl y art imitating
life, but recogni _
tions that life is,
in an important
sense, art.
This expressive dimension of
meaning, as Charles
Taylor has
described it, is not just
our perception of

a separate
reality, but a necessary
element nf
y Sclent
of oo
social reality as
±u
such.
•

t

With this understanding
in mind, I can proceed
to
lay out important
internal connections
between expressive
meaning, social identity,
and authority.
These in turn
constitute vital elements in
my arguments about
legitimacy
problems.
To set these connections
out in an initial way,
it will help to return
momentarily to a discussion
of rulegoverned social activity.
The expressive element of
social reality is embedded
in a web of language
rules which embody the
principle of
authority in its broadest sense
because rules are norm s
lor guiding and judging
activity.
As one is socialized
into the practices of a society,
one internalizes the
authority of the rules which govern
these practices and
makes them a part of one's self. Of
course this internalization is not a simple process:
it does not imply an
inability to be, subsequently, at
least partly selfconscious about one's identity and the
practices one has,
as it were,

embraced.

Nor does it imply that the inter-

nalized authority is not contradictory
(a foothold for
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later consciousness and
criticism).
And, one would want
to,
among other qualifications,
make some distinctions
about
the centrality or
importance of the various
authorities
internalized.
The learning of sexuality
as children, for
instance, will clearly
permeate the purposes we later
embrace in public and private
worlds.
But given these and
other qualifications,- we are
left with this:
By learning
the rules of activity, we
establish at a basic level of
the
personality a fundamental
connection between knowing the
world and its meanings and
knowing ourselves. And given
the nature of rules and meaning
as discussed above, this
provides persons not just with
individual values, but
rather with social identities.
Our own purposes are in
large part purposes given to us
socially, constrained by
the authority of social rules.
Yet we exist as individuals who
have wills and can
make, even in a limited philosophical
sense, choices
about our actions.
Thus rule-governed activity as such

embodies

certain tension between each individual
and the
social practices of which s/he is a
part.
For instance, we
have a choice about obeying rules.
Yet even in disobeying
or mistaking, our actions will still be
appraised socially
within the context of the rules we transgress.
Because
a

rules are social creations, they stand in an
important

sense determined, above you, opposed to capacities
of your
will, yet not unconnected to it.

This opposition, tension,
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in the process of
knowing expresses our
identity as

conscious individuals in
the fact of our
separation from
other physical objects
and from the world
of social rules
and practice.
At the same time,
this opposition enables
us
to identify ourselves
witMjn^h^onte^ of those practices, to see ourselves
as part of them.
If social practice is
rule-governed,

then even

radically- rational,

near-transparent, and democraticallyderived rules contain
identification as an inescapable
feature of authority.
This moment of identification
is a
largely emotional feature
of social practice, an
experiential bond with authority
which substantially bridges
the
gap between our individuality
and a norm which is not our
individual creation.
Of course in practice this
bond would
vary widely in depth and
strength, and one can readily
see social practices-such
as degraded forms of work-in
which primarily coercion, or
necessity-as-coercion sustains routine and in which the
sense I am speaking
,

of

authority exists largely at the level
of, "This is what
must do every day.
It is familiar.
It

is my life."

I

But

given the important modifications we
would wish to make in
this abstract picture of identification
(which I will return to below), we may still see it
as a source of resistance to the rejection of an authority
relation, or to the
loss or undermining of familiar social
practices.
It is
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perhaps, a source of resist
u
an
resistance
to change
as such, stemming
part from the prospect
of self-rejection or
self-l oss
of those purposes and
identities bound up with a
practice.
This identification, and
the prospect of losing
one's
social moorings, help to
explain the staying power
of what
one might expect, on the
grounds of rationalistic
r><=>

m

left

analysis, to be criticized
and rejected.
Such rationalistic criticism, lacking
even the rudimentary
psychology I
have outlined above, would
then be forced to conclude
that
the resistance to change
was based on false consciousness
of a reality inherently
separate from our ideas or
expressive appraisals of it.
Such a position would be hard
put
to make contact, save at
a tacit level, with the
depth of
this experience, to understand
the import it carries for
reaction even among those with other
interests for change,
and to deal with this resistance
in political terms.
For
instance, German communists of the
1930’ s, despite all the
other important aspects of fascism
which they analyzed,
systematically underestimated its expressive
appeals to
the working class.
do not wish,

I

in making these points,

to draw a

Durkheimian picture of the cohesive moral
order.
appraisal of Habermas at the end of this chapter

In my
I

will

make more explicit the contradictory implications
of these
arguments.
But by way of preparing this discussion,
the

points

I

have made help us to situate a central trait of
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liberal society, rooted
ultimately in its capitalist
organization.
This is the expansionary,
dynamic
quality of capitalist relations,
destructive of tradition,
colonizing over historical
time all facets of social
life
which can profitably be brought
under commodity production, which require
rationalization and managing to
facilitate such production, which
have fallen victim to
the by now ingrained impulse
to rationalization for its
own sake.
This trait of liberal political
economy has its
counterpart in liberal thought, in
the skeptical and disdaining attitude of science and
the Enlightenment for traditional ways and knowledge.
Disenchanting the natural
and social worlds, this process
renders liberal society at
its core a perpetual threat to
social authority, a recurrent
source of its own social and political
legitimacy problems.
In T he M aking of the English
Working Class
-

.

E.

P.

Thompson captures the destruction of
these intersubject ivelyconst 1 tuted traditions and their
replacement with more
closely administered, more completely
dominated relationships.

As have others like Gutman and the Lynds 12
,

Thompson locates in this destruction a perpetual
source
of instability,

conflict, and resistance to capitalist

production, as well as
and suffering.

a

source of great anguish, loss,

While Thompson is at pains to discount the

"optimistic" interpretation of this period as one of upheaval but also gradually increasing material living
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standards, he also closely
documents the judgments
of
displaced workers themselves.
These emphasized the
experience of loss of
opportunities for interaction
at work,
loss of opportunities
to help structure
one's own work (i„
Part to accommodate these
personal relations), loss
of the
entertainments, rituals, customs,
and public social life
SO characteristic of
-pre-capitalist village, farm,
and
craft work. 13
Any evaluation of the aualitv
an assessment of

thftS

n-F

i

-p

Sntail

iff.

th
manifold satisfaction or
depri^t^s^cu?;
cultural?
as well as material
of th7n
ol
P e °Ple concerned,
From <5ii oh
standpoint the older "cataclysmic"
view
I,
’

,

condUions

improvement in material

Though Thompson is writing of
the early 19th century,
the expansionary process
which fed this cultural immiseration remains a disruptive force.
Written on a more abstract
level than Thompson's work,
Habermas' Legitimation Crisis
appraises the contemporary form of
this dynamic and its

pressures toward social crisis. 14

In so doing,

he follows

central concern of the earlier Frankfurt
school, one
which regards Hegel, Marx, Weber, and
Freud as historical
moments in the analysis of domination, of
the extension of
a

rationality

,

and of the social control of internal and

external nature.
a

Habermas has pursued these concerns with

scope both maddening and provocative, through
original
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research

these thinkers, earller

linguistic and communications
theory, the philosophy
of
science, hermeneutics,
systems theory, and so
15
on
j
turn now to a consideration
of Legi timation Crisis
as his
distillation of this earlier
research into a more
specifical ly political theory.
.

IH

.

Legitimation Crisis

Because

is a culmination of

Habermas' earlier work, it
is difficult to know where
to
cut into his arguments.
What I intend to do is to
weave
the bare outlines of his
work on materialism, hermeneutics,
etc.

into an overview of the
book, then proceed in more
detail With major elements of
his argument, and finally
appraise his arguments in more
depth.
I
run the risk in
this summary not only of
oversimplifying the earlier foundations of his arguments, but also
of imposing order and
linguistic clarity on his particular
arguments about
legitimacy in spots where there is
apparently little. To
these problems I shall also return.
In his earlier work,

Habermas developed two logically

distinct but interrelated modes of human
cognition which
express themselves as different postures
or interests toward
their respective objects 16 as different
linguistic forms,
,

as different forms of consciousness and
epistemology
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These are the technical
and practical modes, and
each of
them exists as two levels
of communication:
communicative
action, and discourse.
When we engage in either
of these
modes as a matter of course,
without debating the various
claims or purposes made within
each mode, we are engaging
in technical or practical
communicative action
when we

participate in the formal process
of arguing and validating the claims and purposes
implicit or normally made in
communicative action, we are engaging
in either technical
or practical discourse.
The technical mode is an
instrumental, purposiverational stance towards the world.
It expresses our desire
to control that world through
comprehending and acting upon
its objectivity.
The technical mode, like the
practical,
is a developmental capacity of
individuals and societies,
the progress of which is judged in
part by the distinction
any society can make between what the
technical mode may
and may not be applied to, and by the
power
it has at any

given stage of development to tap into, control,
its
object.

In its ideal

formulation, the technical mode

applies to the world of external nature outside
human
society:

non-conscious objects and other life forms.

The

technical mode has as its general place, therefore, the

production processes which appropriate external nature for
human use, and its particular place, in our society, in

scientific-technological activity and thought.

The
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development of its ability
+
y to tan
rap into
lnto this
world of external nature proceeds
through
ugn thp
the development of
theories of
explanation which, through
internal incoherencies,
cannot
account for the
conceptually-imbued data which
the theory
brings to light and thus
require, at some point,
revision
or revolution which
enhances their explanatory
capability
The development of this
ability through this
process
is

what Habermas calls
theoretical (technical)
discourse,
"the medium of ut terances
that admit. of truth .” 17

Whereas the technical mode
reflects the need of the
human species to work, to
appropriate nature to survive,
the practical mode expresses
the need of the species
to
communicate and to regulate action
through
in ter subjectively-constituted
norms and meanings.
In its
ideal formulation, the practical
mode applies to the
socialization of internal nature
through linguistic and
related communicative structures
(art, music, dance,
culture), and thus to the creation
of cultural norms which
organize all interaction, including,
as "background," the
social organization of production
and science.
As in the

theoretical mode, when the claims of
practical communicative action are questioned, they may
be "redeemed discursively" (through practical discourse).
While the technical and practical modes are
ideally
limited to different facets of reality (objects,
persons),
they may be, and have been historically,
applied at various
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levels of development to
the '.wrong', facets.
The contemporary attempt to apply
technical reason to the
study of
society is one such misplaced
effort, according to
Habermas.
The effort in primitive
and feudal societies
to understand
the workings of physical
nature through magical or
religious categories reflects
an insufficient distinction
between practical (interpretive)
and

techn^TT^

(through the imputation of
agency to the natural world).
And, because of this lack
of distinction, in part,
this
effort also represents the "
underdevelopment " G f both
practical and technical modes.

Habermas views these modes as
developmental by means
of truth standards which he
finds immanent in technical
and practical discourse.
By adopting a discourse model
of truth, Habermas is arguing
that whether a technical or
practical claim is true or not is
essentially inseparable
from the ma nner in which the truth
claim is
settled.

The

philosophical arguments he uses to defend
this position
are beyond the scope of this
dissertation,

but the immanent

standards themselves, if he is correct,
have far-reaching
consequences for social theory. For Habermas
is arguing,

against positivists, that moral arguments
have an inner
logic which allows for the adjudication of
moral claims.
And,

he is arguing,

against naturalists, that moral argu-

ments do not "admit of truth in the same sense as
descriptive statements," that in fact they have a separate
logic

Ill

Of their own

For technioal and
practioai discourse
these standards are
grounded on the undominated
speech
situations peculiar to
each mode.
These situations are
not any utopian
creation of Habermas, but
rather exist
even within dominated
discourse as assumptions
necessary
to entering into any
argument over truth claims.
The
various components of these
ideal speech situations
would,
if followed, Habermas
argues, guarantee a
rationally-

motivated consensus on the
truth claims raised in
each
mode.
This consensus, and the
process of arriving at it,
are for all practical
purposes the equivalent of
truth.
By developing the notions
of technical and practical
action, Habermas is engaged,
among other things, in a

revision of Marxism.

He argues that while Marx
himself
argued convincingly
thp nultimate
™
£ y for tne
primacy of productive
activity in capitalism, and
while Marx insisted
i

-t-

-i

on the

relational character of human
interaction, he never explicy developed the epistemological and
linguistic grounding
of this relational quality.
Thus, the understanding of
practical reason remains implicit,
underdeveloped in
Marxist theory, embodied for instance
in a base-

superstructure formulation which, while
Marx might employ
it

subtly, has too easily fallen victim
to mechanistic

and positivistic interpretations.

So,

in developing

explicitly the distinct realm of practical
communicative
action, Habermas therefore has need of
another model of
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ciety.

This he finds, tentatively
and with reservations,
in a radicalized
version of systems theory.
Social systems theory
fits Habermas' needs,
he believes, because it is
formed from the point of
view of the
capacity of a social system,
with its constituent
subsystems, to learn about,
adapt to, "steer" within,
control
environment.
This may be expressed as
a development of
its rationality, but also,
because the development of
subsystems may be uncoordinated,
as a source of crisis.
The
adaptive, steering capacity
of the system is what
Habermas
would describe as the overall
goal-state of the social system.
As an adaption of
structural-functionalism, social
systems theory posits basic
functions which subsystems may
perform in relation to the overall
goal-state of learning
about and controlling its
environment.
For Habermas' social system,
the environment consists
of inner nature, outer nature,
and other systems.
The
socio- cultural subsystem has the
particular function of
"appropriating" inner (human) nature through
socialization
by means of mtersubj ect ively
constituted norms which
require justification.
This subsystem consists (apparently, for he does not say directly)
of family, church,

media, education institutions, and leisure
and recreational

institutions and practices.

These institutions have the

primary (though not exclusive) responsibility for
reproducing the interpretive traditions which provide
meaning
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and motivation to all
social activity.

Outer nature is
appropriated through the
production or economic
subsystem
ultimately through the
capacity to apply technical
reason

to this process.

However, as Habermas would
be quick to
point out, technical
reason need not be confined
to this
subsystem, and in fact its
apparent use within the
administrative or political system
is an important factor
in
his sketch of crisis
tendencies in late capitalism.
This
administrative system assumes,
in late capitalism,
the

steering function of the
social system-an increasing
attempt within the contradictions
of late capitalism to
coordinate social control of
inner and external nature
and
relations with other systems.
Finally, although Habermas
initially recognizes a fourth
system, the legitimation system, the preponderance of
his usage indicates
that the

legitimation system is more
appropriately regarded as a
relationship between the three other
systems which provides
support for the actions of the
administrative system.

Habermas recognizes that systems theory
has an
inherent weakness, due to the circularity
of functionalism,
specifying the boundaries of subsystems.

m

However, this

is not just a weakness of systems
theory,

but apparently a

problem over time for a social system itself,

a

problem it

has in maintaining its "identity" at
both a structural and

intersubject ive level.

This problem will lead us ultimately

to his theory of system crises, but we
must first lay the
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groundwork for that discussion
by
iej-ating the
y relating
th» subsystems
u
to each other.
These subsystems relate
in two ways:
through their
inputs and outputs, and
through the constraints
they p la ce
upon each other, primarily
through their uneven development.
I
shall take the input-output
relationships
first.

The socio-cultural system
provides as its output meanings
and motivations which help
constitute the structured activity of all subsystems.
Apart from pre-bourgeois
traditions, of which little now
remains, Habermas cites
two

motivational "syndromes" called
familial-vocational

pnvatism and civic privatism.

The first is a tradition

of liberal society which
orients subjects toward possessive
individualism, utilitarianism, and
either occupational
achievement or fatalism.
Civic privatism serves to depoliticize the public realm and to
provide for the administrative system a mixture of low-level
participation and
"diffused support" for its policies.
Civic privatism
legitimates state activity.
Both forms of privatism are

embedded in the disappearing pre-bourgeois
traditions and
world-views, such as religion, cited above.
This anchor-

mg

in non-bourgeois traditions is
important for legitima-

tion problems, as

I

shall detail later, for Habermas argues

that bourgeois traditions cannot reproduce
themselves

outside of this relation.

Finally, the socio-cultural

system's output is, in effect, input for the economic
and
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administrative systems.

Its input, colieetive
or commodity-

form goods and services,
is the output,
respectively, of
the administrative and
economic systems.
AS input, the socio-cultural
system receives work
(in part constituted by
socio-cultural motivations),
capital, and administrative
decisions which help to steer
the
economy.
As output,. the economic
system produces material
value, which flows as input
to both administrative
and
socio-cultural systems, and demands
upon the administrative
system for particular and
collective goods and services
(much as O'Connor would describe
them).
In late capitalism
as in market capitalism,
class structure in production
provides the dynamic which makes
the economic system,
ultimately, the structurally-determining
force of social
system change. However, in late
capitalism, the crisis

tendencies of this dynamic have been
displaced into the
administrative system, a reflection of
the need to plan for
and to control the cyclical economic
and social upheavals
endemic to capitalism, and reflective
of the growing

interconnectedness and scope of production and
exchange.
This displacement reflects, Habermas would
argue, the

development of steering capacity, or rather,
the development of both need and capacity to steer the
system within
its environment.

The administrative system, or state and related

institutions, receives as inputs material value (taxes)
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fro m the economic
system, demands from
economic and sociocultural systems for
services, and

diffuse legitimation
support (as well as
particular motivations for
its members'
activities) from the
socio-cultural system.
its outputs
are collective goods and
services for other subsystems
and,

overall, efforts to steer
the social system within
its environments.
It does this through
a form of technical
communicative action, bureaucracy,
which applies instrumental rationality to the
solution of problems.

While the inputs of any
subsystem are the outputs of
others, the relations between
subsystems are not adequately
conceived unless we introduce
the language of structural
forces.
In the description of
crisis tendencies below I
shall make Habermas' use of
this language more specific.
For now, Habermas’ idea of
a struct ural constraint is
best
conceptualized as the product of a
subsystem imperative
which through its uncoordinated
development in relation to
other subsystems, raises the problems
of system integration and boundary definitions.
For instance, the need of
an increasingly socialized,
interwoven economy for planning, displaced into the state,
is structurally constrained
by a socio-cultural system whose
development (at the level
of action and discourse) is logically
independent of

economic development.

The growth of the’ state is con-

strained by its increasing need for legitimation
from a
socio-cultural sphere which does not automatically supply
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Moreover, as a

«tui^o^^

the growth Qf
the state (through a dm
i„i str ative planning)
into the soclo _

cultural system-a boundary
problem-undermines the sources
of its own legitimacy
and the legitimacy of
other social
institutions.
Rather than simply being
constrained
to

legitimate its expanded activity,
which to a point it can
do, the state must
engage in activity
artivit,, planning
which
undermines the basis of that
activity itself 19
To frame the discussion
of crises, it may help
to
develop a spatial metaphor
of Habermas' social

—

—

^

.

system, one

formed from the point of view
of boundary considerations
and of the centrality of
the socio-cultural system
for

legitimation.

One might picture the
socio-cultural system
as a sphere located within
another, "hollowed-out" sphere
which is itself divided between
the economic and administrative systems.
All three systems now have
"physical"
boundaries with each other, exchange
inputs and outputs
across those boundaries, and by their
relative size, shape
and dynamics, structurally impinge
upon one another.

Habermas argues that in late capitalism,
through

means

I

shall examine, crisis tendencies in the
economic

system are displaced into the administrative
steering system.
The steering system expands in (ultimately
failing)

efforts to cope, as described above.

The expansion of the

steering system is not only "outward" into the
economy and
other social systems, but also "inward" into the
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socio-cultural system.

This inward expansion
of technical
rationality disrupts the
process of m otive-for m ation
and
thus the constitutive
dimension of social
institutions
like work, family,
education, etc.
It undermines their
meaning and is incapable,
as technical rationality,
of
creating effective substitute
meanings.
By expanding inward, the state saueezes
the socio-cultural system,
fracturing and restructuring
its institutions.
In so doing,
the state loses its
legitimacy, for its expanded
activities
require greater legitimation
even as these activities
undermine the sources of legitimacy.
The capitalist social
system, as it were, collapses
in upon itself

With this overview in mind,

I

will now examine four

areas of Habermas' theory more
closely.

These are his

general idea of social system crisis;
the state's role as
steering system; particulars of the
motivations supplied
by the socio-cultural system;
and his view of practical

discourse
Habermas' notion of system crisis is
shaped by an
effort to understand society as a set
of structures beyond,
but not unconnected to, the intersubjective
constitution
of activity.

Moreover, he is concerned to deal with what

he regards as an essential asymmetry in
the reproduction
of social life.

This asymmetry has two aspects.

First is

the inherently greater dynamism of economic/technical

action in late capitalism relative to cultural activity.
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Second is his position
that the internal
dynamics of technical and practical
discourse are, at a
fundamental level,
’

"iSei^Clndmndent

of one another ." 20

Th i s last fact r
means that the dynamic
inherent in economic/administrative
(instrumental) action may
undermine normative traditions,
yet will not necessarily
release new norms that
correspond
to this structural
development of economic or
administrative systems.
Hence, Habermas has
reformulated, within an
exploration of culture that Marx
never directly undertook,
Marx's argument that the
relations of production become
fetters on the forces of
production, and his argument that
(however it was intended) the
superstructure of capitalism
is erected upon an economic
base.
Habermas' general notion
of social system crisis,
then, is one in which crises
of
social identity result from
structural dislocations and
change, one in which the purposes
which help to constitute
the deeper structures of social
life are themselves undermined by the uneven development and
coordination of those
very structures.

Contemporary possibilities for crises differ
from
the crises characteristic of market
capitalism, according
to Habermas.
The cyclical crisis nature of market capitalism resulted in the expansion of the state
as a conscious
steering mechanism for late capitalism, replacing
the

unconscious steering mechanism of market forces.

With the

growth of the state, based politically (as with O'Connor)
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on a class compromise
In production, crisis
tendencies which
ortginate in the economy
have been displaced into
the state;

these tendencies are
ultimately sha£ed by class
relations in
the economy, but a^ea,
and are played out within
the public
the state.

It

is important to
emphasize, at this

point, Habermas'

indebtedness to O'Connor, and
also to Claus
Offe, on the role of. the <?tatp no
+
state as the steering
mechanism
'

of

late capitalism.

Habermas closely follows
O'Connor's

description of late capitalism
as a three-sector economy,
and endorses his arguments
on the growing socialization
and
collectivization of production.
On the basis of this description,
the socialization
of production calls for
increased state planning and admin-

istrative intervention in realms
of cultural life which
previously have been (once set in
motion) self-regenerat ing
One example of this is in education.
The need to coordinate
a trained labor supply with the
demands of the labor market
forces the state into curriculum planning
and educational
innovation.
This intervention not only requires
legitimation (for it is an overt exercise of
"new" power in an area
previously, relatively, less dominated); by
requiring
legitimation, it makes the entire matter a matter
of public
debate in a way it had not previously been 21

Whereas school administrations formerly merely had
to codify a canon that had taken shape in an
unplanned, nature— like manner, present curriculum
planning is based on the premise that traditional
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patterns could as wpn
1S ~
trative planning produces
a universal Pressure
press
for legitimation in a
sphere thlt ,?
n
dis reciseiy for its

S;iS

se n-

As other examples of
this process, Habermas
cites land-use
Planning and the matter of
private ownership of land,

health-care planning, and family
planning and marriage laws
which bring sexual taboos
and equality up for debate.
He
further notes that this general
process of administrative
intervention creates a consciousness
"not only of the con-

tents of tradition, but also
of the techniques of tradition, that is, of socialization."
Among other things, this
means a questioning of the
appropriate forums and agencies
of socialization:

family, church, versus the state.

To

the extent that this is so,
and Habermas seems to have

framed a major American political
issue, it means that
Weber's rational-legal model of
legitimacy is insufficient.
State actions may be the product of
legal authority, but
that authority will not carry the day
unless it can appeal
to a standard of ju stice 22 And that
,.
standard is precisely
what is at issue when the state intervenes.
In thinking about this overall process,

Habermas

underlines a crucial problem for the state, in
securing
its legitimation, which ties into important
debates about

the meaning of consumption and the embourgeoisement
of the

working class.

The process of state expansion undermining

tradition means that "meaning is a scarce resource" in
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late capitalism.^

Among the ranks of mi
sslng or scarce
meaning is legitimation
for (growing) state
activity.
This
deficit can be partly offset,
Habermas argues, by material
reward through the state
or directly through a
(temporarily)
well-functioning economy. This
replacement relationship
though, is limited by three
linked factors:
economic downturn, the "natural" limits
to state rationalization
of the

cultural system, and the new
needs created, fostered, by
state expansion. The limiting
effect of economic downturn
clear enough.
Limits to rationalization of
the cultural
system lie in the constitutive
motivations it supplies
to

all,

including economic, activity.

And, the process of

state expansion revolves around,
and creates, groups within
the population who are outside
traditional orientations to
exchange value. These groups, such
as radicalized human
services workers, welfare recipients,
public transport
users, students, and the elderly, are
increasingly oriented
through state activity (Habermas argues)
to use values and
to collectively-provided goods.

As such,

they provide a

source of critical leverage when administrative
rationality, ultimately, re-polit icizes the
public sphere through
its undermining of tradition.
In the history of capitalism,

this undermining of

tradition has taken place in two distinct, though intertwined, areas:

pre-bourgeois world views and culture

(religion, peasant and craft traditions) and the bourgeois
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traditions Habermas describes
as civil privatism
and
familial- vocational privatism.
Habermas argues that these
bourgeois traditions have
always been dependent
upon historical links with
pre-bourgeois traditions 24
:

le to
reproduce ?tse?f from^seW Wa ® never
t
dependent on motivationally
Effective supple
PP
mentation by traditional
world-views

f

The reasons for this
dependence have to do with
"universal"
areas of culture which
"pure" bourgeois traditions
(meritocratic ideology) do not
effectively address: consolation
in the face of death,
guilt, sickness; reconciliation
with
inner or outer nature, which
bourgeois culture takes only
as objects; an explicit
basis for understanding, fostering,
relations of solidarity within
groups or between individuals;
and relatedly, a notion of
politics which addresses collective needs.
Pre-bourgeois world-views which addressed
these matters have been steadily
eroded and with them,

Habermas argues, the tacit strength
capitalist society drew
from their answers to these existential
matters.
Bourgeois motivations are further weakened
(apart
from the processes described above of
state-fostered usevalues, and of direct undermining of
bourgeois traditions)
by a widespread realization that we do
not live in a market

society which justly allocates reward according
to competition and merit.
Rather, Habermas argues, "it has
been

recognized, even among the population at large, that
social
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force is exercised in the
oc
forme?
iorms of economic exchange ." 25
An example of this,
argues Habermas, is
increased emphasis
on schooling as an avenue
to success-a situation
in which
the life chances allocated
by social class are
increasingly
apparent

^

•

In this overall picture
a legitimation crisis
seems

quite probable to Habermas.

Once the traditions essential

for the constitution of
capitalist social relations have
been brought into the realm
of consciousness and debate.
they cannot be reconstituted.
But what

remains relatively

unweakened in bourgeois culture is
its abstract universalism— a component of liberal society
representing a development
thought and action over pre-bourgeois

m

societies.

Universal istic orientations enter into
the public debate
created by state expansion, a force
pushing the resolution
of this moral debate
developmentally-forward
,

a

standard blocking permanent regression.

or rather,

This standard

consciously "appropriates" a segment of an
ideal of undominated communication, an ideal implicit in
our entering into
practical discourse.

Relatively "freed," temporarily, from

the bonds of authority and domination
contained in under-

mined traditions, practical discourse may approach
the
process of collective will-formation which Habermas sees
as inseparable from moral truth itself.
it

Though

I

pretty obtusely, this moral truth is in effect

have put
a

pro-

cedural notion of democracy founded on social equality

.
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M^raisal.

Habermas' arguments in
Legitimation
are
significant not only in
themselves, but also in the
reflection they provoke over a
wide range of issues. My
own
position on legitimacy has
been fundamentally shaped
by
his general concerns with
the process I term cultural
degradation, with the nature of
practical discourse, and with
the linking of intersubjectivity
to the deeper forces and
patterns of social life. Often
obscured by the storm of
criticism and rebuttal which
Legitimation Crisis rightfully, encountered, the
insights he brings to these concerns have not yet found their
proper place in left social
theory and movements.
,

In

appraising the book,

I

will often differ with

Habermas' particular interpretations
of these concerns.
And
so doing, I will raise issues
germane to the American
scene which, given our shared concerns,
he might well
accommodate.
But there remain several fundamental
differences between our outlooks, manifested
also in these

m

lesser" criticisms.

These pressure me ultimately to

differing, more pessimistic scenarios of
legitimation

crises and their possible political resolutions.
the intertwined points

I

shall consider are:

Among

his use of

the mechanical and abstract language of systems
structural-

functionalism; the pressure in systems theory to wash out
class, sex, and racial modes of domination and the dynamics

they involve; the role of the state as a steering mechanism
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in late

capitalist the direct co„tri
bution of the econQmy

as well as the state
to cultural degradation;

and the

matter of his teleology,
especially as it contributes
to
his neglect of nationalism
as a legitimating
tradition in
the modern world system.
Before engaging these points,

I

want to emphasize,

again,

the superiority of the
interpretive view of ideology,
and Habermas' use of it, over
O'Connor's view and the

behavioral treatment of ideology.

it

helps us to deepen

our understanding of public
disaffection from the state,
which is seen though not entirely
correctly by either

—

Habermas or citizens who hold this
view-as a bureaucratic
threat to private life and to the
"self-generating" nature
of cultural traditions which
secure social identity.
We
need to (and will shortly) flesh out
the schematic picture
Habermas draws of this process, and
make it apply to contemporary American politics. But in doing
so, we will

temper considerably the effect of the
"epistemic pressures"
Habermas sees operating in the crisis. His
account ultimately underestimates the tenacity of traditions,
whose
content and possibilities for change are also
shaped by
structural forces in the international system of
nations,
by the dynamics of the sex/gender system and its
links to

class, and by the (related) institutionalized projections
of racial consciousness.
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Any novice confronting
Legit matlon
be excused for wondering
how a theorist of
communicative
competence may write in such
tortured language.
Critics
have often chastised
Habermas for his language
and it bears
repeating here. Of course,
there are valid reasons
for
abstraction or jargon. And,
Habermas' peculiar combination
of German philosophy,
critical theory, and systems
talk
can be translated into
something like ordinary
1.

wm

language-

much as

Wright Mills did for Talcott
Parsons in The
Sociological Imagination
But, it is possible to write
social theory in something like
everyday language, and the
effort is important politically,
even if not completely
possible.
But there is something more
at stake.
The
language of systems theory is inherently
at odds with
Habermas' intention to place
intersubjectively-constituted
traditions in the forefront of his theory.
Systems jargon
wins out in this unlikely partnership,
undermining,
C.

.

I

think,

wider hearing for Habermas' arguments
about culture.
As
Habermas notes when seeking to retain the
experience of
a

subjects as a vital element in his structural
analysis,
"the problem is to demonstrate their
interconnection. ..26
He ha s made connections between "steering
problems" and

normative structures.

But he has not made palpable enough

the manner in which structural forces are creations
of and

beyond intersubjectively constituted activity.
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Systems jargon makes it hard
to express such connections for it tends to
completely reify structures,
to give
them a life of their own
unconnected to human agency.
I„
order to make these connections,
Habermas would have to
engage in a particular and
concrete analysis; since this
is
explicitly not his aim in
Legitimation Crisis he deserves
some benefit of the doubt on
this issue.
In following some
of his concerns in the remainder
of the dissertation,
though,

will be trying to fill in such
connections historically, around race relations.
I

Systems jargon also pressures one
to wash out
patterns of class, sex, and racial
domination within,
across, and common to different
subsystems of society
(economy, state, culture).
That is, we focus in systems
theory not on relations of domination
and the dynamics
springing from them, but on regions of
society. 27 Thus
Habermas, for instance, insists that class
dynamics in the
2.

economy are ultimately the motor of structural
imbalance

between these regions.

But, he fails to underline the

play of class forces in the state and in the
socio-cultural

system (i.e., class sub-cultures); and, he fails to
emphasize how culture itself is increasingly degraded by
being

brought under relations of production for exchange.
lar points which

analysis

I

Simi-

made with regard to O'Connor's class

specifically the role of the PMC in production,

politics, and culture

— would

also apply, at this point,
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to Habermas

.

To make such points,
however,

is to brlng
pressure within one's theory
to modify an account
of the
state as the immediate
source of crisis.
Class relations
which encompass the state
and help to make it
a target of

dissatisfaction play

a

more prominent role.

For example,

the manner in which middle
class reformers articulate
environmental, racial, and women's
rights issues, and
bring them to the state for
administrative regulation,
helps to define working class
constituencies out of the
issues and/or to make them
disproportionately the bearers
of administrative reform.

Systems analysis also fits

a

judgment which on its

surface might be sustained about
late (and especially
American) capitalism, that class
conflict has in fact been
muted, transmuted, into different
forms.
Both O’Connor and
Habermas stress a class compromise 28
they see as central to
late capitalism on which the
expanded role of the state
rests.
The difficulty with focusing on this
"compromise”
is that it never included labor
and capital outside the

monopoly sector, and that labor in the
monopoly sector
resisted in a variety of ways the union
complicity necessary to make this compromise work.
As a result, I would
argue, both O'Connor and Habermas stress the
state as an

arena of displaced class struggle— which it is to
an ex-

tent— to

the exclusion of class conflict in production

itself.

Or rather, they underestimate the potential of a
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d-ect repoliticization

of class relations
in production.
Direct assaults on labor
are an essential part
of the resolution of capitalist
crises-a point O'Connor nates
but
does not fully develop in
his social-industrial
complex
scenario.
These direct assaults always
raise the possibility of outright questioning
of class relations and
the
state's role in maintaining
them.
The current wave of
union-busting, and workers'
response to it, are part of
this dynamic.
In confronting union-busting,
workers often
have to confront the repressive
force of the state in

breaking strikes and litigating
union grievances to death.
Strikes over speed-ups, health
and safety issues, and
important local issues all face
this same possibility.
With less surplus to bargain
over in time
of crisis,

the

repressive role of the state necessarily
becomes more
prominent.
My point here is not to overdraw
the possibility of a direct production-caused
political crisis,
but to show it as an essential
element in the overall picture and to distinguish between
different forms of state

involvement in crisis.
If we

were to incorporate notions of patriarchy
and

sex/gender system into Habermas' analysis, we
would have
to consider whether the dynamic of
economically-induced
a

state encroachment on culture fully captured the
direction
of structural forces operating in the social
system.

Does

the structure of socialized sex roles contain a
dynamic
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which interacts with the
imperatives of the economic
sphere and/or does it
constitute a much more
resistant
object to class dynamics
than the fairly passive
picture
Habermas paints? Does the
distinction between the
"private
life" of family and cultural
tradition on the one hand,
and the "public life" of
the economy and state on
the
other, in fact represent an
accommodation of class relaand patriarchal relations
to one another? How do
we
account for the reproduction
of sex roles and of gender?
For the reproduction of
domination within this system?
Let me give a thumbnail sketch
of patriarchal relations
in a sex/gender system which
begins to address these questions, one which I shall expand
upon in chapter four in my
analysis of race relations.
,

’

Debates over the reproduction of sex
roles and gender
inevitably position themselves with
respect to Freud, and
involve the question of relativizing his
theory historically and culturally.
I would take as my
point of departure the interpretations Nancy Chodorow
and Gayle Rubin
make of undeveloped, or controversial,
points in Freudian
29
theory.
And, I would note the open nature of the
issues
on which

I

must necessarily take a position.

Sexual identity takes root in a developmental stage
in which a previously bisexual infant learns
the congruity

between physical traits and socially-constituted behavior.
As embodied beings learning sex roles

,

young children are
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learning, am ong other
things, the nor m of
heterosexuality
Thus learning requires
a prior and co-extensive
process of

individuation-in which the infant
learns to distinguish
itself from the world around
it, a world which
includes a
mother who attempts to meet
the infant's needs.
In our
culture, this complex process
takes place in a context
where women are mothers-the
primary nurturer and loveobject for the infant, whom
the infant recognizes as
an
all-powerful figure and who,
ultimately, is also an object
of resentment because all
the infant's needs cannot
be

recognized or met.

The process also takes place
in a context in which relatively absent
male fathers have recognizable powers distinct from and
beyond those of women.
Learning in these contexts creates
asymmetries in the
socialization of girl and boy children:
asymmetrical needs,
capacities, and life chances which take
root at the basic
level of the personality and reproduce
themselves in later
love relationships and in social inequality
between the
sexes

Both girl and boy children learn heterosexual
norms
in the Oedipal phase of development,

and enter this phase

with female mothers as their primary love objects.

In

establishing themselves as males, boys must repress
their
feminine aspects and the affective capacities associated

with them.

They learn to identify with a rival for their

mother's love, their father, who resembles them genitally.
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in doing so,

they accept that they
cannot erotically
possess
the mother, but that
they can erotically and
affectively
love someone physical^
like her.
In establishing themselves as female, though,
girl children occupy a
more
ambivalent position. They
must learn that they may
not
erotically love or possess
their mother or someone
like
her, yet they cannot.
as completely individuate
themselves
from their mothers, whom
they genitally resemble.

Chodorow's argument is that in
learning heterosexual norms,
girl children go through a
weaker individuation process
than boy children do, and do
not achieve the same focusing
of erotic and affective
desires upon males that
boys can

achieve with respect to females.

Rather, girls effectively

split these desires, retaining
affective capacities for
females while transferring erotic
desires to males; and,
this transfer of erotic desire is
initially to a relatively
more remote figure, the father, than
a boy has available in
the mother.
In this weaker individuation,
girl children
tend to emerge with a less firm basis
than boys do for

feelings of control over the external world,
for the sense
of competence and effectiveness.

Later training in sex

roles encourages, and bases itself upon, this
asymmetrical

process
In

later life, men and women come together on the

basis of these asymmetries, which result in

a

substantial

but not complete fit between the expectations and
capacities
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they bring to tbeir
relationships with each other.
Though
these asymmetries contribute
to male dominance in
society,
in ways I shall indicate
below, they become at a
very early
age a basic part of the
personality itself, an anchor
with
respect to fundamental needs
which may be questioned or
overturned only on pain of deep
personal crisis.
They form
a core of social identity
which would not neatly fit
into
Habermas' picture of reasoned
moral discourse over increasingly transparent traditions.
The fit between the capacities
and needs which men
and women bring to their
relationships is not a complete
one.
While meeting somewhat more
symmetrically on the basis
of erotic need, men tend to
demand of women a focused level
of nurturing and affective support
which their differing
individuation processes cannot fully sustain.
A woman's

nurturing and affective needs may be
satisfied over
perhaps less intense because less focused,

a wider,

range of rela-

tionships that include children and other women.
man

s

But a

emotional needs tend to be focused upon one woman,

or a series of women, and upon a smaller range
of male

friends.

Kis individuation process more or less focused

those needs on females and discouraged their expression
with respect to males.

As Chodorow notes,

in a society

in which personal relationships and family are increas-

ingly bereft of institutional supports, and increasingly

bear the burden of personal identity, these asymmetries
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and the problems and
anxieties they provoke are
more and
more visible.
In chapters four and
five, I will argue that
thts and other aspects of
our sex/gender system
play a

constitutive role in the dynamics
of race relations and
contribute, among other things,
to the sense of vulnerability white men and women
may feel to the sexual
images
white culture projects onto
black peoples.
As Chodorow and others
argue, because women are
mothers they are subject to a
range of primitive resent-

ments which young children
accumulate when their needs are
unrecognized or unmet by their
primary love-object. These
resentments are a fertile basis for
anti-feminine attitudes
among both male and female, and
a contributing factor to
patriarchal relations. Moreover,
women cannot easily
defend themselves against such
attitudes, other blaming
games, and assertions of male power
or competence because
their weaker individuation process
(abetted of course by
training and role emulation) weaker ego
boundaries
leaves them more internally connected to,
and therefore
somehow responsible for, the world around

—

them.

It feeds,

for women in our culture, a particular
form of internal

self-blame for a world suffused with affective ties
and
bonds
In

The Traffic in Women," Gayle Rubin argues that

contemporary Western sex/gender systems are organized along
lines similar to those of kinships systems Levi-Strauss
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uncovered in

,„ore

'primitive- societies.

In such p re - st ate

societies, kinship systems
organize economic, political
ceremonial, and sexual
activity.
In these systems,
incest
taboos and "eri ftqn
OT7 _ ^
P
major role in organizing
y
these
activities, and together
constitute the process he
calls
the exchange of women.
Incest taboos mandate who
may and
may not become sexual
partners, and thus mandate
marital
exchange between groups
composed of members forbidden
sexual activity with each
other.
these marital exchanges, women moving between
groups form the basis of
kinship and alliance between
the groups 30
.

m

.

in es
results in a
relations
eiations, °»a set? of^ people whose wide network of
connections with
one another are a kinship
structure.
Ml othef
levels, amounts, and directions
of exchange—
Udl
h ° Stlle ones
are ordered by this structure
re.
Thp marriage ceremonies
The
recorded in the
ethnographic literature are moments
in a ceaseiess and ordered procession in
which women
children, shells, words, cattle
names, fish
ancestors, whales teeth, pigs, yams,
spells,’
dances, mats, etc., pass from hand
to hand
leaving as their tracks the ties that
bind.’

—

In this organization,

men are the beneficiaries of the

total exchange system because they
have as fathers and
brothers what mothers and sisters do not
have—the rights
of bestowal in their daughters or
sisters.

These are

rights that women do not have (fully) in their
own persons
or in the persons of their male kin.
These
rights, and

the system of kinship itself, are based upon
the incest

137

taboo, heterosexuality,
and an asymmetric
division of the
sexes

Freudian theory does not
analyze kinship systems,
but
it does analyze their
bases, as described above;
it analyzes
the reproduction of
sexuality.
As in ChodoroWs exigesis
of Freud, central to this
reproduction is the role of the
Oedipal stage of development,
in which heterosexuality
is
forged through an individuation
process involving incest
taboos, penis envy, and
castration fears. Rubin argues,
following Lacan to a point, that
the Oedipal drama is the
conscription of previously bisexual
infants into kinship
structures, and that to understand
this conscription we
must particularly understand the
concepts of penis envy and
castration fears as expressing the
symbolic role of the
phallus in kinship systems.
In original Freudian theory,

rivalry with the father

for possession of the mother leaves
both girls and boys

with the "choice" of having a penis or
being castrated.
In choosing to have a penis,

in fear of being castrated by

the father, the boy renounces his right
to the mother but
not his right to women.
In contrast, a girl cannot physi-

cally have a penis, and so experiences herself
as biologi-

cally castrated, unable to satisfy the mother,
inferior,
and thus gives up her struggle to possess her mother
(or

other women) and acquires the passive and heterosexual

characteristics of femininity.

Though Freud can and has
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been read

overwhelming biologically

i„ hls analysis Qf

these processes, it is
possible, as Lacan and R
ubin do
to "conceive of
psychoanalysis as a theory of
information
rather than organs ." 31
(0 f course, as Rubin notes,
it is
not simply a matter of
either/or, but of both biology
and
information
.

Rubin's use of Lacan distinguishes
between the biological fact of the penis and
the social information of
the phallus.
Thus boy and girl children,
in the Oedipal
Phase, are presented with
information which confers meaning
upon the genitals.
This meaning includes not only
heterosexuality, but also male dominance
over women based on the
possession of the phallus, of which
castration fears are,
in part, recognition.
These meanings are structured in
part by a child rearing system in
which women are mothers,
the primary love-objects of young
children who have genital
differences.
Rubin argues that in the Oedipal phase,
boys
and girls learn that men have
capacities and rights in
women, based on the possession of the
phallus, that women
do not have in themselves.

In learning this lesson along

with their heterosexuality, boys and girls
enter for the
first time (in a conscious way) a kinship
system, with its
taboos and enjoinders, in which women are symbolically

exchanged for phalluses.
In this Oedipal exchange system,

a girl

symbolically

acknowledges her social inferiority in her "castration,"
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“

reCOenlz1

^

^at

she may only have a
p hallus as a gift
from a man.
It is a gift which
the mother can not
give
to the young girl,
for the mother does
not possess the

Phallus either physically or
socially, and herself went
through a similar acknowledgment
as
a child.

it

is a gift

Which the girl's father
does not give her, although
he does
possess it.
In fact, the father
can give it to (acknowledge
it in) his boy child.
The boy in turn must
"give away" his
mother to his father in order
to receive a phallus, in
order
not to be castrated, an
exchange which expresses his
future
right to possess a woman.
In this exchange system
the girl

is systematically disadvantaged,

for she must also "give

away" her mother to her father,
but receives no acknowledgment of the phallus the right
to possess someone physically
like her mother— from her father
in return.
She learns,
through a process filled with
ambivalence, resentment, and
self-doubt, a passive role with regard
to the phallus:
she does not have a phallus to give,
may only receive one
from a man (in intercourse or through
child bearing), and
as future mother will herself be
"exchanged" against the
phallus.

In this original,

primitive exchange of the

Oedipal stage, boys and girls gain basic
identities that
rest not only on an (abstractly) universal
process of
individuation, but also one that rests on disparities
of
power
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These disparities revoive
around

social division of
labor in which women are
primarily responsible for
childrearing.
The extent to which this
role can and should be
shared by men, the desirability
of one primary love-object
for the infant for a
certain period after birth,
the question whether the eradication
of patriarchy requires
changes
in child-rearing that
would result in androgyny,
and other
issues are all matters of
intense debate.
I myself,
for
Instance, do not think that
Rubin's arguments require
androgyny as a solution to
patriarchal domination.
It is
also not clear to me that 32
a

™

S
nSpl
features of kinship
IS
is that ?t
It has been systematically
stripped of
its

r V°

functions-- political economic,
educational
and organizational.
It has been reduced to its’
barest bones sex and gender.
,

—

Particularly for working class, poor,
and minority communities, kinship systems continue to
play a significant role,
organized to a great extent by women, in
many of these
areas. 33

Moreover,

I

want to argue in the next two chap-

ters that kinship systems play a major
role, emphasizing
but not limited to sex and gender,

racial subordination.

in constituting American

These and other considerations sug-

gest that a critique of patriarchy's roots in our
sex/

gender system is not as clear-cut or as telling as
Rubin's
arguments would lead one to believe.
In the following two chapters,

I

shall argue that

property relations and taboos central to the operation of
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our forms of sexual
identity and kinship
are central to
any consideration of
race relations and to
race-connected
legitimation problems of the
American state.
These property
relations and taboos, widely
but incompletely shared
across
white middle and working
34
classes,
i„ vo i ve particular
forms
of the regulation and
repression of sensuality.
As Freud
noted with regard to -the
incest taboo, such regulation
and

repression have been historically
essential to the maintenance of social harmony
through the reduction of
possible
conflicts over sexual activity.
But, early capitalist

patriarchy and its heirs have
repressed sensuality twice
over:
not only to render sociality
possible and to reserve
energies for productive activities,
but also as the basis
for a quantum, qualitative
increase in productive
activity.

In this qualitative leap,

peoples of color served as foils

for projections of this
repressed sensuality, projections

which helped constitute and legitimate
their sexual and
economic oppression. As colonized
peoples, they entered

interwoven class and kinship dynamics.

These interwoven

dynamics have been particularly opaque
not only to everyday
participants in racial practices, but also
to analysts and
resisters themselves in this patriarchal
culture of

productivity
3.

A number of questions revolve around the
charac-

ter of the state as a collective capitalist.

I

addressed

most of these in my appraisal of O'Connor's theory,
and
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because Habermas imports
O'Connor wholesale into
Legitimaii°H^risis, they apply with some
modifications to Habermas
as well.
Among these are: a neglect
of private financial
institutions which play a major
role in coordinating investment and supporting the
array of policy institutions
which
help shape state options;
overestimating the contribution,
on the whole, of state
economic planning to the
accumulation
process
economic steering function;
overestimating
the

institutional capacity of the antique
American state to
serve as economic planner and
coordinator; and underplaying
the dependence of our post-war
accumulation on U.S. hegemony
in the international system
of nation states.
Let me

qualify these somewhat.

Though Habermas is writing about
Western capitalist
states in general, his discussion may
still be more geared
to the Western European experience
than to that of the

U.S.

(or,

for that matter, Japan).

European states have employed

indicative economic planning for quite some
time and have
organized regional political-economic integration, 35
These
states have advanced welfare bureaucracies,
and their adoption of welfare principles preceded that of
the U.S. by 25

to 50 years.

His discussion of both economic planning, and

the penetration of political bureaucracy into
private life

seem more suited to the European experience, though

I

would

not deny its applicability, with revisions, to the U.S.
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In fact,

the expansion of public
power may be a more explosive issue, in some
respects, in this country
than in
Europe

many compelling reasons,
Habermas, like O'Connor,
focuses on the state as the
displaced arena of economic
contradictions.
But
making this argument,
Habermas, also
like O'Connor, needs. to
directly address the relative
visibility of public power. To
fail to do so is to unwittingly
lay one's argument open
to the detours and roadblocks
of
liberal ideology.
The particular detour I see
Habermas
encountering affects his argument
that the state will be a
target of dissatisfaction over
its attempts to "plan culture" for the benefit of
accumulation. On his

m

terms, this

dissatisfaction with the state leads
also to a questioning
of the capitalist priorities
behind the state's
planning.

According to Habermas, the state falls
prey to this
blame because its cultural intervention,
as

a clear exer-

cise of power, must be legitimated.

This need for legiti-

mation disrupts the pattern of civil
privatism, or
generalized acquiescence to state activity.
Yet capitalist
investment decisions and consumption management
contribute
heavily, though less "visibly," to cultural
change; in fact

they contribute heavily to frustrations which
are then

aimed at the state

6
.

Thus not just structural constraints

upon the state to try to "manage" capitalism, but also
the

relative visibility of state compared to private power,
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Play a crucial role in
the

displaces

o f crisis into the
state which O'Connor and
Habermas argue. This
visibility.
Ideologically conditioned,
is something they
both partly
assume and find no need
to explain.
Whatever the source
of cultural disruption,
Habermas is correct that it
could
lead not only to a state
crisis but also to a crisis
of
capitalist relations.. But if
Habermas clarified the direct
role of corporate power in
this disruption, and his
theory
entered widely into public
discourse, it would challenge
the ideological detours
which limit the questioning
of
class relations.
This clarification, as I
argued in chapter two, would require an
examination of managerial ideology
and the role of the PMC.
It would also require a
broader
theory of ideological hegemony
beyond the scope of this
dissertation

Habermas' neglect of nationalism is
a major problGm in legitimation Crisis,
stemming partly from a neglect
of the social system's "external"
environment.
Other important reasons lie in his overestimation
of the decay of
4.

pre-bourgeois and bourgeois traditions, and in
his optimism
that such decay— because of the nature
of practical
dis-

course— is essentially irreversible.
I

These traditions, as

shall argue, play a key role in nationalist
politics.

Though he is clearly sensitive to the problem of
fascism (the extreme form of nationalism), Habermas'

teleology of communicative-social development hinders
him
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from grappling theoretically
with the problem. His
philoso
Phy is a variant of the general
Enlightenment teleology
which has, necessarily,
been so repeatedly confounded
by
historical "regression." An
entire spectrum of theory
indebted to this teleology has
not done a good job at all
of dealing with the range
of nationalisms, "good" and
"bad,
in modern history and so
has adopted a series of theorysaving rationalizations in
order to save the notion of
progress.
In this way, the horrors
of warfare, international domination, and fascism
can be regarded as aberrations, perhaps even necessary
stages or counterpoints to
the march of history.

Nationalism poses an acute problem for
Marxism and
socialism, for it contradicts the notion
of a universal
class they have appropriated from
earlier Enlightenment
theories, as well as of class-based social
revolution.

Instead, modern history seems replete with
examples of

nationalist politics, and all too bereft of
open class
struggle.
And these nationalisms, in fact, rest upon
some
sort of class alliance against outside linguistic
or ethnic
groups.

How are we to understand this phenomenon, whether

or not we can somehow intuit its "good” manifestations

(struggles against imperialism), its "bad" manifestations
(fascist class collaboration), or its confusing Jekyll-

and-Hyde manifestations (say, Vietnamese nationalism)?
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in raising the problem
of nationalism,

I
shall expand
and deepen Tom Nairn's
work in The Break-Tin
37
His major contributions
are in thinking about
combined and
uneven development at the
level of the international
economy, and in dissecting
the content of nationalist
ideology.
He pursues both of these with
great insight and
subtlety, limited however by
an externalist view of
ideology
and a neglect of kinship
systems.
To his credit, he recognizes the first problem, and
suggests in his concluding
essay that a proper consideration
of nationalism would have
to transcend orthodox dichotomies
between materialism and
idealism.
I want here to give
another short sketch of my
arguments which, as they regard
nationalism, gather in or
imply much of my previous discussion
on the state and
kinship

Nationalism must be understood,

I

think,

as a con-

stellation of myths and constitutive
traditions akin to
nostalgic populism, grounded partly in a
world structur e
of combined and uneven economic
development, in which members of various social classes make claims upon
each other
that emphasize their cultural solidarity in
the face of

competing external cultures.

As a capitalist dynamic,

combined and uneven development is at bottom

a

product of

class struggle, but is in no way reducible to it.
ism is a reality indebted to, but beyond

,

National-

that of class.
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These myths and constitutive
traditions are also partly
grounded in another stature
central to culture in any
society, kinship systems
which reproduce sex and
gender
identity through variations
of patriarchal arrangements.
Widely but not completely
shared across class, sexual
taboos, norms, and patriarchal
arrangements help to ground
the claims made across the
class stratification that
stems
from production.
Grounded in these structures,
nationalism historically has been an
essentially conservative,
reactionary, but real alternative
in an array of possible
modes of social consciousness and
action.

Basic to this understanding of
nationalism is the
recognition of capitalism's relentless
expansion and domination from its urban and geographic
core areas.
The Enlightenment first conceived of this expansion
as an even
diffusion of civilization and progress.
But in reaction
to the initial outward expansion
from Holland, England, and
France, market-oriented elites in outlying
regions of Europe
and later the New World forged coalitions
with their

subordinate populations to challenge this external
domination and to embark upon their own course of
internal development.

That is, the process Enlightenment intellectuals

saw as an even dispersion of material progress itself

created a system of conflicting, warring nation states
and colonies.
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the history of nation
building within the
process
of combined and uneven
development, different nations
came
into being at different
times, and with widely
varying
material resources and
traditions at their disposal,
others
failed, are still trying,
or are even now emerging
out of
imperial or multi-ethnic
states.
These factors have placed
each nation at a structurally
more or less advantageous
position in the developing world
economy.
Those early into
the game tended to remain
at the core of the world
system,

with opportunities for colonies,
while latecomers have
emerged for the most part out of
the ranks of colonies and
peripheral areas of Europe (i.e.,
Italy, Turkey, the Balkan
states) and have been relegated
to " permanently " disadvantaged positions.
In this historical process,
the U.S.

occupies a rather unique position:

as one of the first

new nations, the inheritor of ideology
from

a

colonial

struggle against a mercantile state (as
Lipset points out),
and yet early enough into the game and
with sufficient

resources to become

a

core nation itself.

These nationalist movements, revolutions, and
subsequent internal political-economic development
mobilized the

subordinate masses and brought them "into history" as
legitimate and recognized social estate.
tion,

a

In this mobiliza-

folk traditions were a major basis of elite-mass

coalition and a resource for defining economic development
as a collective aspiration against an outside "threat."
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Bourgeois elites could not
afford to develop, as
older
tocracies did, a culture
and ideology sharply
divergent
from those whose labor
they would profit from.
The embrace
by entrepreneurial
elites of folk values,
customs, and

languages represented a
claimjipon mass support in
the
struggle against outside
states and capital, against
internal feudal, absolutist,
or mercantile interests
that
restrained market development,
and for internal commodityform development.
These claims to unity in turn
contributed
to subordinate/working
class claims to political
rights and
equality within the new nations.
By describing nationalism
as in part nostalgic populism, we are highlighting the
general elite embrace of pre-

Eodern traditions to mobilize a
population for modern
development.
Nationalism is, as Nairn argues,
Janus-faced,
facing forward and backward at the
same time.
In the U.S.,

though, the initial colonial struggle
and first 100 years
or so of internal development did
not employ feudal peasant
traditions to articulate collective
aspirations (as did

peripheral European states and third-world
colonies).
Rather, for 150 years by the time of
our Revolution, our

collective myths, traditions, and practices
had been
shaped in the developing craft /entrepreneurial
self-image
of the English middle class and mercantile
minded land-

owners.
all know,

Thus the U.S. colonial struggle was not, as we
so much a social struggle as a political one
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against a restrictive
mercantile state not yet
(until 1831
and the Corn Laws) under
the dominance of market
elites,
constraints, and ideology.
That is, U.S. nationalism
did
not initially meet Nairn's
description of nostalgic
populism, at least from the
point of view of craft
practices.
If we look at 19 th
century U.S. history, I would
argue that four areas, of
myth and practice stand
out in
defining the particular content
of U.S. nationalism and
cross-class alliances.
These involve craft, religion,
race, and democratic aspirations.
Each of these, and in
interwoven ways, are regions of
motivation that helped to
constitute and sustain national
solidarity and internal
development. All four continue to
play central roles in
the currents and possibilities
for contemporary
U.S.

nationalism
Craft practices and self-images
dominated the American landscape up through the late 1800
's, a mode of smallscale, self-organized production for
market which

industrial capitalism largely destroyed in
the process of
creating a dependent class of labor. These
craft practices
were the root of market ideology, and the
living source,
as many sociological studies of Enlightenment
thought

reveal, of beliefs in material progress, science,
and the

civilization of productivity.

Craft organization of pro-

duction included not only the artisan producers we

associate with urban life, but in a more general sense

“
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farmerS Wlth a

™cular

interest in markets and

geographical expansion. 38

When we include small
farmers in
our calculations, upwards
of three-quarters of
the population, through the 1870-8,
fall within craft society.
The
craft mode was crucial
to the geographic and
economic
expansion of Manifest Destiny
and related expressions
of
U.s. nationalism in the
mid-1800's.

Craft was, through the
1300's, a constitutive source
of resistance to
concentrations of private and
public power.
I would argue
that populist revolts in
the 1890's, centered
in South and West farming
regions, were in a sense (failed)
proto-nationalist movements against
finance and industrial
capital centered in the Northeast.
In terms of economic
power (and political power),
South and West became at the
end of the 19th century
geographical regions of underdevelopment.
In sharp contrast to the
heyday of Manifest
Destiny, craft independence came
under attack on the farm
and in the factory, rendered
permanently subordinate by
large capital and its emerging
alliance with the state.

Given widespread acceptance of
privately-organized production, common to craft and industrial
production, the power
of large capital at this point in
history rendered craft
aspirations forever (temporally) reactionary
and futile.

Today as historical resource and myth, and in
part because
they tap into the need for satisfying worklife,
craft/

market ideas remain an important aspiration which
American
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reform movements turn
to.

And this turning to
the past is
indeed an element in the
potential for current U.S.

nationalism. 39

Protestant and evangelical
religion played
role in articulating U.S.
nationalism

a

crucial

in the 19th century,

and.

in providing the training
in mores shared by working

class,

craft, and middle class
families.

Evangelical

religion sanctified not only
property, individualism, and
geographic expansion as God's
plan.
It also shaped and
provided outlet for the sensual
repression required by the
social engine of production and
by patriarchal relations.
In doing so, it promulgated
a complex of kinship
relations
and economic disciplines that
defined the internal and
external "threats" which nationalism
set itself against.
For the U.S.
these threats were defined largely
in racial
form, a not uncommon but in our
case the unusually dominant
feature of our nationalism.
The pattern was something like
this:
the threat consisted of the dangerous
sensual impulses which only uncivilized peoples
could not control
and which therefore justified racial
conquest of the continent and the segregated subordination
of non-white peoples.
,

In an

extremely powerful way, race defined and contained

the craft-based, civilization of productivity
self-image

during the 19th century.
It

is important to stress the multiple role of a

patriarchal kinship system in American race relations.

In
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the service of
production, this system
first of aU generated a high level of
sensual repression. White
culture in
turn projected this
repressed sexuality onto
non-white
populations, making them into
threats to the civilized
order which had to be
segregated and subordinated.
This
sensual repression also
existed in the service of
patriarchy.
For instance, it was an
asymmetrical repression

which sanctioned a double
standard for male and female
sexual activity.
Also, by picturing black
men in particular as sexual criminals,
it posed a perpetual
threat from
which white women and children
might be protected by male
paternalism.
Kinship thus defined a system
of collective
white male sexual property,
in white and black women,
and
it helped organize economic,
political, and sexual interaction with outgroups of nonwhites.
Race, unlike the craft element
of social identity
during the 1800's, seems to have
provided the nostalgic

element of tradition which Nairn is
so right in emphasizing in his general description of
nationalisms.
In the
first place, American racial practices
had a history of
almost 200 years by the time Manifest
Destiny was pro-

claimed in 1814.

Secondly, Anglo myth makers of the mid-

19th century drew heavily upon the cultural
heritage and
the continuity (it seemed) of '’Western
Civilization" in

order to establish their racial point.

And high in the

pantheon of this heritage were the peculiar democratic
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traits of Anglo -Teutonic
culture
of myth makers at this
time.

,

H

qn P
ai
a special

preoccupation

Fears of social equality,
based on the pattern of
threat outlined above,
helped to shape the democratic
pirations of significant
numbers of working class and
craft people.
Heru^nvolk democracy, democracy
for the
master race, defined certain
men as equal not necessarily
in economic terms but
rather in racial terms.
This particular definition embraced
not only Southern, but also
Northern and Western peoples,
and gave peculiar content
to
the general market society
aversion to state power.
Except
for brief periods of crisis,
the American state has
not

been able to sustain interventions
against Herrenvolk
democracy; the cost of doing so
is the state 'e legitimacy.
It

is important to stress that
these four regions of

motivation and self-image served, as
nationalism, to
mobilize 19th century white Americans
for internal economic
development in a context of "external"
racial threats.

U.S.

nationalism in this era is not the garden
variety

which Nairn analyzes in his book.

From the angle of main-

stream historiography, the U.S. was in this
period isolationist and not particularly concerned, even

at the end of

the 19th century, with acquiring colonies.

But the Native

American nations with which the U.S. competed in this
era
are largely invisible to us now, and the other
"external"

racial threat is not neatly captured in the usual
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terminology of nationalism.

something like

i nternal

,

Non-white Americans constitute

quasi-colonies which are in part

the creature of internal
psychological dramas. But given
these intricacies, territorial
expansion in the 19 th
century was without a doubt
a nationalist endeavor
set in
a unique racial context.

Whatever U.S. nationalism is or
could be now depends
large part upon this history
of myths and constitutive
traditions, which represent a sort
of living storehouse
of populist memorabilia.
This storehouse has, depending

m

on its items,

a

tenacity which

does not acknowledge.

motivations?

I

think Habermas' theory

Is religion an anchor of
bourgeois

Evangelical religion is, has always been,

alive and well in this country, a
recurrent phenomenon and
key vehicle for organizing the
nostalgic revival of

threatened values.

Given the eroding position of the U.S.

economy worldwide, evangelism might now
serve as

a focal

point for reworked notions of sacrifice and
self-denial in
an age of scarcity.
One might imagine various wings of
this revival absorbing crucial issues like
the environment
into their world views

— sanctioning

ethics of environmental

plunder (the Reagan wing) or environmental preservation
(the Jerry Brown wing) in the name of competing images
of

the capitalist future.

Is the structure of power behind

the market increasingly transparent to citizens?

Various

reform movements dip into the nostalgic storehouse of
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social Identity to express
their dream of a market
society
or of democratically
restrained corporate power.
Can
America be re-industrialized
in a rough world of
international competition if only
we rededicate ourselves
to one
of several competing
images of the American dream?
Perhaps
the going will be rough
indeed.
In that case, the
continued
vitality of patriarchal kinship
systems, and
a call to

self-denial in the service of
economic development might
sustain and rekindle racial
consciousness, a valuable

unifier especially in the context
of Third World resource
politics

Summary
have argued that hermeneutics can
deepen our understanding of what scientific liberals
separate
I

out as the

normative or evaluative component of
legitimation problems
It allows us to grasp the expressive
dimension
of social

activity
world,

,

to make connections between knowing the
social

forming an identity within it, and the authority

which that social world has over us.

Thus a crisis of

authority, in the broadest sense, can be at one
level an

expressive crisis of social identity, a crisis of a way
of
looking at and knowing the world.
Yet to fully grasp the complexity of this expressive

dimension requires a sensitive grasp of pressures upon
cultural meanings, pressures originating in relations of
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omination and in the array
of impinging yet distinct
and
unevenly developing institutions
of American society.
Jurgen Habermas' work is
a step forward in
grasping these
systemic relationships. His
arguments help us deepen our
understanding of public
disaffection from the state,
which
is widely perceived as
a meddling, bureaucratic
threat
to

private life.

He paints a persuasive
picture of a state
undermining the very basis of
its own

authority-generalized

acquiescence

m

a context of economic
expansion

— simply

by

pursuing its general mission of
rationalizing the social
and economic conditions of
accumulation.
Its expanded
activities, indeed, call for
increased legitimation at a
time when those activities help
undermine legitimation
processes themselves. That is, Habermas
goes beyond other
theories of legitimation I have examined
by linking
experi

ential crises of social identity to
the expanding and
uncoordinated domination of political-economic
structures.
Yet in appraising Habermas, I have
noted that by

importing O'Connor's fiscal crisis arguments
into his
theory he is subject to similar criticisms
on class structure and on state-managed capitalism.
I have also noted
that Habermas, though to a significantly
lesser extent

than O’Connor, encounters problems with the
relative

visibility of state (as compared to direct corporate)
intervention in culture.

And,

I

have directly introduced
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the problems of
patriarchal gender systems
and nationalism
to the legitimation
dynamics which Habermas
sketches.
in reaching this
point, my dissertation
turns to an
extended application of the
framework I have

developed

through the first three
chapters.

I

shall explore the

intimate connections of
sexual/racial identity to the
motivations which help sustain
capitalist work life and
patriarchy, to the meaning of
racial segregation, and thus
to a range of purposes
and social "right" which
state
legitimacy has traditionally
rested upon.
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CHAPTER

I

V

SEXUALITY, RACE RELATIONS,
AND

LEGITIMACY:

PART

I

Introduction

Contemporary concern among
political movements and
alysts with the state seems
to be overwhelmingly
focused
on fiscal problems and
the expansion of bureaucracy
into
private life.
If one traces the genealogy
of these concerns, he inevitably confronts
an array of conflict
acknowledged by phrases like "the
turmoil of the 1960's."
The expansion of government
appears deeply indebted
to the

struggles of this period, and
scientific-liberal, Marxist,
and interpretive accounts
concur in seeing this period as
a crucial one for state
authority.
Yet the dominant scientific-liberal
model of power
and change, elite-pluralism, did
not anticipate this period
of turmoil, despite its practitioners’
goal of a predictive

science.

With its focus on stability and electoral

politics, the behavioral consensus stressed
survey research
findings of citizen disenchantment with
government and an
increasing neglect of voting. 1 The resulting
picture was
of a government beset by an unusual number
of discrete
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Problem, often bad l y handled
by

a mushrooming
bureaucracy

whtch was itself an object
of disaffection.
Urban blight
Poverty, racial struggles,
the Indochina War and
its afterof stagflation, activist
youth confronting social
problems and older generations,
and finally the revelations
of Watergate— these
problems, sometimes inevitably
and sometimes unnecessarily, fostered
citizen disaffection.
The most cogent analyses
of this disaffection
appeared, in mainstream circles,
within renewed discussion
of electoral realignment. 2
From different perspectives,
analysts gave varying accounts
of some neglected majority
of ordinary people who felt
unacknowledged for their devotion to steady work and
patriotism, and threatened by change
abetted by a state seemingly more
responsive to the needs
of minorities and the highly
educated.
Conservative

politicians appealed to this constituency
through issues
of crime, size of government,
taxes, housing
and school

integration, and more recently, family
issues and national
defense.
As I have argued in chapters two and
three, however,

scientific liberal analyses of these trends
have been
handicapped by a rudimentary understanding of
pressures
from within the economy for state expansion,
and by a view
of ideology which does not tap the depth
of experience

people feel about state expansion and other issues.
Marxist accounts of legitimacy see the turmoil of
the 1960's (usually implicitly) as the visible
ferment of
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^

brewing political-economic
crisis.3 Problems that
seen as relatively discrete
from a behavloral
perspectlye
or as failures of an
evolving New Deal approach
to government, are united in the
Marxist view as outcomes of
a

corporate-state interpenetration.

This symbiosis must on

the one hand promote the
conditions of private capital
accumulation and yet on the other
present state policies
as serving a public rather
than a private interest.
Thus,
O'Connor sees a fundamental
contradiction between the
accumulation and legitimation
functions of the capitalist
state.

Theorists using interpretive methods,
such as
Habermas, while accepting such
economic imperatives, see
in the turmoil of the 1960's
and in later legitimacy problems a broader erosion of culture. 4
With a more sophisticated view of ideology, Habermas traces
the state's role

m

undermining the motivations and purposes
that sustain
the social institutions of modern
society

— family

private life, work, citizenship.

But as

I

and

have argued,

Habermas' arguments do not easily account for
the deep

resistance to social change which new conservative
movements
draw upon.
This is also a problem for the Marxist accounts
which Habermas, in part, incorporates into his theory.

Valuable in ways previously discussed, these three

perspectives nevertheless misread the social turmoil which
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initially informed their
treatments of legitimacy.
They
systematically underplay. I
would argue, the distinctiveness and importance of
racial conflict in the
pattern of
legitimacy problems facing
the American state.
Each perspective, first of all, has
problems internal to
its own

treatment of race.
Elite pluralist views of
the state within the
scientific-liberal tradition have
treated race as an impor—
tant but vestigial, isolated
problem basically redressable
through the political system. 5
This view seemed reasonable
to many during the movements
of the 1960's, but today one
would be hard pressed to defend
the isolated and redressable character of racial inequality.
Vast injustices
persist, apparently intractable, in
the face of 1960's
"equal opportunity" legislation.
While sophisticated in
analyzing the internal problems of the
New Deal coalition
from an electoral point of view,
behavioral accounts have
rarely discussed the internal connections
of race to the
.

functioning of the economy and to family issues.
Works with an interpretive moment, like The
Hidden
Injuries of Class, begin to address contemporary
white

working class racial beliefs in a sensitive and
revealing
way.

6

These works bring out some of the binds confronting

people who in their embrace of the work ethic cannot understand how anyone could accept welfare (associated of course

with minorities), who see busing as a threat to the
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chances of their children
for social mobility,
and who
prize their own ethnic
communities.
Yet though this and
similar accounts tap the
important experiences many
whites
have of race relations,
they would be considerably
deepened
by a more historical
focus and by attention,
again,
to the

functionality of racism for
capitalist economies.
Generally stronger Marxist
analyses of Afro-Americans
as a "surplus population"
or as an "internal colony"
rely
as a corpus too heavily
on manipulation to explain
working
class racism (as I shall argue
in more detail later

in this

chapter).

And, Marxist works on
legitimacy which stress

fiscal constraints upon the
state give the impression that
capitalist or class dynamics are
the only pressures to
which the state responds.
They thus tend to picture the
way
which economic change shapes racism
and racial
struggles as coterminous with race itself.

m

Any understanding of 1960

's

race relations would bene-

fit from the strengths of these
different perspectives.

Yet,

they still share a shortcoming which
would limit our
efforts.
This is a neglect of the sexual aspect
of race

relations, "sexual racism" in Calvin Hernton's
terms.

7
I

would argue that unless we bring this factor
into our
analysis, we cannot fully understand the emotional
depth
and intensity of American race relations and
their impact
on state legitimacy.

Nor would we have a clear picture of
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how race relations are
connected at the deepest
level to
prevailing forms of family
life and work.
My basic argument is
that in the dominant
culture,
interwoven dynamics deeply
indebted to patriarchal
and
capitalist relations foster
a projection of sensuality
onto non-white peoples,
interpret this projection as
a
threat to white family life,
and encourage a sense of
vulnerability to this threat.
These projections are a central
element in such important
cultural themes as the contrast
between civilization and barbarism,
and the beast or animal
element in human nature.
The essential capitalist sources
of these projections have
been the historical need, varying
character by class position, to
channel human nature in
the service of disciplined,
intense production, and the
progressive degradation of manual labor
(that is, of physical qualities) in the context of
its abstraction from mental
labor.
The patriarchal context of emerging
capitalism
helped answer for our culture the
"question" of what facet
of social life to channel in the
pursuit of methodical production:
the sensual, physical qualities most
completely

identified with women.
factors,

in a sense,

These capitalist and patriarchal

rest upon a "base level” of sexual

repression involved in the establishment of
heterosexual
norms,

incest taboos, and other rules restricting sexual

partners. g In sum, capitalist patriarchy either
establishes
or intensifies important physical/sexual connections
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between the domination of
inner and outer nature,
and
fosters the projection of
this sensuality onto AfroAmericans
These projections establish
asymmetrical sexual-racial
taboos which speak to white
ambivalence about "undisciplined" lifestyles and those
who seem to embody them;
black
"sexuality" is not only an
object of fear, but an object
of
fantasy and attraction for men
and women.
These taboos are
asymmetrical by virtue of the
sexual property relations
which patriarchal gender
socialization helps establish at
the level of the personality 10
Thus black people appear not
only as threats because of the
generalized sexuality they
represent; black males in particular
appear as superior
sexual competitors and threats to
white males. Yet sexualracial taboos are not mere reflexes
of patriarchal
.

and

capitalist structures.

They enter into and help constitute

the social distance and hierarchy
of racial segregation

and subordination, establishing boundaries
that have

repeatedly been tested by an interracial
sexuality fraught
with conflict and exploitation.
In short,

pressures toward racism are inherent at

the deepest level of the social identities
which individuals

form in capitalist patriarchy.

In the history of our race

relations, they ground consistent ideologies of and fascina-

tions with supposedly degraded black family life, with

miscegenation and interracial sexuality, and with
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supposed black sexual
criminality-prostitution and rape.
Sexual projections, and
especially patriarchal mores,
have
grounded the reproduction
"within" the working class
itself
of racial ideologies
and practices.
Sexual projection,

and
the patriarchal mores
widely but varyingly shared
across
class have also grounded
the frequent and often
successful
appeals to racial solidarity
made across the class structure.
These appeals are a distinguishing
mark of the
r acial nationalism s
which especially mark our
domestic
history, nationalisms internally
related to the international rivalries which have
so often restrained class

politics in modern European societies.
want briefly in this introduction
to explain white
"supremacy" as a form of nati onalism
in the next chapter
I shall
develop these reasons more fully.
American race
relations are an attenuated form of
nationalism in that
white and black Americans share, to
a significant degree,
a common culture 11
Yet white nationalism is an apt term
because it conveys the intimate connection
of race to the
I

;

.

political-economic development of the American nation.
is also fitting in its sense of the
economic,

It

cultural,

and political unity of racial inequality, as
well as the

historically self-conscious nature of this unity on the
part of most white Americans.
a

I

also employ the term as

critical way of insisting that patriarchy and sexuality,

171
as well as economics
and ideology,

have been essential
elements of community and
national life. Moreover,
the
term underlines the
historical, cross class unity
on the
question of race.
And finally, the idea
points to the
state and its legitimacy
as, in part, creatures
of racial
politics

Before expanding. on this
argument,
state the limitations

I

I

am placing on it.

want first to

am not arguing
that race relations are the
prime legitimacy problem recently confronted by the
American state.
Rather, race
relations are one of several
factors in legitimacy problems.
They are a factor which in many
ways distinguishes American
politics from those of other Western
capitalist societies.
And, they are an element not
satisfactorily dealt with by
I

behavioral, Marxist, or interpretive
accounts of legitimacy.

Yet,

to deal with this element successfully
would

be to make deep internal connections
between the structures
of a capitalist economy, sexual
inequality, social identity,
and the political system of the New Deal
state.
In

making these connections,

I

will be drawing on the

strengths of the three perspectives previously
appraised

m
I

this dissertation.

From the scientific liberal stance

will be drawing, among other things, on analyses
of the

New Deal electoral coalition
I

.

From a Marxist viewpoint

will extend the argument that nonwhites were subordinated

in the service of capital accumulation.

And, using
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„„ tloa ,_

,

„n

to

u>k

„„
...» political

„„ tl ,

o, lb ,

•ill elaborate

t#i

racial l.llc.ti.a,

^

Specifically

„

,

a

ent of social identity
which transcends class
divisions.
I shall explore
my basic thesis in this
and the next
chapter.
Thls chapter opens with
a comparison of
caste and
Marxist theories- contributions,
respectively, to the sexual
and productive dynamics
of race.
This comparison highlights

important themes which a
subsequent historical sketch
deals
with.
This sketch covers three
topics:
the period of
racial enslavement, the
contribution of evangelical religion, and the post-Civil War
"black scare." The following
chapter carries the themes of
the historical sketch into
my
rpretation of 20th century housing
struggles.
And, the
final section in that chapter
elaborates white and black
nationalisms and ties them into the
emergence of racial
legitimacy problems within the "New
Deal" welfare state.
I.

— — Ste
a

theory

’

Caste and Marxist Theory
The Periodization of racial ideology
is

complicated matter; Allen, Frederickson

,

and Jordan,

among others, scarcely agree on the
broad outlines. 1 Caste
theory, though, signalled a shift in
public discourse away
from biological toward cultural explanations
of racial

inequality.

At the same time,

in its origins it was close
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to an

^"r

earner era of race
relations whose a„a
lysts
f ° 0US ° n SOUthe
- -res, paid specific

interracial sexuality.

in

attention to

And,

as a liberal theory

^

inequality whose proponents
b y and iar e
g
condemned the
effects of caste, caste
theory helped set the
terms of discourse which described
race relations as
primarily a set
of values, a moral
question, a moral
irrationality.
it
encouraged, I would argue,
the view that race
relations is
racism, racial ideology,
which might be illuminated
primarily by a study of racial
social psychology.
Caste explanations of iree
free blank
xnh-nblack-white
relations date
back to the 1860's in the
U.S.
the
tne earlip^t
1
earliest time
at which
British experience in India
could be applied here. 2
•

,

m

this century its prominence
dates to the efforts of
Robert
Park and others in the 1930
's.
Basing themselves on
notions of the Indian caste
system, various sociologists
focused on a number of similarities
in the Indian and
southern U.S. social systems,
often disagreeing
on the

features which rated most attention.
istics cited were:

Among the character-

accommodation to sharp inequality,

intercaste "etiquette"— manners of
deference and subordination, intermarriage proscriptions,
and barriers
to legiti-

mate descent in mixed marriages.

3

In

making the argument

that whites and blacks constituted
castes, these sociologists were attempting to reconcile their
rejection of

biological explanations of inequality with
those conditions
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th6y re J ec ted the
category of race
Among the constraints
they faced in their
enterpris were:
^^terprise
^ & i d ^^t^ricll inpniiQ t 4
inequality between races;
the seeming
inapplicability of M clas<3"
class due +to economic
divisions within black and white communities;
rigid color segregation
and
the seeming uncleanliness
of nonwhites; and
fearful proscnptions against interracial
sex.
And, on these constraints, the caste
system of fndia offers
a ready analogy.
By far the most
important example of
caste analysis
xs Gunnar Myrdal-s
An^merica^Dil^.4 Its medla
and
political acceptance helped
popularize the notion of
caste
and indicated the shift
to cultural explanations
of race
the transfer of the
burden of argument to those
who
would oppose, rather than
propose, public and social
integration.
The critical functions of
this (and most other)
caste theory are powered by
the notion of an American
creed
or value structure.
The creed affirms the basic
equality
of all men and is the
standard against which Myrdal
and,
he hopes, the nation judge
the racial situation 5 The
CrSed ln
American Dilemma, is both mocked
by caste
and, through people, struggles
against it.
Because caste
is a cultural (rather than,
say, economic) convention
its
.

'

.

.

1

-

i

,

’

,

persistence is primarily a matter of
morality and the will
to change.
By adopting this position, of
course, Myrdal.
other caste theorists, and the public
debate they help
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SVStematiCally

the economic
institutions
and forces which
operate to make
interpretation of
e creed a mockery,
and which have
historica lly sustalned
alternative creeds denying
the humanity of
non-whites
Myrdal and others,
though, through their
focus on social
Psychology, gave important
recognition to the
constitutive
role of sexual interests
and ideology i„ caste
relations
John Bollard's Castejujd^lag
g in a Southern nw ,
is worth attention
in this respect.®
Though he echoes the
main caste school concern
with deviations from a
"value
structure" of equality, his
analysis also gives white
caste
members much more of an
interest in the maintenance
of the
caste system.
Thus the moral choice of
abandoning caste
advocated by Myrdal, though
argued for by Dollard as
well,
is not so self-evidently
likely i„ Bollard's work;
rather,
he gives plausible reasons
for caste's longevity.
Sexual
freedom for white males is one
of the gains accruing to
the white caste, and in fact
as far as Bollard is concerned, sexual practices are
the defining characteristic
of caste relations.
In addition to denying
legitimate
descent (white status) to offspring
of mixed liaisons 7
caste in Southerntown is also a
categorical
barrier to sexual congress between
women and lower-caste men, within upper-caste
or without the
married state.
It does not result in such
a
er * et en up P er " caste ^n and
lower-caste
wnm^n
women.
In this it seems to be modeled
on the
patriarchal family with its possessive
prerogatives of the male; it has a double standard of
the same type.
Nothing else seems absolute
about the caste barrier.

th^

,

™
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Whlle noting and d

“„

tlng that sexual
freedom in the
caste system is relative
to race and gender,
Dollard dQes
not really pursue
these connections nor
li nk them to
caste
economics

The emphasis in
Dollard’

s and other caste
writers’
work on interracial
sexuality seems to have
been lost with
the supercession o f
the Southern-oriented
caste school by
writers concentrating more
on urban, northern,
ln8tltu t i onali Z
segregation
.

ed,^^

.

alWayS beSn m ° re t0lerant

interracial couples (antebellum Charleston, for
example).
But the relative inattention to sexuality in racial
studies once the north
also
became a focal point meant
the atrophy of an
important
understanding, one in fact
applying to the north as
well.
Caste explanations of race
entered into public discourse in a powerful way and
continue today to be relied
upon as a general reference
point in discussions

of race.
Yet there are problems with
the caste interpretation
which

render it largely inapplicable
to the American experience.
In making this clear, I will
rely upon the work of Oliver
C. Cox, an unjustly
neglected theorist of social stratification.
His systematic comparison of
caste and

race-

something caste writers never engaged

in— shows

that caste

relies upon religious distinctions
for dividing social
labor, while physical traits serve
as the standard of

inequality for the American situation.

In short,

"The
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Meaning of 'blood'
as

.,
inra
m
racial

in

* ° nShi P s
caste rc
,i
relatl

T

situations ." 8

C° X BOeS ° n t0

SPeU

not the same

° Ut

-tat distinction.
PhySi ° al CharaCteriS
tics unite members
of a race
an, aiffenentiate
them from other races.
But in caste
practice regions
rituals and occupation,
expressed i„
c othing, jewelry,
and soc ai demeanor>
castes.
color differences
within the indian
population do
coincide systematically
with caste differentiation 9
p

.

t

’

,

.

~

.

Second,

therefore, miscegenation
or amalgamation
disputes do not apply
to caste relations,
though there are
for other reasons.

Physical

melding cannot threaten
caste lines because
caste lines
are not drawn on a
physical basis.
Yet,

"obviously, when
two or more races have
amalgamated, all possible
'race
questions' will have been
answered ." 10

Third, the appearance of
a new caste in a
caste system is historically common.
But, "the appearance
of a new
race is always startling."
Fourth, since caste is

culturally-organized apart from
biology, an individual may
be initiated into a caste
or expelled from it.
Yet one is
born into one's race and
has "no alternative but to
die
11
in it ."
Fifth, therefore, in a caste
system you are
either a member of a particular
caste or you are not.
Yet
in a racial system,
amalgamation can make degrees of color
a problem: 12
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i
°thJsf whi t rNegro nke eSte h PUbll ° treats
'* 6 m n and
he behave like one
lnsls ts
Thus ht
H
h
may be
forc ibly
prevented from sitting
N groes in Public
conveyances, while a
?
° mplexioned
may be assaulted on dark°^
the hi ghwa y because Negro
Negro wife
his

looks white.

FlnaUy

’

C ° nfliCt

mentaily different sort.

Wlthin ea <* system is
of

a

funda-

The caste system is
inherently
-re stable than the racial
system.
This is because -race
conflict is directed either
against or toward the
maintenance of the entire order
of races.
On the other
hand,

caste rivalry never brings
the caste system into
question."
(My emphasis.)
Thus the usual state of
affairs
in the race system is
one of "suspended conflict,"
characterized even in quiet times
by "anxiety, fear,
mutual distrust, and social stricture ." 14
On the other hand, lower
castes may try to improve
their position vis-a-vis
other
castes, but do not aim to
abolish caste distinction and
inequality altogether.
Castes know, value, and maintain
their station in a way that
precludes dissatisfaction with
the system of castes 15
.

In fact,

the major applicability of the
Indian situa-

tion to that of the U.S. was
the relationship of the white
British to the nonwhite Indians,
rather than the internal
workings of the caste system. Race
coincided with nationality in this colonial situation in
a way that exacted
dreadful costs to Indians' public and
private lives.
In
The Jewel in the Crown

,

Paul Scott captures the anguish,
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explosiveness, and impli
catlons of one bpect
the miscegenation bflri'i
p-p
„
arrier,
ln
a way that sheds
B ht. on + k
.
American
16
experience
>

.

•;

u

.

Set in India before
and after WW II,
this sensitive
ook brings out the
strong sexual aspect
of British racism
in Britain,

returns to his own
country.

Once back, Hari
Kumar meets and has a
brief, disastrous
affair with a young
British woman, disastrous
u
sastrous for
for +the
consequences it brings
about for the two lovers
and their communities.
The
subtlety and power of this
story cannot be unfolded
in a
few sentences.
But its impact leaves
the reader acutely
aware of the complications
of interracial
sexuality, the

responses it evokes from
disapproving communities,
and the
very threat to social
order itself seemingly
contained in
the coupling of a
non-white male and a white
female.
The
story is about racially-dif
ferent elites, yet
has the ring

of truth which transcends
its geographic and class
setting

(which is characteristic of
the matter) to the American
situation.
One passage not involving the
lovers directly,
but a related theme,
particularly strikes home. A British
school teacher, Miss Crane,
visits an Indian counterpart 17
Miss Williams, who wore a grey
cotton blouse lonebrown skirt and black button
boots, and was yo^nglr
than she and sallow-complexioned
in a way that some
of the most insufferable of the
European
women were
who had spent a lifetime in the
country; onTy in
Miss Williams' case the sallowness
denoted a
,
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^

half Indian origin
"^ 6 had
horror

the kinH o-f
ta ht to 1 eeJT
ce^ain^*

^

The horror of course
is at the physical
evidence of inter _
racial mating
nf -fviq
-a.
evidence of
e, evidenrp
the act itself,
despite Miss
Williams' Western cultural
appearance.
+.

The Marxist interpretation
of American race
relations is a compelling
account of the
utility of racial subordination
to capital's accumulation

process.

Because

this basic view,

I

I

consider my own work to be
indebted to
will provide here a short
summary

of the

major themes in Marxist writing
on the subject, then
relate
some important criticisms,
especially i„ relation to the
caste school's contribution.
The Marxist account traces
modern racism back to the

need of expanding European mercantile
economies for a
suitable labor force in the exploitation
of the New World 1
Slavery and other forms of servitude
for nonwhites ensured
a sufficient supply of labor
for mining and intensive cultivation of agricultural staples.
Racially based slavery
ensured that there would be a pool of
readily identifiable,
exploitable labor for these tasks, for it
made impossible
.

the biological and thus cultural
assimilation of Africans

into the English North American colonies

2
.

As an essential

part of the labor force, slaves not only mined
and tilled,
they also provided the bulk of crafts people
and artisans
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in the Southern
colonies

therw ith

of free blacks). 5

a restrlcted
number

^ ^^

Afro-Americans thus
contributed directly
to the
^mutation of agricultural
and
before and after
abolition, b ei„ forced
g
after
ites int ° a

;

:::: n y system. 4

—

-

the

soutte

Factors including
poverty, the Klan,
mechanization of agriculture,
and the availability
of’
industrial work in
wartime promoted black
migration to urban
an
northern areas after
1900.
i„ these areas
transition to a
monopoly-capital era of
stagnation and
underemployment, blacks
formed
urmea a large,
lor.P reserve
army of
the unemployed, a
surplus population. 5
_

wm

^

Since at least the
1830's, conflicts between
black
^ite ln thG W ° rking Class
have Periodically
broken out
over labor market
competition.
White unions in the
south
helped destroy the strata
of skilled black labor
after the
Civil War, with craft
unions particularly up
through the
1930 s maintaining
6
dual unions.
Employers fostered and
manipulated racial divisions
through shop floor tactics
and
the importation of black
strike-breakers. 7
'

As blacks moved into
urban areas in search of
work
and relief from virulent
Southern repression, conflicts
erupted in tight housing
markets and at the boundaries
of
black and white neighborhoods.
De facto segregation in

urban areas added to the list
of historical conditions
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——

which a recent fecuei
generation
dcion of
of writer*^
„
wuxers i'ki
(black
and white
st and nonMa
situa ; ion
the
;:;basis of black nationalism 8
The conclusion of
the Marxist argument
is that
capitalism in the u.s.
is deeply lndebted
t<j
inequality.
Capital has always
relied upon racial
.

.

1

--cowu

.

-equality

as a source of cheap
labor and a caU se
of social

-organization within the
working class.

This view of
course is completely
antagonistic not only to
'
~ liberal
dl but
DU
O
1
also to conservative,
free-ma-rkoi
market ocritics of
liberalism: 9
One of the paradoxes
of experience
+
-4

^

“
frequently^f

enabling

t^^XSTto^ ^^^factor

have two basic criticisms
of most Marxist accounts,
as I understand them.
First is a certain tendency,
especially among academic Marxists
as opposed to those directly
involved in organizing, to
overestimate, in an elitist way,
the ability of bosses and
corporations to create and
manipulate racist, ethnic sentiments
among the white working class.
With race clearly a problem for
working class
solidarity, the temptation is great
to interpret working
class racism as an elite-imposed
attitude.
There is no
I
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question as to recurrent
recurrent, widespread
atterrm+<= Q +
^nxpuiation on this score
But rn
thOUgh conce ntrating
the blame
bosses may have
finite political va lue
lt wlll not
S©t at the degree anH mn
er
•

'

,

“

ooted

m

everyday life.

"

WMCh

- Clal

a «itudes are

——

Undoubtedly, working
class racism has
primary roots
the USS
Scabs «* northern
industry and
1D " m ° re generallZed
lab ° r -ket
competition.
But this
VleW iS ° ften adVanC6d
ln
with a view that
tails to
distinguish sharply between
race relations and
ethnic relations, especially in
li ght of discrimination
against
southern and eastern
European workers. Behind
both arguments is the idea that
all social relations
r P i a ti
are expressions
of a calculable
economic interest which
effectively explains their pattern.
Thus the arguments
suggest in effect
that economic competition
is a regrettable but
often understandable excuse for both
race and ethnic discrimination,

“

"

especially when fostered by
capitalists.
Ashton takes this
view in his discussion
of the ethnic hierarchy
developed
within the working class 10
:

hlerarch y was further refined.
Workers of
r ° Pean ° rlBi " "o^Hp
into
semiskiUlS iohf
bbacks were incorporated at
the
e bottom^
bottom.
Rut not,
t
But
however,
struggle and bloodshed. For in without considerable
addition ?o the
Wblcbwa s P ar t °f the national
heritage
cage, ^lack
blacks faced manipulation by
capitalists
rbatedraClal h ° sti lity and'fSSher StS
divided
: d
the working class.
Economically desperate,
South*"

^

^

184

blacks were often forced +
n acc ept
strikebreakers.
recruitment as
Indeed »a Sreat
deal of the
racial violence
n
at the beginning
Northeri cities
of this^eni”
linked to the use
be directl
of
V
abs
tition and conflict blacks
And compeover
6 ” 81 " 8 a centr
feature of urban laciai
al
racial and^th
and ethnic violence
today.
’

^lT

1L!

>

'

Ashton further, correctly,
discusses the role of
trade
unions in attaining
this hierarchy.
But such accounts
neglect the difference
in kl „d between
racial and ethnic
group distinctions,
reflected in the
possibilities of cultural and physical
assimilation and based in
part upon
H°2zrational beliefs about
Afro-American sexuality.
It is especially
important to place the
"economic"
action of trade union
discrimination in a context
that does
not separate economic
and sexual/kinship
factors as distinct causes." Recent
work by Mary Ann Clawson
clarifies
the extent to which
trade unions organized as
fraternal
orders reflected and supported
the patriarchal organization
of working class communities
and cultures. 11 These
unions
served not only economic, but
also a spectrum of needs in
those communities.
As craft organizations,

they served as a repository

of production skills which
belonged to a white and male
world.
Thus, as Robert Allen points
out, post-Civil War
craft unions in the south acted
to exclude black craftsmen
and artisans, who made up a high
percentage of that re-

gion's skilled workers up through
1865; this effectively
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destroyed the s k ii
led black labor
fof
South
In
the north
n
craft unions refuqpH + ~
used to admit^ black
workers or
organized them into
separate i,
locals; their power
over
hiring, training
g and -rk processes
at the time
helped
shut blacks out of
skilinn trades
Skllled
in that iv
region
-6tuu as well 12
Moreover, as Allen
argues
th
e
8
the
con ^ribution of
white workers
and th
Uni ° nS l ° black
unen) Ployment
-

•

’

,

’

^

'

"
.

SklU helPed make

“

and low levels
of

POSSlble for em Pl°yers
to
use black scabs,
often with tu^
the connlvan
,

eaders. 13

i mport

and

ce of black church

where black scabs were
used, the numbers
were
invariably exaggerated,
and their general
use greatly
exaggerated by* the press
Dress and striking
worKers i n „comparison
b workpr?
to the use or white
rural and immigrant
strikebreakers. 14
As communal organizations,
craft unions fostered
solidarity through their
rituals of brotherhood
among
white males and through
their contributions to
community
leisure and recreation
activities.
These activities

m

coexisted with activities
sponsored by clubs and lodges
some predominantly working
class, many others with
a varying mixture of business
and working class men
(Masons,
Elks).

That is, the world of
working class leisure had

prominent organizations promoting
solidarity amo^g working
class men and between working
class and business class men.
Craft unions also thus drew
their solidarity
not only from

shared skills but also from
fraternal rituals.
Clearly,
their exclusion of black males
from membership expressed
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concerns that were not
simple economic
rentes, but a
broader den ial of social
equality b etween the
races.
And
social equality, as !
shal! argue, had
indelible associations with miscegenation
issues.
It seems to me that
many Marxist accounts
of working

class racism focus on
elite manipulation and
imposition of
racial attitudes because
they share a very
orthodox version
of Marxism which gives
them little else to
turn to.
This
lack of alternatives,
I would argue,
is a product of
both
an external view of
ideology, in which ideas
as superstructure are determined by
production, and of a slighting
of
sexuality and relations of
cultural reproduction as
derivative, supe rs t rue t ural
phenomenon.
One tendency, exemplified by Cox, has been to
dismiss sexuality
as a

psychological, and thus an ideological
and not material,
matter.
Another major tendency

has been to interpret the

sex/gender system as the more or
less passive object of
pressures from developments in
production-a one-way flow
of influence or constraint—
and thus to render
power,

property, and affective relations
between the sexes the
status of a secondary rather than
primary contradiction 16
.

Socialist and Marxist feminists have
recently begun
to address this shortcoming, but
their insights
have yet

to affect the main body of Marxist
work on race.

Writers

like Angela Davis and George Rawick are
exceptional for
the theoretical work they have done in
this area
More
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usual is Cox, who
after going to
great lengths to
distln _
guish race and caste
on the basis of th
-Igamation ^sue,
dismisses the sexual
hlst

of

.

ratl0naUZati ° nS

ZT

abl y.

PeOPlS

-

C ° mPUCati

f°r

—

White “onomic
expioitation

-

*
on, understandxs a widespread
hesitation to allow
even the hint of

„. r , otw ., „ Mel piw _

ace relations.

Yet authors such as
Calvin Hernton, who
° UtSlde ° f the
MarXist tradition have
usefull y confronted these stereotypes
and analyzed them. 18

"

,

Surrm^X-

In this brief
comparison of caste and
Marxist

analysis, several themes
stand out which bear
closer examination.
How are the links between
the economic and
sexual
aspects of race relations
best conceptualized?
What are
the significances of
blood lines, miscegenation,
and
assimilation in race relations?
Does the sexual aspect
of
race date as far back
as the need of expanding
mercantile
economies for New World labor?
In addition

to the family,
what institutions have
been important historically
in sustaining sexual racism? And.
what particular forms has
sexual racism taken in the
public sphere of politics?
II.

Introduction

.

I

Historical Overvi ew

had originally intended in
this chapter

to examine the debt of
20th century housing integration
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».,«
clear that issues
~
relate
ated +to
nationalism would be
vital to
my argument.
Given thlS
thi^ need
^
amon S Others, an
historical
Perspective would be
retired to la y out and
support the
nature o f white cultural
unit, on puestions

T,

+.

•

-

o f race,

1

d ° n0t

lntend

stin

’

hiSt ° riCal overview
as an exhaustive
account of sexual racis
m hut as supportive,
indicative
evidence for my theoretical
interprets
interpretations
By means of
this overview and the
section on uhousing in
the next chapter
I want to
suggest the historical
depth, continuity
and
development of sexually-indebted
race relations and
their
impact on politics.
,

-i

.

™

was also moved to this
historical survey by the
tendency of political theory
to slight the social
bases of
ideas.
This problem is often
compounded, I think, by the
importation of theory originated
in a distinctly European
context, outside the particular
conditions of American
history.
Domestic race relations are
clearly one of these
particular conditions. Yet,
American racism is not simply
a false consciousness
impeding class formation of the
European sort.
It is also to some degree
an alternative
reality fostered by mores extending
across class boundaries.
To make this clear, more than
a contemporary focus is
needed.
I
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Aside from this,
there are three i„
imitations
on the
evidence fr>
for my interpretations.
First, sexual
tahoos
aVe lnhlblted old
analyses and source
materia! for th
matters at hand.
Second prlmary
•

-

,

g c ass culture is
not

__

^

easily available

^

a proble
S ° Clal
historians are now
addressing
And hist
° graPhy takin
S
sex/gender systems
y
ems into account
is all too rare.
'

’

Were sexual

projections onto nonwhites
a constitutive
reason for the
enslavement of Africans
by the English i„
Nort h America,
I argue in
this section that the
subordination of sensuality in a patriarchal
setting was

in fact interwoven
at
the earliest point with
the personal
disciplines of emerging
market society, and with
the decision of the
English to
exploit nonwhite labor.
The sources I cite in
this section
make various parts of
this argument, but none
of them have
made the argument as a
whole.
In order to make
this argument successfully, one
must lay out why the
Irish, who
were also seen by the
English as sexual barbarians,
were
not enslaved along with,
or instead of, Africans.
There
are, in fact, telling
reasons related to the
contradictions
of European politics
why the Irish were not
also enslaved.

And,

in illustrating the entire
argument,

the emerging
theme of the domination of
nature underlines the linking
of
patriarchal and productive concerns
in the subordination
of sensuality.
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"
n,ay

The
a lab ° r SUPPly
in the eXPl ° ltati

be taken as a
given.

-

o* the New

The reliance on
racial
slavery by European
powers as part of the
answer^7ot
beBut, slavery as a
source

of labor did exist
for the

English as both historical ana
ical and contemporary
examples of
how to carry out
colonial policies.

Economic developments in
Western Europe after
1400
led to the development
of what Wallerstein
terms the
"world system,, in the
mercantile era, a succession
of key
countries (core economies)
led a process of
national consolidation in which the
search for national wealth
through
colonization and exploitation
of the New World played
a
major role.
In this system, first
Portugal,
then Spain,

seized the initiative and
contested for colonial hegemony.
Their position as core
economies in the world system
received papal recognition
in the Treaty of Tordesillas
(1494), which divided the
non-European world between them
for plunder. 1
The pattern they set was later
followed and superseded by the English.
It involved the chartering
of royal
companies, usually named after the
port cities of their
principal merchants, which were
given dominion over
peoples and vast tracts of land in
the New World for the
planting of colonies. 2 Portuguese and
Spanish colonists
made use of slavery in agriculture
and mines, but this
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was not a slavery
Bhich relled on a
definition
staves sub-humanity.
In tMs the
jberians

r

by catholic
principies ° f
y ° Pe " the

e

3

r

Pania dS
accIpt%Se\eL g^urde«ni?
nit
r

“ eCt

w hlch

.

equality, so lone+t
prejudice was inhibited 6
111

-

P0SSlWlit V Of the
agitation of

„
heathens
through conversion

to

^

'

c °"““»ed

lon of human
^
n
evelo
P me nt of race

Iberia “as constrained
by feudal cultural

traditions
But the Church eventually
moved away from this
principle, as a result of
a debate which took
place in the
Church and Europe during
the middle 1500's over
the potential equality of heathens;
this left colonial
interests
free to increase the
degradation and exploitation
of their
labor forces
That is, in the face of
the enormous wealth
to be extracted from the
colonies, a crucial shift
in
ideology and practice was
forced upon the Church by
the
great landed and commercial
interests of the day. This
was possible in large part
because of the Church's intimate
ties with the aristocracy,
being a "career" outlet for
the
aristocracy's younger sons (driven
there by primogeniture
in inheritance). 5
Even so, Iberian countries did
not
achieve the thoroughness of
racial definitions of humanity

prevalent in later Protestant, core
economies such as
England and the Netherlands. 6
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61 aCC ° UntS and

^
—

*!«* Venice a„ d
cquainted the English
wlth colonlal
ude and slavery
in conquered
lands
Their
y lnflUen0ed En8llSh
Plantati ° n
in
a „7 t reatmeDt
the
Irish culture.
e »id 1500
England had Span sh
poUcy
in subduing
resistance by
7
.

.

"

Spain

^
Ireland

Later

in

.

and advioe

the Irish.

This is important

because the E „g llsh
experience in
-land served as a training
ground for racially-informed
colonial policies in
North America against
Native Americans,
as a basis for
comparison between Irish,
Native
American and African
labor.® Comparison
between different
of labor was in turn
a vital matter,
because ultireliance upon black slavery
as a labor system
rather
than other forms of
servitude was not a foregone
conclusion.
we must forego the
temptation to lose sight
of
other options during that
period which from the vantage
Point of centuries of racial
subordination may now seem
unlikely or superfluous.
It was not a foregone
conclusion
that the Engiish would
enslave Afrlcans p & wholesale
rather than rely upon bond
servitude applied to any nationality, or attempt for that
matter to enslave rather than
press into bond servitude the
Irish.
,

,

mo

.

In Ireland,

^

English planters and soldiers
gained
valuable experience in confronting,
subduing, and exploiting
an extremely different culture;
they had been trying to
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... .......
then
,
q-*--; 1
as thev
j
still
y
do on viewing the
e
1
Irish
r ish nc
as a separate
race.
The Irish,
Tvich up
until 1650 were not ^
Peasants of the
European type; they
were largely
e
y a pastoral
pastor* anda nomadic
people organized ina clans nr. + u
Clans °r tribes.
Thevy llve d a„ way
of
° f Whi ° h thS Engllsh
no recent experience
or
understanding and which
appeared to the English
as barbarian
-d savage, particularly in the
ferocity and style of
their
warfare.
Irish sexual and family
practices encouraged the
y piacrices
English sense of the Irish
as an entirely
different order
appearing by evolving
English standards as
licentious.
The
Irish intermarried with
relatives forbidden by
English kinship rules, engaged in
trial marriages, and
allowed for
easy divorce by man or
woman.
’

!

•

,

Our concept of race, and
the notions of a civilized
culture as opposed to a
barbarian life, emerged out

of the

English colonial experience,
which began in Ireland.
The
Irish underwent the same
wholesale destruction of population and culture and
expropriation of land for redistribution to English planters
that the Native Americans
did in

North America.

Facilitating this transfer of policy
were
many English planters who were
active first in

Ireland and

later in North America, where they
were struck by the
similarity of the Indians to the Irish,
especially in
their cultural savagery and style
of warfare.
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lves

t0 eStabllsh ln
thi s section
that sexual

wtdely construed,
operated in the English
use of
rtcan racial enslavement.
Vet both West Afr
i C a„s and
the Irish appeared
as licentious to
the English, though
perhaps not the Irish
to the same degree.
And, the I rish
-re clearly seen by the
English in proto-racial
terms
G-en these parallels, why
does our history
record African
racial slavery rather
than Irish slavery,
or why does it
record only African
slavery as a widespread
system and not
a long-term
combination of African and
'

2

!rish servitude,

slave or bond labor?

The answers lie in a
combination of
factors about Irish and
African people themselves,
and
about their connections
or lack of them to
major contradictions in English and
European society. These
ruled out
large-scale Irish servitude
after the mid 1600's.
This
disqualification emerged at the
same time as a leap in
the
demand for plantation labor. 9
African labor filled the
bill because it was available;
and African slavery, it
seems, satisfied not only
economic, but sexual motives
as
well

must be made clear that we
cannot explain African
enslavement on the basis of
pre-existing English racism,
though my argument is indeed that
the ingredients for this
stance were already present and
brewing.
Three labor systems were available for use in the
colonies:
It

free labor,

bond labor, and slavery; slavery only
expanded after the
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^

^

first two proved
inadequate to plantatlon
10
_
t ions that were
not n-P a racial
nature applied to
the first
two systems.
Yet all thro
three SOUrces of
labor-free labor
being largely English,
bond labor
slavery after 1650 ior
a p—-; _
for Africans
weree ex
pynio-n-^j
Ploited up to the
imits applying to
each, limits determined
in part by
sexual concerns.
.

^

—

.

.

No great love was
lost by English
merchants and
planters for their
nwn laboring rlaqcoo.
uieir own
g Cias ses
it+ would be incorrect to conclude that
their exploitation was
limited (in
the sense of not being
forced wholesale in bond
or slave
labor) solely out of
a strong cultural
or racial affinity
for them on the part
11
of the upper
,

classes

The upper
classes were limited rather
by considerations of
domestic
politics.
The English poor might
be shipped off in bond
forced to emigrate as small
farmers, but clearly could
not even be considered
for that great pool of
fixed labor
required by plantations except
at the risk of domestic
unrest or rebellion.
When upper class economic
spokesmen
could say:
.

na ion where s i aves are
not allowed
the
the^urp^t
surest; wealth consists of
a multitude of
laborious poor, (Cox, p, 339)
"t

f

we can be fairly sure that
slaves are disallowed not simply
because of an emerging ideology
of freedom in market relations.
There were, in short, limitations
set by a history
of peasant rebellions and by
a tinderbox of wandering,
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displaced poor upon
their use in E„ glish
soclety
The system of bond
or indentured
servitude relied
heavily upon Irish
labor for + o nUm
erS especiall
y in the
West Indi es upon sugar
plantations. 12 They were
imported
Sarly
the 162 °' S bUt SOOn
developed the reputation
of revolting and
killing their English
masters.
Still
English colonial policies
in Ireland made
available large
numbers of displaced and
prisoner of war
,

-i

’

^

^

-

Irish, who were

transported in great numbers
during the 1650- B as
permanent
servile labor for the
sugar plantations.
Bristol sugar
chants, gaining here
invaluable experience for
their
later role in the African
13
slave trade,
had ag^te actively
employed through Ireland
seizing women, orphans,
and the destitute
°
e transported to
Barbadoes and the Envli^h
n
lsh
Plantations in iirnerica
America
o
a
greatr benefit to
the We^t t n dl
Hi o
U
r
Wh ° deSi
the
ten and b^s ?or Ihe
-

•

•

P

•

^

ifb^Sn

for^n.^oLn^and^^L^fL'slnl

1

HT “

6
plantatlons in the West Indies. ?^
The
Commi"
Commissioners
for Ireland gave them
orders upon
the governors of garrisons,
to deliver to them
prisoners of war; upon the
keepers ofgaols
for offenders in custody;
upon masters of workhouses for the destitute in
were of an age to labor, or iftheir care "who
women
marriageable and not past breeding" were
and gave
e
nS t0 a11 in auth °rity to
seize
?hose
wh. had
H H° no visible
who
means of livelihood, and
eliver them to these agents of
the Bristol
sugar merchants, in execution of
which
direction Ireland must have exhibited latter
scenes in
every part like the slave hunts
of Africa

Once in North America or the West
Indies, Irish labor
was often worse-treated than African
labor, primarily
because of its rebellious character and
a pastoral
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C ° ntrlbUted t0

^ ^'easing
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6rVlle lab ° r rather

of th e

rish bond system.
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dangerous

reliance upon

a further
development

These

rebellions drew upon
a
o* S (even by that
.time) history of
Irish resistance
to
“
Sh d° mlnati0n

-Pon international
rivalries f0P
the French were
available as allies
against the English
This international
connection available
to the Irish
touches upon a major
contradiction in English
and European
society which I think
plausibly seems to have
limited any
Irish servile labor
into a major,
long-lasting
system, despite its
plentiful supply and utter
defeat on
home soil.
Thic?
c that
the Irish were Catholic
Christians.
ately prior to, during,
and following initial
colonisation of North America,
English society was being
agitated
and convulsed by the
effects of its own Reformation
and
coming Civil War and
Restoration.
Cromwell himself put
down the bloody rebellions
in Ireland of the
1650's.
The
'

-r

.

Protestant-dominated balance of
power in England
end of its struggles sought
to defuse

at the

religious issues and

not afford,

it seems to me,

to press very far along

the road of permanent
servitude with a population having
such clear connections to
major divisions internal to

England and Europe.
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affinity,

tln ,

sharpiy
Irish,

in addition to the
obvious political opportunities at hand in
French rivalry with the
English.
But it
18 Cl6ar that EngllSh

-

the Irish which then
prevented Further

servile labor.

In fact,

as

I

racial identity with

develops

oF Irish

have argued, merchant
and

Planter Englishmen who were
involved in Ireland and
North
America came quite close
to seeing the Irish
in racial
terms; had their
availability as bond labor
persisted much
longer, we might today
be discussing the
"Gaelic race."
African labor had virtually
none oF these limitations.
Africans were less likely
to revolt than the Irish,
being
initially divided by language
barriers amongst themselves
and with no allies in
warFare as the Irish had in
the
French.
They could not escape to
their Free brethren, as

could Native Americans upon
whom servitude was imposed.
And, they came largely From
agricultural societies, and by
accounts of contemporaries adapted
more easily than the
Irish or Indians to the
disciplines and seasonal rhythms
of plantation cropping.

With the popularity of Irish bond
labor declining by
the end of the 17th century,
and African slavery on the
rise, we see the emergence of
the historical pattern of
free or wage labor for Europeans
and coerced
forms of

labor (slave and colonized labor) for
nonwhites.

The role

199

English or Irish labor
could have served on
colonial plantations was filled by
nonwhites, who were
without the protections of shared culture
or of the contradictions
internal
to English and
European society.
It is essential
not to
separate this fact into
two separate histories,
of white
and black, free and
coerced, labor.
They are aspects of
the same historical.
process.
This will become clearer
once
we discuss the
contribution of developing
English sexual
mores to the work ethic
and enslavement

Patriarchal market society
_and the domination Q f
__
In — lte 0ver B Ia.ck
Winthrop Jordan offers a
thorough and insightful
account of the early years
of race
relations in British North
America.
He acknowledges, often
in spite of himself, the
key role of labor requirements.
More importantly, he describes
the pre-colonization social
attitudes of the English which
he feels made up a climate
conducive to the enslavement
of Africans.
Central among
these for our purposes are
ancient linguistic traditions
associating white with good and
black with evil, and the
associated development of more
contemporary conventions
linking blackness, beastliness,
and sexuality. 16
2-1

,

Jordan brings these out in his
discussion of the dual
voyages of discovery, internal and
worldly, he pictures
the Elizabethan English set out
upon.
To bring out these
themes, he makes brilliant use of
Shakespeare's
Othello.

In the play,

Othello’s being and actions (as the dark-skinned
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Moor) convey -the
integrated

whiteness

i magery

of blackness

^

of Africa, of the
sexuality of beasts and
the
y
sex.
Jordan concludes that: 18
gi v en this charged
atmosphere of sself
® lf ~ die
dlsc °very
it is scarcely
surprising that
al r
Engllshmen should
have used people overseal
a
lal mirrors and
that they were esnpn'nii
?
t0 discOT
attributes
savages
“ flrSt but
could not speak of in
,

«

£

themselves.

This sensitivity to
African sexuality Jordan
attributes to several sources.
One was the circulation
of
Spanish accounts of West
Africa, particularly one
published
in 1526 which vividly
embroidered on cultural traits

appearing as savage, lustful,
and wanton.
The Spanish
account itself had self-conscious
precedents in classical
descriptions of Ethiopia which
associated a hot climate
with lustfulness.
Also in this vein, in 1556
Jean Bodin
reconfirmed this association,
declaring that: 19
Ptolemy reported that on account
of southern
sensuaHty Venus chiefly is worshipped
in
rica and that the constellation
of Scorpion
talnS t0
pudenda dominates that’
continent

^

>

While Shakespeare could rely for
dramatic interest
upon intimate relations between
Othello, a black man, and
Desdemona, a white woman, other
popular tales show the
credence already given to our familiar
stereotype of
African female sexuality. We find
prior to 1600 widely
circulated stories of copulation between
male apes and
black women, in Africa, as related by
English and other
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eyewitnesses.

^

-

"

^

The stereotype

q

^

IBth century, according
to Jordan>
sexual aggressiveness
of Negro women was
virtually de
-Sueur for the African
commentator " 2 ° It seems
in
effect, that a particular
type of pornography
grew up
Quite early around the
matter, quite useful
in selling
travel accounts.

^

^

.

,

The titillating nature
of these accounts is
undoubtedly related to the
influence of Protestant
asceticism in
England, the other major
factor Jordan mentions.
Jordan
does not pursue the
matter fully, and I
believe this is
related to his failure to
explore the reasons why
England
should in the 1500's and
1600's be going through
internal
voyages of discovery.
I shall discuss
the Protestant contribution in more detail in
the next section, but
a contrast to Jordan of George
Rawick's work will be useful
in
raising certain themes I
intend to develop.
In Th e American Slavej

M aking of the Black
Community

From Sunup to Sundown
,

The

Rawick draws upon Jordan's

work but places English concern
with their physical natures
in the context of emerging
market society. 21 He argues
that the Puritan/Dissent
movement, as an important social
base of market society, helped
diffuse repressive attitudes throughout England.
Their push away from traditional
to "modern" habits of work and
family required a more
disciplined, less spontaneous personality.
But because
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the English over a
lQng periQd
but largely obscure,
problem
P
em "
'

e

-sue

in England> Rawick
sees
u £& lln g

with some major

Tho
The Problem of
course was

of sexuality a„ d
self-expression.

Thus ln thelr
initial confrontations
with the more
traditional societies
of West Africa,
merchant Englishmen saw
themselves as they
recently used to be and cti
still were under the
veneer of
civilization
.

In order to ensure
that he wi 1
„ 0t
+
sll P back into
the old ways or act
out hid uhalf-suppressed
sies, he must see , ?
fanta?
0
dl
erence between
his reformed self
and^hoSe
he formerly resembled
But because
1
as
fantasies which
he cannot accept
e must i m
he
theSe f
to the realities 'o?
ies
somlone
.

i

.

-f

“
^
L !! T
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“

would make little sense
for any analyst to
separate
the English perception
of Africans as essentially
sexual
creatures, defined from
the very beginning by
their physical natures, from their
early European and later
English
use as beasts of physical
labor in the slave
It

system.
Nor
does it make sense to cull
out the sexual aspect as
a
simple effect of the economic,
especially given the vital
relation of asceticism to
Protestant work disciplines and
given further evidence of
the impact of patriarchal
relations in this complex.
It was a combined sexual
economy
which made a racial slavery
possible, which denied the
possibility of assimilating Africans
on the grounds of
both labor needs and patriarchal
and Protestant-ascetic
barriers
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We see so me evidence
of these connections
in the
crystallization during the
16th and 17th centuries
of a
tiajor theme in
Bnglish culture: th
.

^"

"

thlS ldSa

~

.

emerglng markSt

^

^

articulated and popularized

««

the fusing too*
place of'

sexual and labor factors
which denied African
assimilation
And, to introduce
a- thread
which we can pick up
again at
the end of the next
chapter, these factors
in turn are
important constituents in
the development of
white nationalism in the U.S. during
the 19th century,
In

™e_Dominat^^

Wiiliam Leiss characterizes capitalist
development as the extension
of domination over both external
and internal nature. 23
The modern
notion of the mastery of
nature has its roots in
the work
of Francis Bacon during
the early 17th century.
The spirit
of the age, if Le i S s is
correct, focused not simply
on the

adventure of discovery but
cn on the power
y, out ai
also
of control
over natural forces.

According to Leiss, mastery
over nature as elaborated
by Bacon contained two
elements:
empirical observation of
natural phenomenon freed from
moral (Aristotelian) categories, allowing an increased
utilization
of nature; and

the social benefits accruing
from this new science,

"notably an increased supply of
goods and a general liberation of the intellect from
superstition and irration24
ality."
Bacon's work is an initial statement
of
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Enlightenment faith
-naitn,

in
m

u
which
science
ence would provide
the
m erial
d lnteUectual
basis
° rderly and
materi _
;
any
abundant society.
The association of
these ideas
Wlth llberal PhilOSOPhy
iS ««™ an old
and innate one.
Leiss' major argument
is that the project
proiect of mastery
over external nature,
far from freeing
society from
irrationality was .nurtured
in the context of
class dominaThus, man not only
dominated man as one class
dominates another tmi 0 -i~,
alSO arranged to
dominate himself
through the disciplines
required of the personality
in
market society.
On the matter of
personality disciplines
Leiss is not so explicit.
But he does bring out
an important point in Bacon
work which requires
further exploration, and that is the
language of gender which
Bacon uses
to articulate the
notion of mastery.

“

-

.

«

,

’

Nature is female in Bacon's
writings, an old enough
tradition which has its basis
in the association of
femaleness with the bringing
forth of new life. The
relationship of this association
to patriarchal conditions
is
not completely clear.
But any casual effort at
anthropology
will uncover customs and
rituals in most societies which
reflect the mystery and fear
in which nature as a general
category and women as part of
fertile, life-giving nature
have been held.
Menstruation confinements and taboos
are
a familiar example.
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What is unusual or new
in Bacon's work,
and during
hlS era iS the
*2SS2 with Which the project of
controlling
nature in general, and
nature as represented h
y the sexual
and reproductive capacity
of women, is presented.
Thus in
referring to advances in
the mechanical crafts,
Bacon says
they "do not 'merely
exert a gentle guidance
over nature's
course; they have the
power to conquer and subdue
'

her,

shake her to her foundations.'" 25
of science, 26

In short,

to

for his method

you have but to follow and
as
nature in her wanderings, and it were hound
you win be able
e
yOLI like, to lead and
drive
her ^irerwards
afterwards
th same place
to the
again.

^

Present in this and other
passages, as Leiss points
out, is an explicit if
sublimated sexual aggression. 27
In
retrospect, Bacon’s writings seem
to herald and reflect a
growing concern in sections of
English society with the
repression and rechanneling of libidinal
energies into
work, discovery, and the conquest
of the material world.
In this it does not seem
possible that the gender-laden
language Bacon uses, nor his enterprise,
was not conditioned by patriarchal relations in the
sexual division
of labor.

First, it seems likely that the legitimacy
of con-

quering nature was aided, not only by Bacon's
appeal to
Christianity, but also by emphasizing that nature
was

female.

What more telling characterization for men of
all

206

stations could there
have been of nn object
k
appropriate for
domination*? Ke lat ed ly
theref o r e, it was
proper husbandry
for men to do the
dominating of nature.
Scientific husbandry, or mastery,
would enable man to
benefit from the
secrets of increase which
nature had to offer.
Patriarchal relations could
also have provided, as
a
resource of existent
attitudes, an answer to
the problem of
what facet of social
life to repress in the
pursuit of
methodical work and discovery.
In an egalitarian
society,
one might imagine a
collective decision to forego
or minimize certain activities,
perhaps for an agreed-upon
period
of time, until a goal
requiring an intense and
sustained
commitment was met; moreover,
everyone would share this
burden equitably.
But in Bacon's time, the
Puritan movement, led by male elders,
made another kind of
,

choice,

albeit not very consciously.

Patriarchal relations defined

the link between women and
nature as essentially a sexualreproductive one, with women
supposedly distinct from men
by virtue of their emotional
rather than rational natures.
In this context, the
Puritans achieved a sober, diligent,

methodical life in the pursuit of
work by repressing that
part of the personality most
closely identified with
women:
sensual, physical appetites.
And outside the
Puritan community, the interpretation
of this solution by
other elements of the new middle class
rested on a double
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ard of sexual
freedom which ensured
the burden of
repression would not be
equitably shared. 28

Moreover

,

as market society
expanded,

and with it the
division of labor, women
were excluded from
new crafts and
Slut out from old ones
which they previousiy
had access to
and in some cases,
monopoly over. They
particularly lost
out as economic activity
left the
y Ieit
the home with male
apprentices replacing labor
by wife and children.
This was the
the printer's trade,
which quite early developed
into a profitable
undertaking; protests of
male apprentices
helped exclude female
labor by about 1650.
Thus science,
virtually synonymous in
Bacon's day with craft
knowledge,
served patriarchal as well
as economic functions.
Another
example, which took until
the early part of this
century
to play itself out, was
the appropriation of
medicine from
midwives and female folk-healers
(often accused of witchcraft by Puritans), and
the long-standing exclusion
of
women from medical training.
Another is the appropriation
of brewing by male craftsmen;
the title of brewster formerly had the meaning of a
woman's art in the home or
29
avern.
The list is long, but in sum
it documents the
increasing confinement of women
to reproductive labor
(among the middle class) as
productive and reproductive
work separated.
v,

.

,

Patriarchy and the developing repression
of sexuality
were vital threads woven into the
fabric of colonial

lm

lses which the e

;; the
with

.“

into defined

*

—
—
—
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to the New world

«-

.

AlonK

they were woven

in the face of
other limits we have
discussed
a racial slavery
hy about 1650 that
,

superseded free and
bond labor as the
major system in the
southern colonies.
Clearly, the unassimil ahi
y ot Africans
f
guaranteed a
exploitable labor force.
Between 1660 and 1700
racial slavery achieved
full legal recognition
in one colony
an ° ther
BGtWeen 1650 »d 1726,
miscegenation laws
ntlng assimilatlon also
were codified.
Because colonial documentary evidence
prior
Pri
° r to 1660 is „
"equivocal," the
precise contribution of
sexual politics
noii-rsexual
to enslavement
cannot be assessed. 30
But in addition to
English cultural
vacillations over sensual
expressiveness, two patriarchal
factors stand out.

—

.

-

•

.

First is the relative number
of men and women of both
31
races in the colonies.
the English West Indies,
blacks heavily outnumbered
whites, and white women were
scarce."
In this context, Jordan
argues, planters could
not begin to recreate
English culture, and so viewed
the
colonies as a temporary place,
a respite from English
mores, and engaged quite openly
in the white male, black
female miscegenation which would
have been legally forbidden inside English culture.
But in all North American
colonies except South Carolina, whites
for some time outnumbered their slaves; with English
culture intact and

m
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available for

reconstruct

ln the colonlal

„

miscegenation statutes
were the law of the
day
Carolina, on the other
hand, especially
Charleston, led
the colonies in
openness of interracial
sex between white
males and black women.
And, both the West
Indies and
South Carolina had the
strictest laws
at-nctest
law, against black
malewhite female sex.
The matter of relative a
access to white
and black women was
clearlyy a lactor
factor in m
i
miscegenation
politics.
.

in this

context the double standard
operated in part
out of patriarchal
concerns over property in
women as
individuals and as a group.
These informed the strong
tendency, even this early,
to see white women with
independently chosen nonwhite
lovers as fallen and lustful
and to strictly forbid
the "availability of
this property
to the subordinate black
male population. Jordan
cites a
Maryland miscegenation statute
of 1681 which castigated
white female-black male
marriage.
In these situations,
according to the Act, (describing
white women) marriage
DZ
was
h Satisfaction of theire
Lascivious
?
andTuJ?
and
Lustful? desires,
and to the disgrace not
8113 *1 butt alls ° of many other
Christ ian^N
enristian
t"
Nations.

Ihis language in miscegenation
statutes of the day is
33
common
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Secondly, for white me
„ of property,
nonwhite concubines rarsed the issue
of legitimate descent
so important
to the transmission
of property rights
and inheritances 34
The not infrequent,
wrathful reminders
throughout the history of American slavery
from Southern press
and legisla
tore condemning this
activity by propertied men
represented
a collective elite
concern for legitimate
male heirs and
the preservation of
white male authority in
the plantation
system.
.

Given all of these factors,
it seems likely that
sexual politics, broadly
construed, were an important
conbuting factor to the English
enslavement of Africans.
To pull these threads
out of the fabric I have
described
would unravel and muddy the
pattern of social concerns it
describes.
In some manner which we
may only interpret,
the English planters and
middle class were in a sense
chaining themselves symbolically
when they enslaved
Africans for their labor and with
that labor conquered a
new world.
And in this process, of course,
the real and

psychological chains were more tightly
secured, respectively, around African labor and
women, especially in the
South.

The mixture of patriarchal, sexual,
racial, and
economic concerns I have described in
this section repre
sents the genesis of white nationalism
as a force in

American history (also, as well, in English
history).
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These factors were all
S'-Ll present
virtual
i\? from
virtually
the inception
„
of modern
American history
Th^
y
The refUsal ° f
biological and
cnlt ura , assimilation
of non-Europeans
was an essential
Part of the .motivational
matrix whlch helped
propel capi _
talist economic
development, and which
allowed a new white
^iier society to pursue policies
of extermination
toward
Native Americans and
exploitation towards
enslaved
Africans
.

,

'

,

-f

As a social-political
stance, nationalism is
not usually spoken of by
historians until the middle
of the !9th
century, first in
reference to European
economic competition, then in reference
to colonial independence
movements
W. a. Williams has
used it in the sense I
now am, in
describing U.S. westward
expansion after the War of
1812. 35
The racial basis of
mercantile policy, however,
makes the
notion useful for an even
earlier period. The value
of its
use in this period, as
in later ones, is its
indication of
cross-class, cultural solidarity
achieved by English
settlers in the face of
exploitive relations with other,
less modern' cultures.
Thus, Jordan notes the
transformation in the colonials'
self-image between 1600 and 1700
from "Christian" to "English"
to "White." 3 ®

This experience of cross-class
ties is not unlike
that related by an English
nanny in India, in The Jewel
in the Crown 3 ^
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It was Miss
Crane
16 " 06 ° f socla
snobbery abroad, which
l
was^e^
the same as
snobbery at hom4
because
?t
Wa COmplicated b
the demands,
sometimes eon 1
y
f
° f W ite
Solidarity and white
§1
?
y
Her
felt a duty to accord supremacy
employers
h„
recognition
would have withheld from
they
the hi S h est-born
Indian, at the same
a com P ulsi °n to
her on one of the
place
lowest
ngs of the ladder
of their own sell
®° clety
side the household
low et outthan in'* Where of
she stood in a position
course,
t
superior to that’
of any native servant
'

P

h
™

—

’

'

Entre
Preneurs and early factory
owners were obvious
contributors
to an ethic of
self-denial in the service
of production
How did other elements
of the population
come to accept
this ethic? This
section is not intended
to be an account
of the accommodation
of the working class
to industrial
disciplines.
It is
thrmn-h
though,
one exajnple of the
contribution of religion to this
process, to the spread of
the
ethic of self-denial
across region and
,

class.

In this
process, religion was not
simply a tool of propertied
classes for manipulating
working class into producing
more or for manipulating
divisions within the working
class.
Evangelical religion of this era
was to a considerable extent a product of
interaction between working
and middle classes, a means
of coping with, even as it
shaped, the upheavals of the
period.
In this respect,

evangelical religion was an indi-

rect but major contributor to
the projections of
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^

sexually- in formed raclal
polltlcs
In
explore Natlvlsm as an
example Qf
sexual drama an
historical model for
post-Civil War and
m ° re r6Cent raClal
Confli -t.
in addition to
important
economic motives, Nativism
exhibits the typical
role of
sensational press and
literature, and the
appeals made
across class boundaries
on the basis of shared
mores,
which has characterized
racial politics in the
U.S.
While
manipulation by elites is
undoubtedly a ke y factor
in such
politics, it is necessary
to ask:
manipulation based on
what? The answer, it
seems to me, is manipulation
based
on shared beliefs and
purposes which help to
constitute a
culture of production and
which are also indebted
.

'

,

to

patriarchal interests shared
across class boundaries.

^"gelicals

and the la boring classes:

back -

The ethic of self-denial
developing among men of
property in England and the
colonies was not a simple
repression of sexual needs.
What was at issue was a complex of belief, a way of acting,
which undermined
££21ind-

the

validity and value of the body
except for labor.
Physical
needs (sex, the enjoyment of
food, the need to eliminate,
etc.) were _s_hameful things to
the Puritans, who embodied
these attitudes in the extreme. 1
Self-denial, or selfcontrol, is the proper characterization
for this attitude.

It was an internal discipline
that denied the authority of

214
e physical self,
whloh accepted the
methodical external
disciplines (i„ one’s
lifespan) first of the
parents, then
of the worldly
calling,

work.

i„ Weber's words: 2

° nly
Principle, from
that of monasticism
7
vegetable diet and cold bathe °?i? Wlth a moder ate
atd s the same prescription is given for all
1 tem P ta tions
used against re?Lfi
as is
sense
of
.oral
UIK n ard in your calling."
Evangelical heirs of thee p 11T.u
Puritans
America developed this
y emphasizing, for both
men and women, the
vestiges
of Proper female
personality remaining after
the breaking
°f the will
childhood (the will a
particular characteristic of adult men) and
the repression of sexuality.
As
brides of Christ," they
celebrated a meek and humble
submission of will to a highly
sexualized, father figure of
3
Christ.

ShC

^Z

m

m

This constellation of beliefs,
though, was a relative
attribute of groups in colonial
North America.
Geographically, Puritan settlements
in New England were characterized by this ethic to an
extreme degree, as part of their
notion of a closed community in
the Devil's wilderness; it
is probable that this aspect
of Puritan culture helped
exclude Africans as integral members
of society. 4
Southern
planters, on the other hand, Anglican
on the whole and
thus a mi lder part of the Reformation,
had both the economic need and social attitudes (and
opportunities) which
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allowed them to exploit
African labor
aDor and
bines, African women.

,

.

>

th
through
concu-

Because self-denial was
conditioned both b
y patriarchy and by business
opportunities, non-Puritan
colonial
merchants could partake
of this ethic in
varying deg rees
Them zeal was partly a
response to the unwillingness
of
underclass labor to- work
steadily and to drop
their traditional rights to portions
of the material and
products
of their labor.
Thus during the
transition to production
for exchange during
the late 1700 's and
early 1800's, we
find elites condemning
these workers for sloth,
indolence,
theft and intemperance.
Such castigation was an
aspect of
attempts to impose the new
disciplines upon emerging
wage
workers, first in the putting
out system of manufactures,
then in early factories.
The generality of self-denial
thus varied by class,
and, through the process
of extension into the
working
class, it also varied by
time.
Protestant sects played a
major role in bringing this
ethic to farming and craft
workers, who carried these
beliefs with them in their
experiences with and transition
into wage workers.
These
sects also directly proselytized
the emerging class of
wage workers in urban areas.
Not simply a source of
discipline, evangelical sects helped
interpret and shape
working class experience of an often
troubling
world, and
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were in turn shaped
by
y

clas<=;
s

ex P eri ence
•

I would
argue
that in an indirect
but powerful way
this religious
y, xnis
rei
experi.

•

1

working classes, for the
sensual repression
inherent in its
ethic of work was
fertile ground for racial
ideology.
It
is inseparable from
rom the entire ethic
in question.
There is
an internal connection
in it between an
"uncontrolledlifestyle, including
sexual expressiveness,
.

and a lazy.
unwilling, unmotivated
worker; these two sides
of the coin
are important in racial
stereotypes.
In

the colonies, the original
major churches were
Congregationalist in the north,
and Anglican in the South

These were established state
churches; other sects such
as
the Quakers flourished
mostly in the middle colonies 5
The colonies remained
overwhelmingly Protestant up
through
the early to mid 1800's,
with the exceptions of early
Maryland and of the urban Irish.
Within this Protestant
culture between 1700 and 1850
we find the growth
.

of

fundamentalist-evangelical sects whose
members helped to
supply the emerging working
class in the latter part of
the period in question.

Although Congregationalism was an
established religion, its faithful membership
in the population was never
a complete matter.
Many in the underclass were indifferent
to Sunday services out of choice
or out of the necessity
of scrabbling for a living in New
England villages. This
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co mmo „ ly noted
absence of piety among
the underciass was
addressed after about
1725 by the Great

^

Awakenlng
was a revival
.ove.ent begun in the m
iddle colonies and
glV6n great lmPetUS
the Northampton
Massachusetts
Preacher, Jonathan
Edwards.
This revival lasted
approximately until the
Revolution, and coincided
with the growth
of the Baptist Church
in the middle and
Southern colonies.
in this period,
we find on the one
hand that emerging
market society was
increasingly apprehended
and popularized
g the upper classes in
rationalistic, Enlightenment
terms:
the material and
spiritual progress of society
through science and
knowledge.
This belief was not incommensurate with the ethic of
self-denial. On the other
hand,
the rural poor and
laboring classes helped
shape evangelistic revivals as part of
their response to the same
historical process, often an
experience of hardship, and
especially
in the early 1800's,
great disruption and loss of
traditional ways of life.
,

Evangelistic conversion to Christianity
was an exceptionally cathartic experience,
requiring a complete debasement of the saved individual.
Greven describes the attitude
of key evangelical figures
in the Great Awakening as
one of

"profound alienation of individuals
from their own bodies
and an intense hostility toward
their innermost natures." 6
This attitude of utter "personal
corruption," based on
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physical alienation,
was the basis for
the belief in the
complete gravity an d
sinf ulne ss of human
beings, a central
enet in evangelical
preaching.
Exhorted with thls
message revival
participants experienced
-a deep consciousness of sin with an
accompanying anxiety for
salvation " 7
Succumbing to their sense
of debasement, meeting
members released and
shared the frustrations
of the difficult lives they led,
through spontaneous
displays of emo‘iobg ThSy reSP ° nded
to a charged and
violent preaching
with
,

n

^"

e

^ “Lg,

and°th: crud“ fo™r:f'e CSta
m :t
as barking like
SUCh
g
°r
muscular spasms of the body
andd (allln e to th e
V
ground in a dead faint.

H

u.”S
’

Indicative of elite,
Enlightenment-informed distaste
for the movement is a
letter of 1742 from a Boston
preacher
to a minister in Edinburgh,
Scotland. 9 The Boston preacher
saw the revivals as the
"Spirit of S uperstition ." as
"gross
Di-orders and barefaced Affronts
to common Decency," though
indeed the revivals possibly
had led many to a "truly
Chr istian temper." 10

Disturbingly, 11

they place their religion so
much in the Heat and
of their Passion that they
too msflT
)^ Glr ~--aS ° n and
(original
°ii d g ment.emphasis

l^our

,

The good preacher commented further
on the revival
leaders who were emerging from the
common people, another
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sign of the underclass
character
aracter of th
the movement.
Known as
exhorters " these lay
12
preachers were:
most commonly raw i 1 itova + z,
weak and conceited
“
young Men or Lads’.
-ssr—
a e gener ally'~much
better thought~of than'anv
f
Ster
the new Way, I mea n
^’ except those
by
bv^h^
p
the
fiends
Ext raordTna rT^c; n !
to the
em
11
ional
displaysiiT~the~L a n d
and ^hev" *
°J
the
reate
moters of them
^
st pro"f-is indo h
Of these poor ignorant
0" 5
there 18
ordinarily the most Noise
and Confusion.
emphasis)
(original
,

—

’

m

•

.

1

1

SurL^??^^

In comparative terms,
Methodist revivals,

occurring
largely after 1810 in the
U.S., outstripped in
fervor the
-re restrained Baptist versions,
and were rivaled in
intensity only by the earlier
Great Awakening. 12 E P.
Thompson's
description of English
Methodism during this latter
period
closely parallels 0.8.
Methodist experience in their
camp
meetings and regular Sunday
services.
Methodists went
further than other churches
in regu^rizi^g the
outpouring
of emotions as a feature
of Sunday sermons, which
Thompson
describes as "Sabbath orgasms
of feeling." 14 And of
revivals 15
.

The word is unpleasant:
but it is difficult not
o see in Methodism in
these years a ritualized
ChlC m tUrbati ° n
Energies and Motions
tions°wh?ch
which were dangerous to social
order, or
nich were merely unproductive
(in Dr. Ure's sense)
were released in the harmless
form
feasts, watch nights, band-meetings,of sporadic love
or Revivalist
VdUbl
campaigns.

r

-

These later doctrines, to varying
degrees, kept intact
the Puritan teachings of the
sinfulness of sexuality
and
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sexual organs.
and

th<3

A i ong with th0
loss Qf tradltionai

lmP ° Sltl0n ° f

—

d isclpllnes

these teachings
themselves established
the need for the
periodic catharses
revival.
At the very least,
in Thompson's
Phrase, these teachings
constituted a -pollution
of the
sources of spontaneity."'*'®
,

Religious activity after
1800 follows no simple
pattern, admits of no
simple Interpretation.”
The major
denominations sometimes split,
sometimes cooperated, i„
their strategies, to a
considerable degree in each
direction.
were lines of tension
between clergy and laity
over
tactics, authority, and
doctrine.
Upstart Baptists and
Methodists, the latter much
more hierarchical
than the

former, both appeared to
the established clergy of
New
England to be dangerously
associated with democratic and
emotional excesses.
These two sects had a virtual
monopoly
on the religion of the
frontier and of the urban poor,
and

were associated in
Congregationalist minds with first
Jeffersonian and then Jacksonian
politics.
In the Congregat ionalists
home territory, Deism and
Unitarianism reared
their heretical heads.
'

The collapse of Federalist power
and the growth of

manufacturing meant a loss and an
opportunity for churches.
After 1800, the familiar world of
established churches with
their intimate connections to public
(Federalist) power was
undermined by disestablishment and the
growth of the West
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and South.

The clergy
gy learned to cope
„
with these conditions
y supporting private
organizations, interdenominational
if
Possible, to influence
public morals and policy.
These
organizations could not be
said on the whole to
have been
controlled by the clergy,
though, for an increasingly
vocal
middle class segment of
the laity found religious
activism
vital for imprinting its
stamp on new social
conditions.
This phenomenon has been
called by one historian
the "evangelical united front " 18
•+.
One of its major
accomplishments
Which bears on my arguments
was its takeover and
promotion
of the Sunday School
movement.
Once in evangelical
hands,

these schools provided a
major means of bringing the
ethic
of self-denial to the new
working class.
Early Sunday Schools were
founded for the education
of poor boys, girls, and
millhands, with a certain
religious
content but no particular
religious mission. The First Day
Society of Philadelphia, in
1790, and a similar school in
Pawtucket for Samuel Slater’s
millhands, in 1797, are
examples.
Between 1800 and 1812 the idea
blossomed in
Philadelphia, with new schools serving
all ages and both
sexes, but intended for the "poor."
Methodists again seem
to have been active in many of
the early schools. 19
An appreciation of the possibilities
of these schools
resulted in what Foster calls "a craze
for voluntary teaching beginning around 1814 in large
eastern cities.

Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Charleston
(S.C.),
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Pittsburgh, and smaller
cities ~experienced
rapid growth in
Sunday Schools.
Foster comments 20
,

h

the principal inst
rumen t^of^a
0"
S rapidl >’ growing 8

suburbs

“

Sch ° o1 b -ame

[wage-workIng-! R

0l

H.]

The targets of these
schools were wage earners
and their
children, who by and
large held to traditional
customs and
morai
in particular they
hadn't a well-developed
sense of
Private property, showed
up late and irregularly
for work
drank, cursed, and
21
fornicated.
The influx of middle-class
volunteers to combat this
menace through the Sunday
Schools
provides the first substantial
example in U.S. history
of a
ained missionary impulse
to remake working class
culture
in the middle-class
image,
Expansion of the effort was
phenomenal; for example 22
:

Philadelphia

Year

Schools

1818

43

556

5,970

1821

313

2,754

24,218

1824

723

7,300

49,619

The American Sunday School
Union,

Teachers

Pupils

formed in 1824, reported

in 1828 that it had 394
local unions with 3,760 schools,

32,806 teachers, and 259,656 students,
mostly children.
About one in seven children, five
to fifteen years old,

attended these schools, and a much
higher percentage if we
consider only the areas where
manufacturing was beginning
to concentrate.

Middle class children began enrolling
in
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larger numbers at this
thi<? time,
peer-models for other
students
Key to promoting the
whole system was the
American Bihle
Society, formed in
1816.
It provided Bibles
and interdenominational literature
to the schools, and
was one of
the first successful
commercial publishing
ventures in a
national market
.

^

"

Nativism.

-

a mo del

for
sexual l v in formed p olitic
£H£_«exuaily-•

_p

,

The Sunday School
movement and the printing
concerns" which
supported evangelical causes
established important institutional and cultural links
between the middle class
and
emerging working class.
The expansion of literacy
and
evangelical morals among the
population in turn provided
Part of the political basis
for Nativism and created
a
potential market for profitable
anti-Catholic literature.
Nativism united middle and
working class Protestants,
through some shared and some
distinct concerns, against the
waves of immigrants, largely
Irish Catholic, landing in
the
after 1830.
One embracing sentiment was
the fear of
papal designs on the western U.S.,
a conspiracy between the
Pope and Austria to seize western
territory as a base for
spreading the evils of Romanism
throughout the continent
and for denying land to Protestant
settlers.
A book by
Samuel Morse (of telegraph fame),
serialized in a New York
newspaper, was the genesis of this story.
Protestant
ideology had long been a vehicle for the
expression of a
major theme in American nationalism, westward
expansion. 25

’
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In retrospect it
makes sense that

longstanding tears about
European designs on the
west would be expressed
in religious
terms for they provided
some of the sharpest
distinctions
possible between the U.S.
and Europe.
Catholic immigrants
would have, from this
point of view, supra-national
loyalties to the Pope and
thus to those European
thrones which
were still Catholic,
,

As a threat to the
American way of life,
Catholics

represented in particular a
threat to working class
economic
security.
Billington reports 2 6
llG

r

° bS

aWay
J
^workers
Di S co t
rew ln pr °portion to tSe increase “ f
g
en iaborers;
natives
began to complainn of
i
°f a
lowered°standard o f ^living^and'of
^ec V
as factory owners
adjusted their wage levels to^
they C ° Uld
foreign^bor^
workers"^
f rom American

^

—

’

To those in the middle class
without a direct interest in
cheap labor, Catholic immigrants
were another undisciplined
population, but one f rustratingly
beyond the reach of their
evangelism; held in mystical
ignorance by their priests,
they were a permanent menace
in a way the native working
class was not.
For many middle and working class
nativists,
Catholic communities with their
clerical leadership served
as opportunities for sexual
fantasizing and projection.

Billington judges this theme to be the
most prominent in
the flood of anti-Catholic vituperation,
capitalized on by
urban press, church literature, and book
publishers.
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Celibate priests were

a particular
nnr-f--;^ i
a

metaphor for the
Pro bl e ras created tor
Protestants by self-denial,
symboli2 _
1,16 the
temPtati °"
at hand (the „unner
y
the confessional
as well as the wish
)
to break the rules
of sexual conduct as
priests were i mag i„ e d to.
Priests
were pictured as wont
to entrap, seduce,
and sexuall y exyoung women, a pattern
set by the success of
Maria
"°nk S
«*• b °ok, a young Protestant
glrl 13 1Ur6d tQ a C
abused there at the leisure
of priests and with
the connivance of ranking
nuns, who seem
madams.
Another tale centers on the
intimate
atmosphere of the confessional,
where a priest succeeds in
placing lurid suggestions
in a girl's mind: 28

^"

’

'

™b ^

Y

S ° Ul and b ° dy of his
Day
Dav^f
after day, week after week and
r
h
eS thiS
S irl come to
confess“n un?n th° wretch hapless
has worked up her
passion,
« i
almost -upping, and then
i tent
penitent
P

.

K^hls

eas^prey

.

Such tales could seize upon the
imagination and be credited
as reality.
The mob which in 1840 torched
a convent outside Boston had been inflamed
by sensational newspaper
accounts similar to Awful Disclosures
These tales were
also fundamental, along with backing
from pulpits and evangelical groups, in laying the social bases
for nativist
.
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Political movements like
the Know-Nothing
party,
with
organizational sources in
secret fraternal orders
such as
the Order of the Star
Spangled Banner, Nativism
also sugSojts that opposition to
Catholic immigrants, l
ike later
craft-union exclusion of
blacks, obtained some
of its
cross-class and sexual
elements from fraternal
Protestant
y
solidarity.
These Protestant crusades,
as Billington aptly
terms
them, are instructive
for several reasons.
First they
attest to the power of
Protestant ideology and
institutions
to shape a social climate,
a politics, indebted
to sexual
concerns.
Second, they are fundamental
examples of middle
and working class interaction
around common concerns.
While
middle class evangelists seem
especially concerned with
social control of new immigrants,
and working class nativists seem especially concerned
with job competition,
nativists from both classes shared
feelings of threat
indebted to their common mores,
upon which cooperative
action might be based.
Finally, the crusades were a
major
impetus to the development of a
popular press committed to
sensations of crime and sex. Each of
these factors played
a major role in race relations,
especially with the growing
power of Abolitionism, the possibility
of war, and
the

threat of increased social contact
with newly-liberated and
"uncivilized" slaves.
The post-Civil War "black scare"
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succeeded nativist theater,
ln
social-sexual drama.

Post-Civil War "b lack scarp

a P erm anent way,

as in part

"

Between 1800 and 1860
the

development of evangelical
Protestantism, capitalist
work
relations, literacy and
popular press, and debate
between
pro and anti-slavery
forces all contributed
to a deepening
of the ideological
ties between Afro-Americans,
sexuality,
and the devaluation of
sensuality as a "civilized"
trait.
Politicians and printed matter
increasingly traded upon and
fostered an evolving popular
view of blacks which
insisted
on their inability to
exercise the sexual controls

that to
the white community were
a hallmark of civilization.
This
iew was not confined to
the South, even in 1800,
and
definitely not by 1860.
In this context any
suggestion of
black social equality, or even
of black freedom, carried
the automatic suggestion of
increased intermarriage and
other sexual crimes (rape,
prostitution).

The intermarriage barrier itself
carried a heavy
freight of meaning, not exclusively
sexual as we have
seen,
expressing a complex of motives best
defined as
white nationalism. The notion
of nationalism conveys the
-~ allty of economic, sexual, and cultural concerns which
the white community carried into
the process of racial
separation and subordination.
Bans on interracial sex were
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absorbed into this tendency
to articulate
national expansion in terms of Anglo
Saxon superiority.
Blacks were
either to be separated,
subordinated, and exploited
as
the slave system, or
were to be excluded
as far as
Possible from all social
and economic contact
with whites,
as in the northeast
and northwest.
In this process
of
self definition,
economic motives, where
they existed with
regard to race, differed
widely.
Sexual and social concerns though, rooted
in a denial of sensuality
indebted to
both a shared work ethic
and kinship affinity,
were more
widely shared across region
and class.
That this was so
helps to explain the
frequency and power of the
resort to
sexual rationalization and
tactics in the politics of
racial subordination, a
resource called upon with
increasing frequency after the
1850' s.

m

Although the image of blacks
in the white mind was
already by 1800 indelibly
associated with sexuality,
descriptions of free blacks by
northern evangelical clergy
and middle class emphasized
other concerns as well.
Evangelical criticisms were not unlike
those accorded to white
wage earners, as being given
to "Idleness, Frolicking,
Drunkenness, and in some few cases to
Dishonesty." 2
such,

As

free blacks were part of the larger
social danger

perceived by northern clergy during this
period.
But the
clergy recognized limits to the social
redemption of blacks
in the white prejudice which they
felt contributed
to the
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degraded COnditi ° n ° f the

This preJudice would

not allow blacks to
be an integral part
of American
society and thus was
one reason why Afro
Americans
,

were
regarded as candidates
for emigration to t-v
Liberia through
the African Colonization
3
Society
•

.

Beginning in the 1830

's,

though, southern propa-

gandists contributed to a
strengthening of the conceptual
connection between blacks,
animality, and sex as an
animal
function, as well as trading
upon existing connections. 4
Tracts, pamphlets, and
books flooded both north
and south
with the ideology of
biological racism,
its first full-

scale enunciation.

This ideology developed in
response to
attacks by abolitionists on
the degrading nature of
slavery;
as Frederickson notes 5
:

llke J coblnism forced
previously
unart iculat
pd assumptions
^
Ul5 ted
to the level of defen-S
f
sive ideological consciousness.
-

One major strain of the
southern reaction justified slavery
on the grounds of the subhuman
character of Africans,
locked by biological necessity
into savagery and licentiousness.
Together with the other major strain
of

paternalism, southern propaganda stressed
that blacks were
safe elements of American society
only under external white
controls.
Propagandists justified the continuance of
such
controls in part by appealing directly
to pre-existing

deep-seated white fears of miscegenation" on
the part of
freed slaves.
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The fears and social
identity these
propagandists
traded on and fostered
were not confined to
the south.
Northern farmers and free
soiiprc anti-slavery
soilers,
by moral
Principle and economic
interest, fought for white
homogeneity in the west.
Supporting African colonization,
and
el forts to exclude
and remove blacks from
the northwest,
y subscribed to climatic
theories which found African
Peoples suited only to the
deepest south.
Confined there
by nature and law, blacks
would eventually die out
or be
eliminated through Darwinian
racial competition 7
Negro excl usionist sentiments
were particularlv
+.

.

6
immigration and to remove the
blacks^ho^ere
already there.
In 1851 Indiana prevented
all
Negroes from entering the
state, and Illinoiss
followed suit in 1853.

^0

Iowa as well passed an
exclusionary law in 1851.
Referenda
in four states— Illinois,
Indiana, Oregon, and Kansas-

averaged 79.5 percent in favor of
excluding free blacks.
In all of these efforts,
the whites (that is, white males)
drew heavily upon the unacceptability
of miscegenation,
a

sure consequence (they thought) of
social proximity.
"The
point was raised too often to be overlooked."
Even in
Wisconsin, which allowed free blacks but
denied them the
vote, politicians warned against voting
rights as encour-

aging blacks "to marry our sisters and
daughters, and
smutty wenches to [marry] our brothers and
8
sons."
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in the 1850's,

Democrats and the new
Hepublican part,

tlme and aBaln US6d the
to attack one another.

interracial marriage and

Republicans were accused of

favoring social equality,
and labeled amalgamation's.
Democrats were branded the
"Mulatto Democracy" in reference
to widespread interracial
offspring in the south, a
region
in which Republicans
were not organized at all. 9
And,

Lincoln's well-known denials
of racial equality included
acceptance of the prevailing
amalgamation issue; he was not,
he declared, 10
in favor of making voters
or jurors of negroes
nor of qualifying them to
hold office nor to
intermarry with white people.

Po st-emancipatio n "black scare .”

’

Emancipation set

a

new context for the sexual designs
and proclivities white
culture imputed to blacks, the context
being the lack of
external controls that slave codes
seemed formerly to have
provided, and thus a correspondingly
greater threat
to

white society.

Blacks had all along been, and would con-

tinue to be, a social metaphor for the
subordination of
sensuality which white culture had imposed
upon itself.

Events after 1863 confirmed the nature,
limits, and depth
of the sexual drama inherent in racial
subordination.

The miscegenation controversy of 1864 establishes
some of the content and limits of this drama.

It was in

part an extension of political tactics developed in
the
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1850 s

But emancipation
afforded a test of the
connecbetween white identity
on the one hand,
and state
policy and legitimation
on tne
the other.
othpr
n
Copperhead opponents
Of Lincoln circulated
an anonymous pamphlet,
to be linked
with the Republican
party, which argued for
racial intermarriage as the vehicle
to a truly superior
race.
The
authors coined the word
"miscegenation', for this
policy,
and left no doubt as to
11
its meaning:
'

.

ts

T^th^whiL^

8

^

° ne

Sism-r
U

ntemPt

the period°
an attempt to influence
the election of 1864 and

topple Lincoln's government,
the pamphlet was a failure.
For most whites, "the whole
miscegenation issue was just
12
too fantastic"
to be credited as the policy
of a major
party.
Even negrophobes during the
reconstruction era did
not generally subscribe to the
belief that radical Republicans would force social equality
upon the south. 13
It

could not be credited that whites
themselves would pursue
a policy of social equality
for the races; it was not
thinkable, it contravened a deeply rooted
identity.
It was,

however, thinkable that blacks would have

such designs as part of the larger threat
they posed to
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d° mlnanCe

-

ThUS WS

a

* national pattern,

not Just

southern one, in which
the threat of sexua!
eri me by
blachs symbolised the
total threat that
racial equality
represented to whites,
and which united
disparate elements
° f WMte S ° Clety
o f shared sexual
mores and
kinship interests. The
shared notes sustained
any allegation of black sexual
misconduct as prima facie
evidence of
guilt, and any such
allegation proved sufficient
to set off
community retribution
through lynching, pogrom,
or bombing
and to justify the
violence that was in fact
directed
against blacks for other non
non-sexual reasons.
'

’

In the south,

such retribution involved
community participation in
the
reproduction of segregation
practices that persisted
between
the lapse of the slave
codes and the codification
of Jim
In the north, particularly
after 1900, violence justified or incited by allegations
of sexual crimes helped
create and enforce segregated
patterns of housing, which
state policy later absorbed
as a condition of profitable
property speculation and social
legitimacy among the white
working and middle classes.

The intertwining of black
sexuality and crime in the
public mind was, as in all past
and present matters of
race, both traded upon and
fostered by the daily press.
The 1860's press was rife with
reports of atrocious sexual
outrages committed by black men, as
well as attention to
the "tendency" of newly arrived
black women in urban areas
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^

to become prostitutes

m.

he n
Copperhead press was espe-

cially responsible for th-io ^ u
tor this emphasis,
as part of antiRepublican politics.
The evidence indicates
not only a
desire on the part of
capitalists or the upper
class to
divide black and white
te in the underclasses,
who were in any
event already socially
divided.
It also suggests
an attempt
to use a volatile
issue both to sell
papers and to influence
national poliftics,
ics
a0 welli as an appeal
by authors of these
articles based on mores
they shared with their
readers
These newspapers luridly
recounted such incidents as: 15
X)

h
e ra
b
hlS h me by a black mob
led by a man "bent
bent u
un
?
n amalgamation."
P°
Detroit Pno
n
Free Press
February 16, 1863.
.

2)

1863.
3)

tinR ° f a four year old girl
by four
Cleveland Plain Dealer April
10,

h?L?°°
mSn

'

.

°* a German immigrant woman
convalesof her fourth child
Detroit Fr ee Press September
4, 1867

cin/?rn
ng from the birth
,

,

4>

0ria1 counter ing abolitionists
by invoking
”?nl
^ at
the sound
midnight [of] the fanciful
shrieks
e
en ’" the WallingS ° f mutl lated
children
e
the°“
le
ans ° ^f tortured and powerless
::
men. „ Albany
ff°
Atlas and Argus February
28, 1863.
.

Other papers gave equally lurid
accounts of black male
assaults on a thirteen-year-old
white girl (New Haven), a

five-year-old white girl (South Orange,
N.J.), and two white
women and a thirteen-year-old white
girl (Chambersburg
Pa.).

The point of course is not to dismiss
sexual

assault as a trivial crime, but rather
to show that such
reports had an automatic credibility
and attraction (which
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the press could trade
upon to sell papers).
power e,

Nor was the

^^

„„„

newspaper

lses

set off by a life
sentence sgiven11 to
xo a black man
convicted
of raping a nine-year-old
white girt,
girl- an *>„+•
entire community

was punished for a crime
(which we are required
to doubt
was) committed by a
particular member of that

comity.

Emancipation brought into play
the belief that blacks
were retrogressing into
savagery in the absence of
the
strict controls and exposure
to white influence
available
under slavery.
As Hall notes, this idea
influenced "popular and academic thought
into the 1930’ M 18
:

The chief evidence was
sexual immoralitv
familvY
feeling the cornerstone of
social order' wls
116
communlt
lapsing
apsing into prostitution and 5'; black women were
illegitimacv ahrwall, black men were acting
upon thl innate'
lasciviousness of the savage beast.
-

,

•

In the

post-bellum south, Hall sees the
development
of a folk pornography of
rape around this theory of retrogression, an obsession echoed in
other regions because "it
was rooted in the deepest of
American communal preoccupations:
the conflict between 'civilization'
and
'savagery.

t

The white woman's humiliation at
the hands of the black man
19
was

escribed in minute and progressively
embellished
detail:
a public fantasy that implies a
kind of
group participation in the rape of the
woman almost as cathartic as the subsequent
lynching of
the alleged attacker.

?T
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Rape was the pop ular
and offlcial
ratlonallzation Qf
the entire practice
of lynching, though
±t figured
("only") 23 percent of
the 3,38G lynchings
of blacks between 1882 and 1930
,,
tt
^
1930.
Undoubtedly,
even this fi gure represents a distortion of
reality through the use
of a credibie
excuse.
For our purposes, the
significance of the rape
accusation (or the professed
fear of it in the
absence of
lynching) is not that
it was a false one
in the vast
majority of lynchings, as
An.es, Cox, and NAACP
studies have
argued.
Rather, the significance
is in the credibility
extended by whites to the
allegation

^

i»,

^

in all

And, secondly, the
significance is in the solidarity
which
the accusation evoked
in the white community
against blacks
HL^eneral, apart from the atrociousness
of rape per se.
All segments of the southern

white community participated

in,

condoned, or supported lynching.

As late as 1939

.

65 percent of whites in a
national survey supported lynchings for sexual assaults. 21

For lynching of course was not
the righteous punishment of an individual, something
conceded by white

participants and well known by blacks.

Studies by Arthur

Raper and the NAACP, as well as
first-hand accounts,
emphasize the use of lynching as a
general social control
device, following a set pattern, and
depending upon widespread popular and official support for
22
its
existence.

Although rape was the ideal excuse for
a lynching, the
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threat of economic or
politinni encroachment
was a common
..
motivation
As Cox points out
( in
1947 ,
ment makeS lyn ° hinS
P° ss ib le and lynchlng
speedily
squelches any movement
among Southern Negroes
for enfranchrsement." And, Piven
and Cloward conclude
that the
disappearance of lynching
y oning and iits
to terrors
was the major
change brought about in
the dailv
aily lives of southern
blacks
by the civil rights
movement.
.

,

,

+.

-p

The effectiveness of
lynching as a social
control
device depended heavily
upon its arbitrary character
and
upon the savage character
of its execution.
Individuals
were selected as targets
almost at whim, because
they were
handy; any individual
might do, because it was
a punishment
of the community.
Richard wv!o.v,+
rticnard
y
Wright recounts the effect
of
this culture of violence 23
:

^T

th
lnflu enced my conduct as a
Negro
not have to happen to me
directly; I needfd
to hear of them to feel
their full
deepest layers of my consciousness. ef?ects in
Indeed
white brutality that I had
not seen was a more
1 Ve
n
1
behavior ttlM that which
I knew
The art
experience would have let me
see the
tlC ° utllnes of what was
really
?
haonenincr
g> v, Ut aS l0ng aS i1: remai ned
something
terrihi
S ^et remote,
something whose horror
and Mood
descend upon me at any moment, I
was comnelTefj
P Hed to give my entire imagination
over
t
I
whlch blocked the springs of thought
;l"
a feeling
n
me, creating a sense of distance
between me and the world in which
I lived.

I?d
did
but
the
the

f

^

rea^nf'

I

fm

The horror lay as well in the
mutilations which consummated many lynchings, frequently
castration and symbolic
rape (of black women).
Once finished, lynchings frequently
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led to mob actions
against black neighborhoods
themselves
1,1 Sh ° rt
t0 Whit6S aS a
-xual offenses effectively
symbolized the encroachment
of the
tne blank
Diack ncommunity.
'

Reprise
have developed the
following points in this
chapter.
First, sexual concerns
are a major constituent
of race relations and have been
present within American
race relations
from the very beginning.
Second, these concerns are
deeply indebted to a
combination of patriarchal
relations
and the sensual repression
required of persons within
capitalist development.
Third, a direct vehicle
of this repression, and thus an indirect
source of sexual racial images,
was the religious message
of evangelical Protestantism;
this movement moreover
established important institutional
ties between working and middle
classes.
Fourth, evangelical culture and the general
distinction between civilized
and barbarian races fostered
social dramas (miscegenation
controversies, rape scares and lynchings,
later, housing
politics) in which black men and
communities symbolized
the threat of unrestrained sexuality
to the dominant white
culture.
Moreover, the image of black sexuality
in these
dramas symbolized a total threat (sexual,
economic, political) from black communities to white
society.
The next
chapter will explore more fully the housing
integration
I
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an expression of white
nationalism in which sexual

racial concerns play a
prominent role, and link
these
matters to political legitimacy.
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CHAPTER

V

SEXUALITY, RACE RELATIONS,
AND

LEGITIMACY:

PART II

Introduction
In this chapter

want to lay out my
understanding

I

of how sexual concerns
am ong whites fit into
the totality
of subordination which

Afro-Americans experienced in
their
migration to urban and
northern areas.
I will use residential segregation and racial
housing conflict as the
point
of departure for my
discussion.
The first section
of the

chapter will discuss these
conflicts and the matter of
sexual taboos.
The second section will link
these concerns
to emerging legitimacy
problems for the state and
political
institutions after WW IT
,
Finuiiw
mally, a„ concluding
discussion
will broach possible future
courses for racial conflict,
state policy, and legitimacy.
The embracing thesis of
these sections is that the historical
commitment of the
state to the concerns of white
nationalism, with its constituent of sexual racism, was
significantly altered in the
.

Post'™

11 era to the detriment of the
state's legitimacy

among many white citizens.
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Housing Integration r nnfi^
t
gii^Liiaci a i -sexual Tahnno
Racism was not so much
exported from the south,
after the Bourbon reaction
of the 1890-3, as it
was activated as a cultural theme
by the urban migration

of blacks.
The boll weevil,
repression, and changes in
land tenure and
agricultural practices forced
many of the black peasantry
out of the rural south
between 1890 and 1930, and
again
after 1940; a large percentage
of the displaced ended
up
northern cities, along with
displaced southern whites.
In response to this
black migration, and to
extremes of
racial violence and ideology
(lynching and retrogression
theory), some white intellectuals
developed a paternalis1
tic racism.
Most whites, though, drew
upon a racial
stance closer to the extreme,
a stance that was a social
production of family and community.

m

Ihis stance fed the popular
violence which enforced
racial subordination, a violence
which spread out of the
south with black migration and of
which lynchings
and a

resurgent Klan were only one aspect.

In addition to con-

flict over jobs and scabbing, much
of this white violence
was precipitated, fanned, and justified
by allegations of

either black sexual crime or black male
violence which
injured white women and children. For example,
in Congressional testimony about the East St. Louis riot
of 1917
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labor leader Edward

F.

Mason "gave a vivid
account of the
report that Negro me n had
committed vicious acts of
assault
against white girls in the
East St. Louis streets." 2
Rio ts
in Washington, D.C.,and
Waukegan, Illinois, were
precipitated by reports of black
male attacks upon white
women. 3
And, riots were only the
tip of the iceberg; racial
bombings and assaults (as I
shall note) were common
stories in
urban newspapers of the day.
The Chicago riot of
1919-essentially a pogrom
directed against the black
community-has been characterd as especially indebted to
housing competition. 4

ever, the housing issue,

How-

in the riot and in general,

expresses much more than competition
over a scarce resource,
or economic subordination of the
black
community.

housing

The

integration" conflict is deeply indebted
to sexual
racism and ideology, and thus focuses
an entire range of
social and power relations between the
races.
'

As the commission investigating the
Chicago riot of

1919 found, the "sex myth" was a prime
contributor to the
atmosphere of violence against black neighborhoods.
It

noted "the common belief among whites that
Negroes are

rapists by nature," and found the white press
guilty of

trading upon kindred beliefs and thus of fanning
the
flames of white violence.

ferred

r

Newspapers continually re-

to sex matters which provide[s] a powerful stimur*

lant to public interest."

Such matters were not limited
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to crime reporting,
but included as well
stories of inti-

mterracial contacts:

intermarriage, interracial
dating at "black and tan"
resorts, and love affairs
such
as
WIFE VANISHES HUSBAND
7
SEEKS NEGRO."
While press accounts
stressing the use of black
scabs may well have been
direct attempts to use
racism to
divide the working class,
news accounts sensationalizing
interracial sexuality have
other important dimensions
as
well.
They were written by men
who had their own social
training as a source of and
guide to the popular attitudes
on race they were trying
to tap in order to sell
papers.

Moreover, the manipulation
involved in these stories (and
scab stories as well?) was
not the paradigm case in
which
the manipulated is unaware
of the process.

Rather, one

must conclude that such whites
as were affected by these
stories participated in their own
manipulation by giving

their imagination over to these
tales.

Although a non-

rational process, it is at some level
a seeking out of
the titillating information, a
channeling of unacceptable
impulses not unlike the consumption
of True Romance
Detect i ve and Argosy stories.

.

,

White images of black sexuality and
sexual crime
played, and continue to play, a constitutive

role in the

housing politics of Chicago in the 1910's
and other urban
areas then and now.
These images invited and sanctioned
violent white resistance (native and immigrant
ethnic) to
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lack urban migration.

simply explosions
lngS

'

aSSaUUS

'

,

Urban riotg

^

^

^ ^^^

but culminations of
a pattern Qf

^ *«"”*«*

border areas between
white and (growing)
black residential areas.
i„ Chicago,
a three-year period
at the end of the
decade saw 45 bombings of black homes
and establishments. 8
As with the
post Civil War "black
scare," the atmosphere
carried not
only sensationalism about
black sex crimes (the rape
myth)
but also eternally-associated
rumors of blacks arming
themselves.
Both attest to white fears
of black male aggression, revenge, power.
Violent reprisals by whites
for

breaching or appearing to
breach the unwritten law of
racial separation continued
to be a major tactic in
the
north (as well as in southern
cities) through the early
1950's, especially in the decade
immediately following
WW II.
Then, a widespread housing
shortage coincided with
renewed black migration to urban
areas.
The
result, as

Abrams documents, was "a wave
of violence [which] swept
through the country from the South
to the North,

from East

to West."

Cities outside the old confederacy
which
experienced this violence included:
San Francisco;
Richmond, California; Los Angeles;
Chicago and Cicero,
Illinois; Detroit and Dearborn, Michigan;
and the Bronx. 10

Housing conflict is an important area
to consider
because of the focus it provides for the

economic, sexual,

and ideational aspects of legitimation.

In the first
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Place, good housing in
capitalism is scarce:
building
housing requires
significant capital, and
housing production especially low
income housing-i s generally
a less
Profitable investment than
others for those who have
the
capital-banks and builders.
This scarcity underwrites
a
struggle for good housing
in the working class,
and racial/
ethnic animosities definitely
have this material component.
Yet homes in our culture
also provide a locus of
sexuality,
socialization, and patriarchal
property relations, as well
as an important symbol
of major cultural themes:
the cult
of domesticity, and the
family as refuge.
In helping to
constitute housing segregation,
sexual-racial taboos keep
at a distance those who
seemingly negate or threaten
that
which is gathered in the meaning
of the "home."
These interwoven economic, sexual,
and cultural
motives for segregation have
historically been traded upon
by the constellation of interests
which dominate urban
housing production and rentals:
banks, builders, real

estate agents, and landlords.

These interests helped to

develop and heavily profited from the
post-1900 residential
segregation which whites were culturally
inclined to, 11
even as the housing production these
interests underfunded
created the material conditions for shelter
competition

within the working class.

When the housing market col-

lapsed in the Great Depression, the state helped
under-

write mortgaging and low-income housing in order
to
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forestan class conflict
around this basic material
need

12
.

In doing so,

state policy sanctioned
and promoted segregaas a condition of
its legitimacy, both
to the white
public and to the housing
interests which found
state fundtng and segregation
so profitable.
!„ this policy, f
would
argue, as well as in
the effects of its later
symbolic
eversal, we can see an
intimate connection between
legitimation and social identity.
And in this policy, I
would
argue, the state responded
to and represented an
aggregation of popular and elite
interp^fq
hoot conceptualized
inrerests best
as
white nationalism.

te

Whether one owns or rents,
housing is a physical
locus of immensely important
cultural meanings relating to
family life, to the split
between private and public life,
to aspirations which help
sustain the daily struggle to
get by.
If to a critical eye these
meanings appear romantic or (increasingly) without
substance, then perhaps we
are missing the contemporary
threat that is felt when even
the aspirations and symbolic
meanings wrapped up with

housing become unrealistic, untenable,
impossible to sustain.
Perhaps especially when this is so,
and when the
"home" is felt to be the last redoubt
of old and threatened values, the meaning of a "home"
remains a central
constitutive element in our culture, and its
defense from
all threats becomes imperative.

And make no mistake,
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blacks have a lways been
felt by whltes tQ
these meanings.

fae

^

&

Here are some broad
generalizations which relate
meanings and aspirations:
Home is a refuge from
the
bustle, cares, and
impersonality of the ublio
p
world; home
IS where your boss
can't order you around,
where you can
be in control; home
-is a family where
you love and are
loved; home is where
your children are, to whom
you are

an

authority, and your children
are your future because
you
sacrifice for them and because
(inevitably) they often
reflect what you are and
hope for them.
Or as Abrams
says:

3

The word "home,” one of the
[housing] problem, embodies symbols of the
the deepest senti
ments of American folklore.
Home is tL sea['
6
1SU
hours security, memories,
where the
th ® ?
fam py rs raised, where hopes
are
b-.fit
buiit, where treasured
possessions are kept
P
and good friends fed.

r

’

These are romantic meanings and
aspirations, often held
more dearly by some of those who
have them (women, working
class people) because an alternative
or extra world of fulfilling career or community life
is not available to them.
Such meanings, if they reflect as

I

think they do a

substantial opinion, reach paradigm
significance when you
aspire to own the building which houses
them.
(Working
class families were able to do this in
significant numbers
only after WW II.) Owning is arriving
or "making

it" in a

substantial way, representing a pinnacle of
security, an
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with equity, as well
as peace from
landlords (if
not the mortgage
The aspirations built
up around ownerre in part the creation
P
of government and
real estate
industry advertising, the
dream of security standing

out
all the more sharply
against the reality of
substandard and
insufficient housing.
But underneath the hype,
the aspirations, and
the
romantic visions are other
realities which also shape
the
meaning of housing. The
family that lives in any
house or
apartment is a locus of
socialization, even

though parental

ty increasingly competes
with media and educational
institutions.
For the vast part of the
period under consideration, 1910 to 1980, families
in the working and

middle classes lived and
reproduced an ethic of selfcontrol, self-denial in which
a significant degree of
sexual repression was central. 14
Religious training still
played a major role in sustaining
it.
For many in the
working class, both Protestantism
and Catholicism bound
family and community in a straitjacket
of guilt over the
demands of the flesh, while a secularized
Protestant ethic
was available to all in their early
schooling.
The ideal

of self-denial retained its strong
internal connection to

patriarchal relations, sexual property, and
the sexual
division of labor.
Thus, in addition to the romantic
expression of the withdrawal of meaning into
private life
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^^

cited above, housing-as-home
was constltuted as
&
Powerful background of
denial and inequality.
ecalling the discussions
of gender identity
in
chapter three, it is
important to note
ULe now
how the asymmetries
and power relations
of the
ne nirrpnf
current gender system
foster
important vulnerabilities
for many people around
heterosexual sensual and sexual
relations.
Men and women tend
to
develop differing,
gender-related combinations
of affective
and erotic capacities
and expectations, deeply
complicating
even frustrating, intimate
1*
relations.
Evolving ideals of’
virile men and sensuous
women, indebted to patriarchy,
may
add burdens of "performance"
to the sensitive process
of
developing and sustaining
intimacy.
These and other areas
of vulnerability are
compounded, manipulated, by the
deployment of sexuality in consumer
ideology 16 They are also
sustained, perhaps intensified,
by taboos which may hinder
or prohibit the discussion
necessary for reducing this vulnerability; these taboos affect
both men and women, and
especially in Anglo cultures discourage
male openness about
emotions
,

.

Domesticity is thus not
sexual terms.

a

trouble-free preserve, in

But the ethic of self-denial
encompasses

much more than sexual practices.

As an attitude which

reins in emotional and sensual expression,
it may affect
styles of dance, modes of dress, the use
of bright, varied,
or subdued colors, public and private
display of strong
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^

©motions (grief
ei) nno-cn~
anger, joy, tears)
It also contributes
to the practice of
sacrificing for the future,
particularly
the way children may
be the bene ficiaries
of that
sacrifice 17

m

.

None of these facets
of self-denial belong
exclusively to white society.
As Afro-Americans,
living for
hundreds of years in. the
ne context of +x
these developing mores
and their religious and
public supports, black
people have
appropriated many of these
qualities from liberal society
in their own way.
But for a long period
during slavery,
and arguably to the
present, Afro-American
isolation from
mainstream institutions ensured
the social space for the
preservation of cultural practices
from a West African
heritage.

While black nationalist
movements in the U.S. have
repeatedly emphasized and
celebrated these practices as a
matter of racial pride, white
nationalists have repeatedly
seized upon and exaggerated
certain of these in order to
justify their projection of black
people as innately
sexual.
White racists during slavery
righteously seized
upon and embroidered "evidence"
of sexual immorality
in

the relative tolerance in the
slave quarters for out-of-

wedlock first births among black women.
shows,

But as Gutman

this tolerance traces to a freer
attitude among

West African societies toward pre-marital
sex (which

Western Europe also held before capitalism)
and their
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unwillingness to make young
„ ome n maritaf captives
of thelr
first conceptions 18
Comparatively exuberant
styles of
religious celebration, song,
an d dance
.

are a part of a

common racial stereotype
that in ffact has an
arguable basis
in West African
19
culture
My point is not that
differences between modern
European and traditional
West African
world outlooks justified
at any point the terrible
stereotypes built up around black
people.
These stereotypes were
the result of European
attempts to tame sensuality
.

in the

service of expanded production
and of the resulting
taboos,
bivalences, and projections of
this project.
The point
is that it would be
foolish to deny that some
important
cultural differences did and
continue to exist between the
in the area of
emotional/sensual expression.
But in the context of the
continued reproduction of
the ethic of self-denial in
the home, and the intensified

commercial exploitation of the
ambivalences created by the
ethic, and in historical continuity,
white culture continues
to give credence to myths about
black sensuality which set
Afro-Americans up as a threat to white homes
and communities.
Black people continue to serve as the
"social
mirrors” Winthrop Jordan so aptly described,
their social
utility often learned by white children
as they imbibe the
ethic of self-denial.
To make clear how the ethic of self-denial
and

actual cultural differences tie into race
relations,

I
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want to recap and
expand on my baS i c
argument
In thg
dominant culture, interwoven
dynamics deep ly indebted
:

to

patriarchal and capitalist
relations tester a
projection ot
sensuality onto non-white
peoples, interpret this
projection as a threat to white
family Ule, and encourage
a
sense of vulnerability
to this threat.
These projections
are a central element in
such important cultural

themes as
the contrast between
civilization and barbarism,
and the
beast or animal element in
human nature.
The essential

capitalist sources of these
projections have been the historical need, varying in
character by class position,
to
channel human nature in the
service of disciplined, intense
production, and the progressive
degradation of manual labor
(that is, of physical qualities)
in the context of its

abstraction from mental labor.

The patriarchal context of

emerging capitalism helped answer
for our culture the
"question" of what facet of social
life to channel in the
pursuit of methodical production:
the sensual, physical
qualities most completely identified
with women.
These
capitalist and patriarchal factors, in
a sense,

a "base level" of sexual

rest upon

repression involved in the estab-

lishment of heterosexual norms, incest
taboos, and other
rules restricting sexual partners.
In sum, capitalist

patriarchy either establishes or intensifies
important

physical/sexual connections between the domination
of
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inner and outer nature,
and fosters the
projection of this
sensuality onto Afro-Americans.

These projections establish
sexual-racial taboos
which have three
important qualities 20
First, as Freud
emphasized, a taboo seems
to express a fundamental
ambivalence about the situations,
persons, activities, or
objects
it proscribes.
A taboo by its very
nature is both feared
and desired, an object
of attraction and
repulsion, even a
morbid curiosity.
The history of white-organized
relations
blacks clearly reflects this
dual nature-an obsession
with black sexuality, with
interracial sexuality construed
in a criminal manner, and
a simultaneous keeping at
arm's
length, a segregation of
the suspected qualities,
with
surreptitious testings and crossings
of the dividing line.
In white sexual stereotypes,
black people are the creatures
our morality forbids us to
be, not fully civilized,
.

not in

control of themselves, still part
savage that will always
ut
insatiable, prostitutes and rapists,
easy prey (black
women), the ultimate lay, little
respect for property or
work, living for immediate
gratification. These images
are ambivalent because they not
only picture (exaggeratedly)
part of the personality that must
be controlled, but also
because they express doubts about the
control itself.
The
images are not only of scapegoats, but
of fantasies.
,

Second, the social distance which sexual-racial

taboos require is not only a geography of
communities.

It
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IS also a hierarchy of
men, women,

and sexual property

relations.

Sexual racial taboos are
asymmetri c! by vir _
tue of the sexual property
relations which patriarchal
gender socialization helps
foster at the level
of the

personality.

They proscribe not simply
interracial

sexuality, but especially
sexual relations between
white
women and black men.
Third, sexual racial taboos
are not mere reflexes of
patriarchal and capitalist
structures.
They enter into
and help^onstit^ the
social distance and
f
racial segregation and
subordination, establishing boundaries that have repeatedly
been tested by an interracial
sexuality fraught with conflict
and exploitation.

h^^

It

is important to note the
bitter social irony,

for

both blacks and whites, contained
in ambivalent, asymmetrical taboos.
Black people are socially degraded
by white
society
part because they are pictured as
innately
sensual; not really ’'civilized,"
their "savagery" shows
through, seemingly confirmed by
restriction to hard physical labor in agriculture and industry 21
But the projection of physical, sensual qualities
onto Afro-Americans

m

.

ironically endows them, especially black men,
with an

appearance of power which seems to threaten
patriarchal
relations and capitalist culture within the white

community
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Historically, the record
shows that situations
which
Seem
all ° W inVlte ° r
possibility of breaching these taboos-integration,
sexual crimes real or
imagined are often met by
whites with resistance,
repression, and violence.
For, at bottom, we are
talking not
about black sexuality,
but about interracim
sexuality,
about the feared meeting
up of white culture
with its own
projections.
The circumstances of this
meeting are often
a violent reception for
the "return of the repressed."

^

’

>

It

is essential to acknowledge
the connections be-

tween these taboos and the
persistence in the popular mind
-abetted by academic sociology-of
the notion that AfroAmericans are innately or culturally
hindered from enjoying
a solid family life.
when this attitude rests on
biological arguments, it is, as
Jacquelynn Hall notes, an outgrowth of the "retrogressionist”
view propounded during
the post-Civil War black scare
(see chapter four, this
dissertation). More recent variations
on this thesis continue the notion of degraded black
family life but assess
the blame for the situation on
hundreds of years of oppression, i e
slave-holder practices of breaking up families,
or the transition to urban life and
a consequent breakup
of social institutions in the black
community under the
•

.

pressure of poverty and discrimination.

E.

Franklin

Frazier, in The Negro Family in the United
States

pounded this latter view in the late 1930

's;

,

pro-

more recently
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Daniel Mo y „i ha „ and
Nathan Glazer (among
others) have kept
thxs position alive
with their analysis
o f urban minorione might turn to
various explanations of
the
urban education crisis
to see the persistence
of this
attitude among educators,
who blame the family
Hf e of
minority students for
poor student conduct or
performance
in the classroom. 23
-

certainly would not want to
discount the tremenpressure of oppression and
poverty upon black family
life.
It is crucial, though,
not to generalize the fragmenting pressure of poverty
to all black families,
not to
see it as the norm, as well
as to recognize the crucial
resilience of black family life
in most settings, poor
or
not.
Thus in T
B
ck_ F am i ly__i n Slavery and FrP Pjnm_
I

1Z50-1925, Herbert Gutman extensively documents
the persistence, indeed the flowering,
of Afro-American family
sentiment and kinship and community
ties through slavery
and the early period of migration
to urban areas. 24

Patterns of family and community life
which he uncovered
are both indebted to West African
heritages and to the
strength of

a

distinct underclass population in adapting

to difficult conditions while
preserving valued social ties

and traditions.

In short,

Gutman persuasively argues for

the direct role of Afro-Americans in
creating and repro-

ducing their own family life, social space
and ties, and

culture— a reservoir of support and meaning despite,

in
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the face of, racial
oppression.

And, mo re contemporary

work by carol stack reveals
doth the destructive
impact of
poverty upon adult love
relations for Afro-Americans,

and
the strong kinship ties
which nourish and cherish
adult and
child.

But overwhelmingly negative
views of black families
continue to exist.
Intimately linked to ideologies
of
black sensuality and criminality,
they feed white resistance to the expansion of black
neighborhoods.
Though
these white images clearly
have little contact with the
reality of Afro-American personal,
family, and community
life, they nonetheless help
constitute and sustain real
practices of racial segregation and
inequality— white
nat ionalism

Race Rela t ions, Nationalism,
L
and Legitimacy
We are now at a point where

I

can tie together my

arguments about sexuality and race relations
and connect
them with some clarity to a position on
contemporary
legitimation problems.

Racial-sexual images are part of

economic and cultural practices
nationalism.
First,

I

I

a

community of

have labeled as white

choose this label for several reasons.

it emphasizes the self-consciously racial
character

of American economic and geographical expansion since
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g ish colonization.

Second, it ties this
development to
an intennationa!
economic onder of which
our domestic race
relations and economic
development have always
been a particular, and special,
instance.
Third
J-nira, the te
term emphasizes
the unity of economic,
political, and social
practices
which constitute racial
super/subordination. Fourth, it
allows me to insist that
a patriarchal sex/gender
system is
an essential part of
that unity.
And fifth, it leads us
directly from social
experience to the state, and
to conclusions about the constraints
and contradictions posed
by
race relations for political
legitimacy.
The second and
fifth of these reasons are
of particular concern in
this

section
As

have argued, when core economies
in the emerging
capitalist world system confronted
underdeveloped regions,
familiar contrasts such as
"civilization/savagery" emerged
within Enlightenment thought and
popular ideology, carrying
a consciousness of national
and racial superiority.
The
racial character of American identity
(to be a full person
social and legal terms was to be
white) was fully
established by 1700, with the transition
of colonial selfperceptions from "Christian" to "English"
to "white."
This self-image depended on the relative
permanence of an
I

m

enslaved African population and of continual
successful
conflict over land with Native Americans.
When one includes the transformation of slavery into
peonage, both
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factors persisted until
the late 1890 -s. and
peonage muoh
longer.
As described in chapter
four, during this long
Period of nation-building
and expansion, costing
i mag es
of the process held by
northern labor, farmers,
and industry on the one hand,
and southern planters
and small
farmers on the other shared
a common ground:
denial of
social equality to blacks
(with its implication of
miscegenation), limiting the range
of social variation to
complete racial subordination
or complete exclusion.
If

any national consensus on
values existed, this was part
of
it.
The national, cross-class
character of these beliefs

ensured that Afro-Americans would
confront them in their
migration to northern and urban

areas— in housing, for

instance— in their own transition from
rural and peasant
folk to working class.

Yet the state endorsement of
housing segregation

which

I

have previously described emerged
at the begin-

ning of a ch ange in state racial
policy and in the white
nationalism which it responded to, especially
at the na-

tional level.

These changes were possible in a period
of
highly contradictory legitimation
requirements with
re-

spect to race, contradictions literally
embodied in the

Roosevelt electoral coalition of white native
and ethnic
workers, PMC reformers, the "solid South," and
AfroAmericans.
term,

The sources of this change were complex, long-

and cannot be adequately represented in this
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SS6 rt clt io n

^

Th©v
nnlurlc
y 1include,
however, the demographic
and subsequent electoral
pressure of black urban
migration
after 1900, itself encouraged
by war jobs, Southern
repression, and the increasing
capitalization of Southern
agriculture.
They also include a set
of threats from the
left
which helped force corporate
liberal planners, politicians,
and PMC reformers to.
embrace, and attempt to channel,
black
struggles.
Among these were Depression-era
labor and black
community organizing by black
and white leftists,
.

i.

the left

and nationalist tendencies
within the black movement which

helped "moderate" groups look
respectable, and the range of
inspiration which post-WW II colonial
liberation movements
provided for black struggles in
this country.
And finally.
the sources of change include
an evolving climate of racial
consciousness indebted to the paternalistic,
social-welfare
consciousness of PMC reformers.
This PMC racial consciousness, emerging
after roughly
1900, challenged the extreme biological
racism popularized
by opponents of Reconstruction and
by defenders of lynching.

It

initially viewed Afro-Americans as child-like,

amiable, and genetically inferior yet capable
of cultural

improvement.

In accord with the PMC Weltanschauung

,

it

offered a future of inegalitarian harmony and
cooperation
--of the races.

This consciousness informed such reform

groups as the white founded and financed NAACP

,

the Cam-

paign for Inter-Racial Co-operation and Harmony, and the
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Southern Women's Campaign
Against Lynching.
Initially
favoring black "improvement”
within segregated institutions, this opinion
gradually shifted under
black and left
pressure to one which could
regard segregation as an
unjust
“ni^ntion, and one whlch CQUld
therefore
27
actual integration.
The history of racial
caste theory,
I would argue,
expresses just such a development.

^

As these factors opened
wedges in the historical
alliance of white nationalism,
the state was forced increasingly into contradictory
positions:
between, at
least initially, Southern and
Northern power blocs, between
national and state levels of
government, and between the
need on the one hand to calm the
disorder of non-electoral

struggles through concessions, and
on the other the need to
respect still-powerful white
nationalist forces. The reappearance of black nationalism, after
roughly I960, played
a key role in shaping these
tensions.
Black nationalism re-emerged as a
force in AfroAmerican politics (as it had earlier in
the century) as one
alternative appraisal to the community of
interest which I
have described as white nationalism. 28 in
classic nationalist fashion, black power advocates sought
to mobilize a

people short on politic-economic resources around
of romantic populism:

a

kind

black history and traditions, black-

ness as an aesthetic standard, and so on.

While the

articulation of black pride came to suffuse the entire
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spectrum of black struggle,
it informed separatlst
ln PartlCUlar
trough the media many
whites-i nc l udlng
those previously
sympathetic to civil
rights-experienced
thus explicit black
nationalism as a nightmare
threat, and
one sense directly
intended by advocates, as
a materialization of black manhood.
The white backlash fed
-

,

m

in part

on the dread of black
male power immanent in the
sexual
aspect of race itself.
In the post-WW II era,

survey analysts uncovered

important distinctions made among
working class whites in
particular, and among middle
income whites to a somewhat
lesser extent, in their evaluation
of the expansion
of

federal government into daily
life.

These distinctions

have important bearing on the
thesis that state intervention in everyday life, a function
of the state's role in
capitalism as "steering mechanism,"
is a primary source of
loss of meaning and thus of
legitimacy problems. Whites
in the I960 's made important
distinctions between federal

social-economic programs on the one hand,
such as Medicare,
FHA, and Social Security, and civil
rights legislation on
the other, such as fair employment
practices, equal public
accommodations, school integration, and open
housing
laws.

30

Wallace supporters made this distinction much

more sharply than other citizens, and were
drawn by and
large from southern and northern working class

Democrats.

Even on this score, as Samuel Lubell noted, the
Wallace
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vote far underestimated
support among whites for
his wellknown opposition to
32
integration:
e
C
Ieasu?e ofthe racIaT !“ thS f° rth was not the

Sis?;

:

rll;

Finally, Lubell's analysis
and first-hand investigating showed that Wallace
drew some of his strongest
vocal
and electoral support in
the north from white working
class
neighborhoods that bordered on
expanding Afro-American
neighborhoods.
I would argue that
what he most astutely,
and other survey analysts
somewhat less deeply, uncovered
were the fears and threats to
a particular self-image of
white community, the sexual
bases of which I have developed in this and the previous
chapter. 33 Open housing and
hool integration in particular
seem to have raised fears
among whites of eroding disciplines
and order in their
community.
The sexual bases of race relations
which I
have elaborated were, and are,
constitutive elements in

resistance to integration and thus in
disaffection from
the state which was seen as promoting
such policies.

Sup-

port from the state for this community
had always seemed
assured, and was an integral part of that
self-image; now
the state had betrayed this common understanding.

It

would be a serious oversight to miss the distinction
made
by most whites during the 1960 's between racial
reforms
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and other social programs
with which they are too
often
lumped.
Social Security and Medicare
were seen by most,

particularly working class,
whites as supports for family
life, and earned by hard
work at that.

Racial reforms
like open housing and school
integration were threats to
family life and neighborhood,
and welfare concessions particularly were rewards for not
working.

Both politicians and planners
in corporate-state
policy institutions approved civil
rights and welfare
legislation only in the face of
increasing Afro-American
militance and social disorder in the
ghettoes.
This militance and disorder made reformers
such as Martin Luther
King and the NAACP seem benign by
comparison, and raised
the possibility that Afro-American
discontent could not be
contained.
The moderate reforms which militant
black
power advocates help make necessary, I
would argue, helped
satisfy the reformist consciousness of white
liberals,

undercutting key support for further progress. 34
since 1970, the impact of some reforms

— especially

And

affirma-

tive action and school int egration--seems to
have signifi-

cantly eroded abstract white middle class support
for
integration, thus to have helped restore a certain amount
of white,

cross-class unity against integration, and

therefore to have made it possible or necessary, in the
absence of black social disorder, for the state to retreat
on racial issues.

In this retreat,

the state has shored
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up one of the few
areas of its legitimation
problems that
is reasonably within
political control-unlike,

stance, economic planning.

for in-

This retreat,

I
think, cannot
be fully understood
without analyzing the sexual
sources
of deep, intense, and
widespread white resistance
to

integration

Conclusion
My analysis indicates
that racial turmoil in the
I960' s played a major role
in state legitimacy
problems of
that period, a larger and
more independent role than
that
attributed to it by behavioral,
Marxist, and interpretive
theories of legitimacy. The
state acted not simply as a
capitalist state, or as a
liberal-democratic state, but
also as a state constrained by
white sentiment.
In this

situation of threatened and declining
legitimacy, disaffection among whites over integration
and social upheaval
was inevitably shaped by the sexual
racism I have elaborated in this and the previous chapter.
The
state,

in

effect, threatened to breach a major
taboo and common
purpose of the dominant culture.

The conditions which fostered Afro-American
social
struggle in the 1960's, the constituents
and consequences
of white nationalism, remain largely
intact, bubbling

through only occasionally into public acknowledgment.

Afro-Americans still overwhelmingly bear the burden of

277

sharp,

increasing income dif
ferentiais between themselves
and white Americans,
along with disproportionately
bad
housing, schools, and
so on-consequences
of the nationalism which confines them
by and large to reserve
army,

under/unemployed status.

The situation awaits only
some

catalytic development to
precipitate struggle again.
For
as Cox insisted, race
relations, unlike caste
relations,
are inherently unstable,
reflecting even in dormant
times
a situation of
suspended conflict, characterized
by fear

and mutual distrust.

What are the possibilities
for racial struggle and
related state policy? A few
likely paths suggest themselves.
As a general rule, state
policy-making by corporate political elites
(overwhelmingly white and male)
will make symbolic or substantive
concessions toward

subordinate population needs only
under the duress of
social disorder or struggle, or
its imminent threat.
State policy will continue to ignore
the worsening plight
of Afro-Americans in the absence
of such a situation.
Policy makers are constrained in any
anticipatory or response strategies by state fiscal problems,
brought on by
an inflationary and slow-growing
economy.
If
anything,

this constraint increases the possibility
of repression
as the major policy for dealing with
any upheavals.

Policy makers are equipped for this option,
having supplied urban police departments with a wide range
of
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hardware in the wake of
1960s turmoil (primarily
through
the Law Enforcement
Assistance Agency). Thus
if urban
ghettoes move into another
cycle of relatively
unorganized
upheaval, the state may
either actively repress
disorder
?lthi„ ghettoes or allow disorder
to run its course within
orders heavily defended by
police and militia.

I
see
this as a probable, not
simply possible, situation
within
the short-term future, though
not one which precludes
other possible developments.

Budgetary limitations do not
completely preclude
symbolic and tactical commitments
in state racial policy
designed to ward off or minimize
disturbances.
Summer
jobs programs aimed at Afro-American
youth, the tinder and
spark of I960 's urban upheavals, are
currently being
ex-

panded, and may possibly be good
for both public relations
and preventive purposes.
Other programs that would make a
significant symbolic impact without much
expenditure of
funds might include "sweat equity"
rehabilitation of urban
tenements in a highly visible but not
widespread program.
Various other self-help programs might be
launched with a
maximum of fanfare and minimum of funding. Any
of these,
though, run the risk of raising and then dashing
expecta-

tions

.

Policy makers must take domestic racial politics
into account when considering future resource
conflicts in
the third world.

Has the Afro-American community been a
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constraint upon intervention
in southern Africa,
in addition to acknowledged
Vietnam-related constraints in
public
opinion? Did Angola policy
in 1975-76 in
fact take this

into account?

How does racial strife
within the military,
a problem of major
proportions, affect both
preparedness
and the prospects of
intervention in African politics?
Is
the disproportionate
representation of Afro-Americans
in
the military a constraint
upon such interventions?
Is
this a consideration in
current design and introduction
of
the military draft? Will
resource conflicts within the
third world rekindle virulent
white nationalism
’

in the

U.S.?

Will they push or encourage the
state to trade upon

racism in increasingly troubled
economic times?
these are serious and imminent
questions.

All of

These questions, and domestic race
policy generally,
would be affected by the re-emergence
of a movement
for

racial equality or of a left-wing
movement which seriously
promoted such a goal.
Either development, or both, would
move the state away from the "low level"
policy of neglect
and repression outlined above away either
to the right or

—

to the left.

It

is not impossible that sustained,

organ-

ized pressure on the state could wrest significant
racial
reforms.

The price of such reforms to the state would be

major legitimacy problems among many white citizens and

weakening of capital
class,

'

s

a

position vis-a-vis the working

the second perhaps intensifying long-term economic

280

problems.

The difficulty of mounting
such an organized
drive for reform would be
the need to deal openly
among
potential white support with
the taboo element of
race
Without such a campaign,
organized racial reform
will encounter the same
popular resistance that it did
in
the 1960's.
However, while such politics
now show scatsigns of emerging, they are
not an immediate prospect.
This prospect is conditioned,
both in left theory and
practice, by the intertwined and
yet "independent” nature
of racial issues with respect
to sexual and class considerations.
If my analysis is correct,
then racial issues are
at once more independent and
yet more deeply intertwined
with class and sexual liberation
than is usually argued by
various theories of inequality.
It suggests that, as Allen
and others have argued, 35 movements
for racial justice must
have an independent status within left
politics and yet be
an integral part of left strategy.
(Feminists make a similar case for independent organizations.)
This independent

basis is the requirement for constraining the
ever-present
tendency of white reformers to subordinate
racial reform
to other considerations, to see racial reform
as the inevi-

table outcome of their own agenda, to see race relations
as a derivative phenomenon.

derived

I

of course in a sense have

race relations from a confluence of patriarchy

and capitalism, but the conclusion of this derivation is
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the relatively independent
status of race relations
as
quasi-nationalist politics.

Thus a final and related
possibility is the reergence of militant and/or
revolutionary black nationalism as a widespread, organized
force in Afro-American
communities.
Depending on the strategies such
a movement
employed, I would expect the
state to respond with a combination of repression and
concessions.
And, state response could foreseeably be tipped
toward substantive,
even structural, reform, if such
movements were accompanied
by a strong left-wing presence
in general.
To restate,
however, while such politics show
scattered signs of
emerging, they are not an immediate
prospect.
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CHAPTER

V

I

COMPETING THEORIES OF LEGITIMACY:
review and conclusions
I

ntroduction

In this dissertation

I

have appraised liberal,

Marxist, and hermeneutic theories
of legitimacy, and have
drawn their insights into my own
account of one major
legitimation dynamic, the connections
between sexual racism
and state legitimacy.
In counterposing these
theories I
have focused on their concepts of
social structure and
ideology, which offer some of the
sharpest possible comparisons between them.
And, I have tried to clarify the
socialepistemological commitments behind these
differing

treatments of social structure and ideology.

From these points of view, Marxist and
hermeneutic
theories of legitimacy improve in two ways on
mainstream
liberal analyses.

First,

in different ways each alternative

brings to legitimation theory an appreciation of
the interwoven and mutually constraining nature of social
institutions.

They provide us, in a way the abstracting tendency

of liberal analysis does not, with insights into the
struc-

tural interaction between economy, state, and culture which
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shapes the American state's
legitimation problems.
Second,
in its analysis of
constitutive ideology, hermeneutic
theory
Boes beyond mainstream liberal
and Marxist epistemology
by
perceiving the essentially
normative and rule-governed
nature of social activity.
In doln g so lt contributes
to
legitimation theory vital connections
between knowing the
social world, authority in the
broadest sense, and social
identity.
This epistemological potential
brings out the
crucial expressive dimension of
legitimacy, helping establish links between the erosion
of cultural traditions
so

prominent in capitalist development,
and the questioning of
social authority, including that
of the state.
On the basis
of these contributions, James
O'Connor's and Jurgen
Habermas' theories stand as successively
more capable than
the liberal perspective they challenge.

This chapter will review the successive
capabilities
of liberal, Marxist,

and hermeneutic theories on these

terms, as well as the themes which

this appraisal.

I

particularly bring to

These include first of all an explicit

conception of class structure, including the role
of

professional-managerial class (PMC).

I

a

find this structure,

and especially its PMC aspect, crucial for clarifying
main-

stream political science's treatment of legitimacy and the

displacement of crisis tendencies into the state which
0 Connor and Habermas argue.

Second,

I

rely on an explicit

account of gender socialization and patriarchy to fill out
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views on culture, social
identity, and the structural
pressures to which the state is
subject,
I apply both of
these amendments, finally, along
with the contributions of
the other theories I counterpose,
to connections between
race and legitimacy which remain
undeveloped in these
theories.
I argue that by
examining the sexual aspect of
race, we can perceive deep
connections between the structures of capitalism and patriarchy,
constitutive belief
systems and social identity, and the
legitimacy of the New
Deal state.
rny

Review of Themes
Chapter One.

In chapter one,

I

traced the history of

legitimation analyses by the liberal mainstream
of political science.

Liberal theories, going back to Hobbes, have

often embraced some form of scientific, or more
broadly

positivist, epistemology.

Yet up to about 1900, the main-

stream of liberal thought considered this commitment to
science consistent with addressing the normative questions
so central historically to social theory.

Mill,

John Stuart

for example, developed a theory of the state which

explicitly linked questions of human nature and individual
development to the analysis of political institutions and

political obligation.

In this country,

early political

scientists like Woodrow Wilson applied similar commitments

288
to normative questions
to their concrete
studies of American

government

After about 1900, though,
the study of politics
began to move away from
these questions and toward
a view
which denied the meaningfulness
of normative debate.
I
argue that if we are to
fully grasp the discipline’s
current
toward legitimation, we
must understand the social
meaning of the historical
shift to scientism.

Liberal thought originally
emerged in a context of
social revolution, a revolution
propelled in part by changes
in social class relations
which allowed and fostered new
productive techniques.
In appraising the development
of
these technologies, men like
Francis Bacon became philosophers of the new science they
found in craftsmen's empirical
experimental tinkering.
The empirical, mathematical,
and
mechanical sensibilities of these
new men of science influenced liberal thought in profound
ways.
They helped infuse
the intellectual climate with a
standard to be applied in
knowing not only nature, but also
society, and a standard
by which we could not only know
society, but also improve
it through the material progress
it would inform.
That is,
they helped shape a major claim of
liberal thought, that

science might ameliorate or solve age-old
social problems,
especially those rooted in material scarcity.
This claim of liberal ideology emerged in somewhat

altered form, and with renewed force, by the end of
the 19th
century.

As it had been originally,

it was shaped in
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complex ways by the
and technology.

develops

of social class
relations

In a series of struggles
over rou ghly a

forty-year period (1880-1920),
capital broke the craft
organization of production
remaining inside many
industries.
By seizing control
over production
itself, capital "freed"

the mental aspect of
production,

and science itself, as

forces in both the abstraction
and degradation of labor
and
in the expansion of
production.
This degradation and
abstraction of labor exacerbated
the social problems of
poverty and unemployment endemic
to capitalism, at the same
time that it helped to undermine
the craft organization of
many working class communities.
In the context of this
turmoil,

occupations evolved

or emerged in the social
division of labor concerned pri-

marily with planning and social
control in production (i.e.,
engineers), and social control and
reform outside production (i.e., social workers, cultural
workers, positions
related to advertising, lawyers).
These occupations

developed largely under the pressure of
capital's need to
intervene directly and continuously in the
work process,
and increasingly in the everyday life
of the working class

--raising the rate of exploitation, fostering
attitudes

amenable to capitalist work requirements, socializing
immigrant labor, dealing with social disorder.

The dominant

self-images of this emerging class, and the activities they
informed, were both accepting and critical of capitalism
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pressure from the left, and
in part

because of genuine revulsion
from what appeared as the
"excesses” of capitalism.
These self-images included
the
task of bringing order and
rationality to social
life,

reforming capitalism and
mediating the disputes between
capital and labor, and the
application of scientific/
technical expertise to the surrounding
world.
These selfimages express the mediate position
of these occupations
in the class structure,

and are in effect modern statements

of the liberal vision

summarized above.

I

This vision is

of a society improved and run
by men of science and knowledge, overcoming material scarcity
and its attendant social

conflicts.

Any account of the new science of
politics

gestating in this period, or of its subsequent
development
and content, would be radically incomplete
without an

account of these visions, and without an
account of the
roots of these scientific aspirations in the
struggles of
the era.

Successive waves of the aspiring political science

profession articulated its claims to realism, precision,
and neutrality against traditional liberal (and
radical)

theories of politics.

But it was not until the late 1940's,

when corporate foundations funded the behavioral science
movement, that political scientists could successfully

dominate the study of politics.

These foundations were

open to the professional claims of behavioralists in large
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part because of the success
of applied science's
social
control and productive
roles in the work process.
The
foundations had, for instance,
already created and funded
new universities such as
Rensselaer, and funded existing
universities, to supply the
required basic research and
engineering manpower; they had
also funded the development
of industrial sociology and
various other manageriallyoriented sciences.
The funding of behavioral
political
studies in the late 1940's was a
logical extension of these
management concerns to broader social
and political issues,
especially in the context of Depression-era
disorder and
the attractions of left-wing
movements.
What the new profession of political
science produced,
within the pressures of corporate funding,
was a body of
political knowledge bearing the imprint
of both corporate
concerns and the technocratic/managerial
ideology so constitutive of the PMC life-world.
These imprints bear in turn,

though in a manner epistemologically unconscious
of the

relation itself, corporate and PMC concerns with
the ability
of subordinate populations to disrupt the
social agenda of

elite groups.

Peter Bachrach has aptly described these con-

cerns as a "revolt from the masses."

The revised theory of

democracy produced by this revolt held, for instance, that
elites were the guardians of democratic values, that apathy
is functional for democracy,

and so on.
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In order to reach such
conclusions,

the new science
of politics had first to
do away with inherently
normative
and politically suggestive
terms such as class and
state,
and then to reduce absolutely
necessary concepts like power
and interest to highly
behavioral/operational definitions.

These definitions created, in the
revised theory of democracy, a startling likeness
to the social relations in
production resulting from capital’s
seizure of the work

process.
The great mass of people could only
engage in the operational equivalent of democracy--pulling
the voting leverwhile elites themselves possessed the
values, ideas, and

technical expertise to manage the democratic
state.
By assuming this behavioral stance,
political science

could ratify a system which discarded older
aspirations for
participation in decision making, or for an active
citizenry,

as unsuited to industrial society

— much

as their

engineering counterparts like

F.

relationships in production.

Yet, this was no conspiracy

W.

on the part of political scientists.

Taylor did with social

Rather, it was the

result of internally-woven class and epistemological pres-

sures to abstract the social world into routine and creative
labor,

and as mental labor, to regard the body politic

objectively, much as an engineer regards a machine--or

a

worker
Since roughly 1950, the dominant attitude in political

studies toward legitimacy (whether behavioral, or more

293

generally positivist) has embodied
these concerns.
The
collective effort of this mainstream,
represented by the
work of Almond and Verba, Lipset
and others, formulated a
major contradiction of the
capitalist state:
,

the need to

ma intain its legit imac ^hrough
democratic forms whii P
i nsulating itself
from actu a l democratic pressure
from
Yet the studies of value consensus and electoral opinion which
produced this equation of

legitimacy with social stability did
not predict, despite
their scientific aspirations, the
legitimation problems that
would confront the state after the mid-1960's.
Why?

Self-identified as elites, having painted

a

picture of

the just and stable society, and
epistemologically

unequipped to deal with either the logic of moral
issues or
the interconnected structures of the political
economy, the

mainstream was ill-positioned to anticipate and conceptualize the growing problems of the welfare state.

It suffered,

as John Schaar put it from a perspective somewhat
different

from mine,

from the blindness of the eye perceiving itself.

Treating legitimacy as a matter of mere belief about
authority, this mainstream could record but not clearly con-

ceptualize the expressive depth of a crisis in socially

constituted standards of right

.

And by embracing welfare

state capitalism as tacit background, this mainstream could
not be fully aware of developing structural pressures
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either on the state, or on the
cultural beliefewhich help
ground political authority.
As Marx said, when the wagon
of history turns a
corner, the ideologists fall
off.
When the current period
of economic and legitimation
crises emerged, political sci-

ence found that the "behavioral
laws" it had been after had
somehow changed.
Since the late 1960 's, opinion in
the
discipline has increasingly characterized
the limited democratic forms of welfare state pluralism,
with their tacit
Keynesian background, as hindrances to
effective social and
economic policy.
Effective policy, especially effective
economic policy, is clearly a requirement
for legitimation.
Yet,

as is often grudgingly perceived,

democratic forms

also seem crucial to legitimating state
power.

But faced

with a perceived trade-off between democracy and
effective

policy

,

most political scientists not surprisingly give

greater weight to effectiveness.

Much of the current debate

within the discipline over meeting the crisis through institutional change and innovation assumes this common ground.

There are two crucial points to be made about such
debates.

First is that proponents of market techniques,

of investment coordination through a Reconstruction Finance

Corporation, of various Constitutional changes, all see
their solutions as simply a matter of will within prevailing economic relations.

They do not grasp how the truly

constrained and contradictory nature of our political
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economy will limit the effectiveness
of these changes.
The
second point is that rhetoric
increasingly used by politicians and academicians to justify
calls for "reindustrializat ion" carries with it strong
proto-nationalist

tones—

appeals to a threatened civilization
of production, economically and militarily challenged in
an unstable world in
which we must "modernize" to survive.
These protonationalist appeals seek to legitimate the
re-grouping of

corporate power in a time of economic crisis,
and in the
context of a retreat on the crucial legitimating
processes
of democracy.

Chapter Two.

James O'Connor's account of state fiscal

crisis moves significantly beyond liberal legitimation

theories by clarifying the extent to which the state is

structurally captive of capital's accumulation needs.
Properly amended, his analysis pushes us to realize the
constraints on

new" market —incentive policies, and on in-

stitutional change confined to the state, in resolving the
state's legitimacy problems.
As O'Connor argues, the increasingly interwoven and

interdependent nature of our capitalist economy has required
the state to finance an array of capital's collective pro-

ductive and social control needs.

That is, to a considerable

degree, the parameters of state spending are not simply a

matter of political choice, but rather of necessity—
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necessity beyond the conventional
appreciation of the level
and categories of spending
mandated by public law. No constitutional amendment or "sunset"
clause in any legislation
could appreciably offset this
trend.
But as O'Connor points out,

in responding to these

pressures to aid private accumulation
the state must present its actions as those of an
independent public institution operating for the general welfare.
This
,

it can

generally do as long as the economy
performs well. However,
in expanding, the economy requires
increasing state spending
(reflecting growing interdependence) to
support collective
productive needs and to control the surplus
populations shed
by capitalist development.

And,

the increase in this spend-

ing has been exacerbated by an entrenched
network of particu-

laristic corporate interests and by the decentralized,
overlapping, and uncoordinated branches and levels
of the
U.S.

state.

One major result, as predicted by O'Connor, has

been the politicization of the budget around tax revolts
and

around elite attacks on the state's "social wage."

O'Connor

sees the unplanned nature of this accumulating spending as
a

major cause of the stagflation which plagues the economy,

a situation threatening the state's legitimacy in two ways:

by undermining its claim to economic management

contributing to

a

,

and by

general fiscal politicization which

menaces the state's appearance as an independent, public
institution
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Yet amendments to 0’
Connor’s account are crucial.
He
actually understates, in my
opinion, the constraints
on the
state as an economic
manager. This shortcoming
is related
to his perhaps unwitting
embrace of what I call the
liberal
Problematic of public power, a
problematic which both expresses and shapes his inadequate
account of the class
structure.
By assuming and even
embroidering this perspective, he glosses over the
crucial question of whether
a

crisis of the state, even as he
explains it, will necessarily
be a crisis of capitalist
relations.
Finally, he underestimates other cultural constraints
on the state through an
external view of ideology similar
to that which handicaps
behavioral theories in explaining
crises of belief. He thus
suffers nearly the mirror image of
their problem:
unable to
grasp the experience people have of
structural
change,

behavioral theories failed to predict the
legitimation
crisis, while O'Connor encounters crucial
problems explaining the p ersistence of the social order
in
the face of the

crisis

O'Connor too readily accepts the Keynesian view
that
the state can act as economic manager.
He does this
by

slighting the role of private financial centers in
economic
management, and by overstating the positive impact and

capability of state economic policy.
argues,

State spending, he

is the prime determinant of investment and consump-

tion patterns in the economy, and the driving force behind
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capital's post-war expansion.

In contrast,

I
would argue
that the growth of social
spending in a capitalist economy

represents a bigger contradiction
than O'Connor recognizes.
In the first place, the
spending categories he outlines
are
neither clearly productive or
unproductive from the point
of view of capital; their
essential ambiguity from
this

point of view is itself a problem
for understanding and con
trolling their impact. Moreover, while
certain forms of
state spending may be necessary to
production, their ambigu
ous status means that they are essentially
a drain on
the

total system's capital available for
directly profitable
investment.
Second, state spending is a risk because
the

state policy is relatively vulnerable to
pressures from

subordinate populations; these pressures do not
have to
respect the dictates of profitable investment.
In

short,

I

would bring out even more strongly than O'Connor
does

the contradiction between the growing need for
economic

planning and social spending, and the constraints on such
activity in a capitalist economy.
State policy options are also constrained by the

international political economy.

I

would argue even more

strongly than O'Connor does that the structural position
of the U.S.

in this framework had a tremendous influence on

the economic surplus which the state could draw on.

Policy

makers had options, which they do not now have given shifts
in this framework,

for directing spending at subordinate
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populations in order to forestall
or stabilize social disorder, and for pork-barrel
type raiding of the state
budget.
Appreciating this point would help
make O'Connor more
sensitive to the potential
contribution of nationalist
politics to the "solution" of
economic and legitimation
crises, a potential overshadowed
in his theory
by the

state’s predicted economic managerial
role in fostering a
social-industrial complex."

O’Connor's flawed view of the state's
economic managerial role reflects his embrace of
what
I

problematic of public power.

call the liberal

This problematic cannot be

understood outside of the developing
class relations which
have shaped it, class relations which
O’Connor partially
obscures by dividing the economy into
sectors.

Even though

he goes further than liberal theories
in clarifying the

structural economic constraints on state policy,
if his
view entered widely into public debate it would
insufficiently challenge a widespread public resignation
about

private power relations, would in fact encourage more
blame

of the state than is warranted,

incorrectly

,

and would suggest

that reform of the state is the primary way of

solving the current crisis.

Liberalism's focus on public power, as well as the
very institutional distinction between state and production,

bear the imprint of early bourgeois struggles against the

entrenched aristocracy of feudal and mercantile states.
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With this institutional
distinction, state power becomes
relatively more visible than
class power in production
in
large part because the taxes
which the state levies are
so
transparently enacted and enforced,
and appear to be matters
of convention.
In contrast, the economic
surplus
is no

longer extracted as transparently
as it was under feudal
social relations.
Exploitation is mystified through the
labor market's ideology of equal
exchange, and class relations appear not as conventional or
political in comparison
to the state, but as natural.
O’Connor cannot make this
point, not simply because he has no
labor theory
of value,

but also because he does not focus
on productive relations

per se.

The tax revolts he so correctly predicted,
as well

as their political limitations,

are in part conditioned by

this relative visibility.
A complete account of the American form of
this

liberal problematic would have to address the real
and

ideological impact of the vast proprietary class of the
early 19th century.

In this dissertation,

I

on the relation of the PMC to this ideology.
1930' s,

have focused

Since the

ideologies of the managerial revolution have vastly

inflated the power and latitude of PMC occupations.

This

inflation, generalized by media and educational systems,
has fed into a real and complex set of PMC

— working

class

relations, relations suffused with a "mixture of deference
and hostility on the part of the working class, and
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contempt and paternalism on
the part of the PMC." 1 The
managerial activities of this
class in production may generate resentments on the part
of workers, but such resentments do not often issue in a
political challenge to these
productive relations themselves.
Rather, they spill over
into public politics— much more
clearly the arena of convention, will, responsibility, and
blame.
These relations
and images of the PMC influence
dominant public images of
the welfare state
as agent of social justice, as
economic
manager, as unwelcome meddler.

—

In particular,

PMC actors (through foundations and

interest groups) visibly influence the
definition of political issues which, when embodied in
state policy, often
impinge directly and disproportionately on
working class
life.

Middle class activists have tended to define
pollu-

tion at the work place out of public debate;
and, they have

until recently neglected to consult, or to propose
protection for, workers who would be dislocated by effective

environmental regulation.
1960' s,

Or,

as far back as the mid-

early New Right ideologists pointed out the class

hostilities wrapped up in working class resistance to
integration:

resentments of "limousine liberals" and

"pointy-headed bureaucrats" who supported integration, but
who could personally opt out of it.
Thus, both the visibility of and frustration with

the growth of the state are generally compounded by the
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reformist /managerial claims of PMC
ideology and activity.
In particular, the managerial
stance not only informed
state economic policy, but invited
blame on the state for
the failure of this "management"
--ideologically overdetermining the legitimation problems rooted
in the structural constraints on capitalist economic
planning.

In the

problematic of public power, PMC occupations play
an essential role in reproducing the social order
through
the con-

venient lightning rod they make for the ruling
class itself.
They facilitate, through political activity and
self-image,
the di splacement into the state of conflicts
deeply indebted
to class relations in production.
in the class structure,
in this process:

But like their position

they play a highly ambivalent role

helping create political problems (resent-

ment toward the state) even as they deflect from the deeper

property relations which shape them.

Chapter Three

.

Within a Marxist framework, we can go this

far in grasping the rootedness of legitimating ideology in

social (class) relations.

But there is still some distance

to go in understanding the belief-suffused experience we all

have of social relations, and in applying this understanding

both to internal connections between authority and social
identity and to the tenacity and vulnerability of various

beliefs which affect state legitimation.

In the Marxist

tradition, recent works developing Gramsci's notion of
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hegemony have started to address
these issues; Raymond
Williams, in fact, has quite
eloquently and fruitfully
explored them.
But it was the hermeneutic
tradition in
Philosophy which in earliest, clearest,
and most explicit
fashion laid out what was at stake
in the internal

link of

beliefs to activity.
have argued that it is the task of
social study, and
not only art or literature, to
convey the expressive dimension of human experience.
To assume, on the contrary, a
stance which necessarily or overwhelmingly
objectifies
social relations, however well intended,
is to participate
I

in the dynamic which divests the modern
social world of

meaning.

For,

the scientific world view has not confined

itself to the debunking of mystical purposes
in the cosmos.
Rather, shaped by and influencing the power relations
in

which they are situated, applied natural and social
science
have helped divest many social activities of purposes

internal to themselves
tions.

— especially

for subordinate popula-

That is, science as a facet of domination has helped

destroy the expressive meanings embodied in everyday life
by degrading the human relations which foster the creation
of this meaning

— reducing

the number of those who can

cooperate in shaping their own activity, as well as the

opportunities to do so.
The obvious example of this is contemporary work
life.

With the dichotomizat ion of mental and manual labor
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and the commodification of
science, the vast majority of
people must (today) engage in
abstracted, repetitive, and
intense work processes beyond their
control.
Robbed of the

opportunity to shape their labor and
products according to
their own purposes, robbed even of
the opportunities to
interact in a human way at work, they
give meaning to and
legitimate this bondage through external
reasoning; work
has little if any meaning on its own.
Instead, most work
in order to live a human life outside
of work:
they work
to sacri f ice for families and children,
and project
a

better fu ture through such sacrifice in part
because work
and its wages cannot justify the present.

Hermeneutics can clarify the place of such experience
in legitimation dynamics through a normative "logic"
not

available to most liberal and Marxist theories.
first place,

In the

it reveals how depth grammar of our language

establishes a pr ima facie connection between human wants
and purposes and the normative appraisal of "good."

Be-

cause human activity is in part constituted by rules which

embody purposes and wants, our social relationships are

essentially normative and expressive

.

Rules are also gen-

erally normative in that they establish correct and incorrect ways of acting; they are social authority.

Because of these qualities of rule-informed activity,
there are important internal connections between how we

know at a practical level to engage in the institutions of
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our culture, our

exeressj^ex Eerience and social identity

within the institutions of that
culture, and the authority
which that culture has over us.
To cast doubt upon, or to

render increasingly difficult,
contradictory, or utopian
the range of purposes that form
the expressive dimension of
these institutions would be to undermine
their authority.
That is, a crisis of authority, whether
political or
more broadly social, can be at one level
an expressive
crisis of social identity.
Thus social change which renders
a set of

practices untenable— the impact of capitalist

development on English hand weavers, as

describes— can be experienced

E.

P.

Thompson

as a qualitative loss of

self, even if material gain accompanies the
change.
a

Or,

process which led one to reject or re-evaluate the aspi-

ration, say, of social mobility— because it undermines
the

solidarity of community or family life, as some interviewees
in The Hidden Injuries of Class came to

believe— would be

at some level a rejection or re-evaluation of the self.

One would rightly expect such loss, questioning, or rejection to be a painful, troubling experience, and perhaps for
many,

a

source of resistance to social change (or social

critics) as such.

Hermeneutics helps us appreciate the internal web of
purposes, wants, meanings in a culture, and so can go some

distance in clarifying the chain of displacement or effect
when an area of social life undergoes this divestiture of
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meaning.

For instance, with capital’s
seizure of the work
process and the virtual disappearance
of the left between
1920 and 1932, the range of
eulturally-available motivations to sustain blue-collar work
became qualitatively more
privatized.
The possibility of individual
mobility for

one's children could appeal to a
range of families where
class mobility was no longer on the
agenda, where craft
work was no longer a major force in
working class communities, and where the expansion of
professional occupations
based on the expropriation of working class
skills provided
a real but limited outlet.
For some, a consumerist frame -

——

might make sense of a society in which working
class

families and communities— in part through demands
on time,

destruction of skills, competition from capital

— were

in-

creasingly less able to organize the production of
basic
foodstuffs, community services, and culture.

This frame-

work could also claim to "solve" problems associated with
the degradation of work-life and community:

products to

sustain youth in a culture where speed-ups at work and in
the family required vitality, products which offered an

outlet for the mechanical skills increasingly degraded in
production, or a sense of individual power to compete with
the periodic appeals of cooperative power (the auto);

products like radio, movies and the auto which offered the

possibility of escape.
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Here, though, hermeneutics
necessarily draws upon
(often) tacit notions of power
relations and structural
change to situate the shift in
purposes and meanings. For
instance, the instrumental and
structural causes of the

destruction of mass transport are an
essential part of the
privatization of purposes around the auto.
Thus a theory
of legitimation requires not only
a sensitive grasp of

culture, but also of the pressures upon
cultural meanings,

pressures originating in relations of domination,
and in
the array of impinging yet distinct and
unevenly developing
institutions of American society.

O'Connor's account of

tax revolts, for instance, could be deepened
by relating

increased taxes (and their relative visibility) to
pressures upon the aspirations and motivations of everyday
life.

Jurgen Habermas' Legitimation Crisis is a step for-

ward in grasping these systemic changes.

He traces a dis-

ruption of the traditional meanings essential for

constituting capitalist institutions to increasing, economically originated pressures upon the state.

In late

capitalism, he argues, the general replacement of market

mechanisms with attempts at corporate planning have entailed increasing state intervention in the socializing

institutions of society (family, educational system).

This

intervention proceeds through a form of technical rationality, bureaucracy, which is disruptive of and incommen-

surate with the essentially moral rationality of cultural
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institutions.

Writing in 1973, he also argues

a continuing
erosion of pre-bourgeois
world-views-religions-that have
tacitly strengthened capitalism by
addressing the crucial
existential questions bourgeois
individualism cannot even
ask:
death, guilt, sickness; reconciliation
with

nature;

relations of solidarity; collective
needs and interests.
According to Habermas, this ’’tale of two
reasons” has
politicized un reflectively embraced practices
in education
and family life, leading different groups
to question the
authority relations embedded in these practices
(gender
relations, parental authority, the education
profession),
and impinging on these practices (the state’s
bureaucratic

interference).

But this politicization will not neces-

sarily result in new cultural patterns supportive of
late
capitalism, he argues.

For normative argument, once begun,

follows a process di st inc

from the instrumental ration-

ality embedded in state and economic institutions; moreover, normative argument per se presupposes that we could,

through the giving of reasons, reach consensus on

posed norm.

a

pro-

Habermas sees this presumption of normative

argument as an epistemic pressure operating in periods of

legitimation crisis; it is a presumption based on an ideal
of undominated discourse,

an ideal "freed” in times of

structural crisis to exert a forward-looking, developmental
force.

The ideal itself amounts to a procedure for arriv-

ing at an uncoerced consensus (on social purposes, norms,
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authority), equivalent for all
practical purposes with
m o ra l truth itself --an ideal of
participatory, democratic
discourse and the social relations which
would sustain that
discourse.
Largely for this reason, he argues,
the erosion
of tradition is a one-way process.
Once the traditional
meanings which enter into and legitimate
capitalist social
relations have entere.d the realm of consciousness
and debate, they cannot be reconstituted in their
old patterns.

Habermas argues, therefore, for

a

particular version of

historical teleology (of social systems) based largely
on
his analysis of teleological meaning (human
purposes) at

the level of everyday life.

Habermas’ treatment of constitutive ideology and

social identity helps us deepen our understanding of public

disaffection from the state, which is widely seen as
meddling, bureaucratic threat to private life.
a

a

He paints

persuasive picture of a state undermining the very basis

— generalized acquiescence in a context
expansion — simply by pursuing its general mis-

of its own authority

of economic

sion of rationalizing the social and economic conditions of

accumulation.

Its expanded activities,

indeed, call for

increased legitimation at a time when those activities
help undermine legitimation processes themselves.

Habermas goes beyond other theories of legitimation

That is,
I

have

examined by linking experiential crises of social identity
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to the expanding and
uncoordinated domination of
political-

economic structures.
However, since Habermas imports
O'Connor wholesale
into his theory, he is subject
to the same criticisms I
made against O’Connor with regard
to class structure, statemanaged capitalism, and the international
political economy.
Like O'Connor, Habermas' problems
in these areas may reveal
a debt to the liberal problematic
of public power.
It particularly affects his argument that the
state will be a
target of dissatisfaction over its
attempts to "plan" culture for the benefit of accumulation.

According to Habermas, the state falls prey
to this
blame because its cultural intervention, as
a clear exercise
of power, must be legitimated.

This need for legitimation

disrupts the pattern of civil privatism, or
generalized

acquiescence to state activity.

Yet capitalist investment

decisions and consumption management contribute heavily,
though less "visibly," to cultural change; in fact they

contribute heavily to frustrations which are then aimed at
the state

.

Thus not just structural constraints upon the

state to try to "manage" capitalism, but also the relative

visibility of state compared to private power, play

a cru-

cial role in the displacement of crisis into the state

which O'Connor and Habermas argue.

This visibility, ideo-

logically conditioned, is something they both partly assume
and find no need to explain.

Whatever the source of
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cultural disruption, Habermas
is correct that it could
lead
not only to a state crisis
but also to a crisis of
capitalist relations.
But if Habermas clarified the
direct role
of corporate power in this
disruption, and his theory

entered widely into public discourse,
it would challenge
the ideological detours which
limit the questioning of
class relations.
The teleological thrust of his
argument also raises
problems.
I would concede the
epistemic pressure toward

equality which he describes, but temper
it with an account
of identity-based resistance to
criticism and
change.

For

this reason, social practices and their
internal relations
of domination may change in form but
not necessarily evolve

;

elites and reactionary movements can appeal
to the emotional
roots of such practices.
This possibility, in
part,

is

essential to the potential for the reactionary
nationalisms
which, though he is clearly sensitive to them,
Habermas

largely ignores in his crisis analysis.
The tenacious quality of social identity can be seen

m

the gender roles and patriarchal relations which Habermas

does not detail in his account of culture.

As a system of

gender inequality, patriarchy has its roots in complexly

interwoven sexual property relations and social identity.

Though it varies significantly by class and ethnic group
in our country,

patriarchal relations in general embody

distinction between public and private worlds in which

a
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women

prlmary roles are defined ±n

^

Qf the

world of family, kinship, and
mothering.

Men, on the other
hand, participate in both
spheres of social life with
recog-

nized prerogatives in each sphere.

As children, as em-

bodied beings, are socialized into
gender roles, they enter
a social system of capitalist
patriarchy in which sensual
repression for both men and women serves
the needs of in-

tense production, and in which relatively
greater sensual
repression for women helps to define and
reproduce patriarchy.
This inequality relates not only to
a double
standard for sexual activity, but also to
male and community
rights" in women’s activity that women do
not have equally
in themselves or in men.

This system of property rests in large part on
the
fact that mothering in our society is primarily
a female

responsibility— not simply bearing, but raising children.
This equation of gender and mothering is an essential

moment in the reproduction of patriarchy, as

I

have argued

with Chodorow and Rubin, for it means that girl and boy

children through asymmetrical processes in learning their
heterosexuality, and that women as mothers are symbolic

objects of exchange

— "cultural

ing of heterosexuality.

property"

— during

the learn-

The asymmetries and power rela-

tions of the current gender system foster important

vulnerabilities for many people around heterosexual sensual
and sexual relations.

Men and women tend to develop
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differing, gender related
combinations of affective and
erotic capacities and expectations,
deeply complicating,
even frustrating, intimate
relations.
Evolving ideals of
virile men and sensuous women,
indebted to patriarchy, may
add burdens of ’’performance" to
the sensitive process of
developing and sustaining intimacy.
These and other areas
of vulnerability are .compounded,
manipulated, by the deployment of sexuality in consumer ideology.
They are also sustained, perhaps intensified, by taboos
which may hinder or
prohibit the discussion necessary for
reducing this

vulnerability; these taboos affect both men
and women, and
especially in Anglo cultures discourage male
openness about
emot ions

Introducing such considerations will deepen but

necessarily complicate the perception of social
identity
which hermeneutics and Habermas provide.

Moreover, in

accepting the idea of a sex/gender system, as well as
an
account of inequality in that system, we are under real

pressure to rethink the constraints under which economic
and political elites operate.
speak,

in that system,

Personally implicated, so to

they are susceptible to politics of

family life and sexuality that speak both to the eroding

power of capitalist development and to the tenacity of

tradition
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Ch apters Four a nd_Five,

In reaching this conclusion,
my

dissertation moves from an appraisal
of competing legitimation theories to a more concrete
application of the perspective I have worked out through this
appraisal.
I argue that
American race relations are an area
in which we can perceive
deep connections between social
identity, the structures of
capitalism and patriarchy, and the political
system
of the

New Deal state.

These are connections which are largely

unavailable to us through received liberal,
Marxist, and
hermeneutic theories— though each of the theories
I

have

examined makes contributions to my analysis.
My basic argument is that in the dominant
culture,

interwoven dynamics deeply indebted to patriarchal
and
capitalist relations foster a projection of sensuality
onto

non-white peoples, interpret this projection as a threat
to
white family life, and encourage a sense of vulnerability
to this threat.

These projections are

a

central element in

such important cultural themes as the contrast between

civilization and barbarism, and the beast or animal element
in human nature.

The essential capitalist sources of these

projections have been the historical need, varying in character by class position, to channel human nature in the

service of disciplined, intense production, and the pro-

gressive degradation of manual labor (that is, of physical
qualities) in the context of its abstraction from mental
labor.

The patriarchal context of emerging capitalism
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helped answer for our culture
the "question" of what
facet
of social life to channel
in the pursuit of
methodical production:
the sensual, physical
qualities most completely
identified with women. These
capitalist and patriarchal
factors, in a sense, rest upon
a "base level" of sexual
repression involved in the establishment
of heterosexual
norms, incest taboos,, and other
rules restricting sexual
partners.
In sum
capitalist patriarchy either establishes
or intensifies important
physical/sexual connections between
the domination of inner and outer
nature, and fosters the
projection of this sensuality onto
Afro-Americans.
,

These projections establish asymmetrical
sexual-racial
taboos which speak to white ambivalence
about "undisciplined” lifestyles and those who seem to
embody them; black
"sexuality" is not only an object of fear,
but an object of
fantasy and attraction for men and women. These
taboos are

asymmetrical by virtue of the sexual property
relations

which patriarchal gender socialization helps establish
at
the level of the personality.

Thus black people appear not

only as threats because of the generalized sexuality
they
represent; black males in particular appear as superior

sexual competitors and threats to white males.

Yet sexual-

racial taboos are not mere reflexes of patriarchal and

capitalist structures.

They enter into and help constitute

the social distance and hierarchy of racial segregation and

subordination, establishing boundaries that have repeatedly
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been tested by an interracial sexuality
fraught with conflict and exploitation.
In short,

pressures toward racism are inherent at

the deepest level of the social
identities which individuals
form in capitalist patriarchy.
In the history of our race
relations, they ground consistent ideologies
of and fasci-

nations with supposedly degraded black family life,
with

miscegenation and interracial sexuality, and with
supposed
black sexual cr iminality--prost itut ion and rape.

Sexual

projections, and especially patriarchal mores, have grounded
the reproduction "within" the working class itself of
racial

ideologies and practices.

Historically, for instance, the

refusal of craft unions to admit black men to full membership must be seen in this light.
a large role in

nities,

These unions often played

organizing the social life of their commu-

and guarded access to economic skills in the con-

text of fraternal rituals emphasizing equality.
of black male membership,

The denial

save in segregated locals, not

only preserved economic privilege, but also denied

a fra-

ternal equality that would tacitly sanction interracial

sexuality
Sexual projection, and the patriarchal mores widely
but varyingly shared across class, have also grounded the

frequent and often successful appeals to racial solidarity

made across the class structure.

I

have argued that this

was true in the proto-racial Nativist movement of the
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period 1835-1855, where sexual themes
provided a common
ground between native workers in
economic competition with
immigrants, and middle class reformers
with no
direct

interest in cheap labor who saw Catholic
immigrants as an
undisciplined, licentious group.
Sexual projection, and

especially the threat of black male sexuality,
symbolized
both in post-bellum Southern communities
and
later in

Northern urban centers the encroachment of the
entire black
community upon the position of the white community.
In

situations where appeal to these projections was clearly

manipulatory

justifications for lynching, Northern news-

paper stories fanning working class racism against newly-

arrived black workers

— it

is significant,

I

think, that

the appeals were made on the basis of beliefs shared across
the class structure.

These appeals are a distinguishing

mark of the racial nationalisms which especially mark our
domestic history, nationalisms internally related to the

international rivalries which have so often restrained
class politics in modern European societies.

Nationalism generally must be understood as

a con-

stellation of myths and traditions akin to nostalgic
populism,

in which members of various social classes ally,

making claims upon each other that emphasize their cultural
solidarity in the face of competing cultures.

This popu-

lism is grounded in a world structure of combined and

uneven economic development, and serves to mobilize support

318

for politics! economic
development in the face of competition or domination in this
structure.
Widely but not

completely shared across class,
sexual practices and patriarchal arrangements also seem
to ground the cultural
claims
made a c r oss the class structure
that stems from production.
This source seems crucial to the
racial definitions
of

threat or competition so common to
nationalist consciousness, definitions unusually prevalent
in domestic U.S.
history

Sexual projections and mores also play
a clear role
struggles over housing integration in both
working and
middle class communities, though by virtue
of most AfroAmericans' class, these struggles (and the
school integration struggles they help inform) have been
concentrated in

m

working class neighborhoods.

Housing conflict is an impor-

tant area to consider because of the focus it
provides for

the economic, sexual, and ideational aspects of legitimation.

scarce:

In the first place,

good housing in capitalism is

building housing requires significant capital, and

housing production

— especially

low income housing

— is

gen-

erally a less profitable investment than others for those
who have the capital

— banks

and builders.

This scarcity

underwrites a struggle for good housing in the working
class,

and racial/ethnic animosities definitely have this

material component.
a locus of sexuality,

Yet homes in our culture also provide

socialization, and patriarchal
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property relations, as well as an
important symbol of major
cultural themes:
the cult of domesticity, and
the family
as refuge.

In helping to constitute
housing segregation,

sexual-racial taboos keep at a distance
those who seemingly
negate or threaten that which is
gathered in the meaning of
the "home
.

These interwoven economic, sexual, and
cultural
motives for segregation have historically
been traded upon
by the constellation of interests
which dominate urban housing production and rentals:

agents, and landlords.

banks, builders, real estate

These interests helped to develop,

and heavily profited from, the post-1900
residential segre-

gation which whites were culturally inclined to,
even as
the housing production these interests underfunded
created

the material conditions for shelter competition
within the

working class.

When the housing market collapsed in the

Great Depression, the state helped underwrite mortgaging
and low-income housing in order to forestall class conflict

around this basic material need.

In doing so,

sanctioned and promoted segregation as

a

state policy

condition of its

legitimacy, both to the white public and to the housing

interests which found state funding and segregation so
profitable.

In this policy,

I

would argue, as well as in

the effects of its later symbolic reversal, we can see an

intimate connection between legitimation and social identity.

And in this policy,

I

would argue, the state
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responded to and represented an
aggregation of popular and
elite interests best conceptualized
as white nationalism.
Yet these housing policies
emerged at the beginning
of a c h a nge in state racial
policy and in the white nation-

alism it responded to, especially
at the national level.
These changes were possible in a
period of highly contradictory legitimation requirements with
respect
to race,

contradictions literally embodied in the
Roosevelt electoral
coalition oi white native and ethnic workers,
PMC reformers,
the "solid South," and Afro-Americans.

The sources of this

change were complex, long term, and cannot be
adequately

represented in this dissertation.

They include, however,

the demographic and subsequent electoral
pressure of black

urban migration after 1900, itself encouraged by war
jobs,

Southern repression, and the increasing capitalization of
Southern agriculture.

They also include

a set of

threats

from the left which helped force corporate liberal planners,

politicians, and PMC reformers to embrace, and attempt to
channel, black struggles.

Among these were Depression-era

labor and black community organizing by black and white
leftists, the left and nationalist tendencies within the

black movement which helped "moderate" groups look respectable,

and the range of inspiration which post-WW II colo-

nial liberation movements provided for black struggles in

this country.

And finally, the sources of change include
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an evolving climate of
racial consciousness indebted
to the

paternalistic, social-welfare
consciousness of PMC reformers
This PMC racial consciousness,
emerging after roughly
1900, challenged the extreme biological
racism popularized
by opponents of Reconstruction
and by defenders of lynching.

initially viewed Afro-Americans as
child-like, amiable,
and genetically inferior yet capable
of cultural improveIt

ment.

In accord with the PMC Weltanschauung

,

it

offered a

future of inegalitarian harmony and
cooperation— of the
races.
This consciousness informed such reform
groups as
the white founded and financed NAACP the
Campaign for
,

Inter-Racial Co-operation and Harmony, and the Southern

Women's Campaign Against Lynching.

Initially favoring

black "improvement" within segregated institutions,
this

opinion gradually shifted under black and left pressure
to
one which could regard segregation as an unjust convention

,

and one which could therefore conceive of actual integration.

The history of racial caste theory,

I

would argue,

expresses just such a development.
As these factors opened wedges in the historical

alliance of white nationalism, the state was forced in-

creasingly into contradictory positions:

between, at

least initially, Southern and Northern power blocs, between

national and state levels of government, and between the
need on the one hand to calm the disorder of non-electoral

struggles through concessions, and on the other the need
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to respect still-powerful
white nationalist forces.

The

re-appearance of black nationalism,
after roughly I960,
played a key role in shaping these
tensions.

In classic nationalist

fashion, black power advocates

sought to mobilize a people short
on other economic and
political resources around a kind of
romantic populism:
black history and traditions, blackness
as an aesthetic
standard, and so on.
While the articulation of black pride
came to suffuse the entire spectrum of
black struggle, it

informed separatist politics in particular.

Through the

media, many whit es--including those previously
sympathetic
to civil

rights— experienced this explicit black nationalism

as a nightmare threat,

and in one sense directly intended

by advocates, as a materialization of black
manhood.

The

white backlash fed in part on the dread of black male
power
immanent in the sexual aspect of race itself.
The moderate reforms which militant black power advo-

cates help make necessary,

I

would argue, helped satisfy

the reformist consciousness of white liberals, undercutting

key support for further progress.
pact of some reforms

school integration

— especially

— seems

And since 1970, the im-

affirmative action and

to have significantly eroded

abstract white middle class support for integration, thus
to have helped restore a certain amount of white, cross-

class unity against integration, and therefore to have made
it possible or necessary,

in the absence of black social

323

disorder,

for the state to retreat on racial
issues.

In

this retreat, the state has shored up
one of the few areas
of its legitimation problems that
is reasonably within
political cont rol--unlike for instance,
economic planning.
This retreat, I think, cannot be fully
understood without
analyzing the sexual sources of deep, intense,
and wide,

spread white resistance to integration.

Conclusions
My conclusions stand in five areas.

The first con-

cerns the relative merit, on their own terms, of liberal,
Marxist, and hermeneutic theories of legitimacy.

The second

covers the need for a concept of a PMC in American political analysis.

power.

The third concerns the problematic of public

The fourth embraces some of the implications of my

work on sexual racism.

And the fifth covers more general,

but quite important, thoughts about the political trends

which my analysis clarifies.
One.

Liberal analyses of legitimacy, O'Connor's theory, and

Habermas' theory are successively more capable accounts of

legitimation.

Mainstream political science's analysis is

limited by epistemological and social commitments which

shape its status as a legitimating ideology for the social
order.

Shaped by positivist understandings, the mainstream

understands only tacitly the essentially rule-governed and
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expressive nature of human act ivity--f eatures
which internally link human beliefs and purposes, social

identity, and

the authority of social institutions and
practices.

Shaped

by bourgeois understandings, the mainstream
cannot ade-

quately formulate or understand the economic pressures
under
which the state operates. O'Connor improves our grasp
of

these pressures, but cannot adequately illuminate the

experiential crisis of belief inherent in legitimation
problems.

Habermas, though, employs sophisticated notions

of both structural pressures and constitutive belief systems
to describe the crisis of the state.

If we regard these

three theories on their own terms, they stand in this order
of capability.

But their particular contributions can also

be improved by an external critique summarized by my con-

clusions in the next four areas.
Two.

Contemporary American social theory, including the

topic of legitimation, requires some concept of

professional-managerial middle class.

a

While the dimensions

of this concept are debatable, the need for it is clear.

This concept adds needed subtlety to a class analysis of

politics, a subtlety not available when we apply an abstract, two-class model of capitalist development to recent

historical situations.

Such a concept only makes explicit

the sociological reality which many Marxist analyses con-

sistently but tacitly draw upon.

325

In this dissertation,

the PMC concept first of all

helps clarity the managerial and scientific
commitments of
the dominant paradigms in post-WW II
political science,
xhese legitimating ideologies themselves
express, secondly,
the broader mediation of capitalist domination
through

political and ideological institutions in which

a

profes-

sional elite plays a subordinate but active role.

Thirdly,

the PMC concept also sheds light on the displacement
of

crisis tendencies into the state posited by O'Connor and
Habermas.

It

helps us understand the relative visibility

and vulnerability of public power by clarifying the social

relations which ground reformist and managerial political
aspirations, and by clarifying a visible and mediate source
of capital and state's impact on culture.

And finally,

connections between race and legitimation clearly show the
effect of the PMC presence:

this class was important in

the breakdown and recent reconstruction of the class alli-

ance of white nationalism.

The state disregarded the pur-

poses of this alliance at the cost of considerable

legitimation problems among the white public.
Th ree

.

Generalized in our culture, the liberal problematic

which focuses on the exercise of public power enters and
disables O'Connor's, and to a lesser extent Habermas',

theories of legitimation.

Increasingly involved in

underwriting the economic, social, and political needs of
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corporate capital, the welfare state has been
surrounded by
an ideology informing its attempts at economic
and
social

management, and overstating its managerial capacities
by

mystifying its structural dependence on the corporate
economy.

O'Connor and Habermas go an appreciable yet in-

sufficient distance in clarifying this structural dependence,

still accepting an overstated version of state-managed

capitalism.

O'Connor sees the state budget as the primary

spur of capitalist accumulation, and primary cause and

remedy of accumulation crises; Habermas argues a politici-

zation of the state over its interference in cultural
practices.

Both seriously underplay the role of class

dynamics outside the state in affecting the areas they
examine:

investment and economic growth, and cultural

degradation.

With their primary focus on the state, both

assume what they must in fact explain:
of state power,

how a questioning

over economic growth or cultural crisis,

will necessarily be connected by participants to

tioning of capitalist social relations.

a

ques-

That is, the dis-

placement of crisis into the state posited by both

theorists reflects, what

I

might without too much crudity

describe as, true and ideological judgments about the
state's role in late capitalism.
Four

.

The place of race relations in recent legitimacy

problems cannot be fully understood without an analysis of
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its sexual aspects.

These aspects reveal deep connections

between the structures of capitalism and
patriarchy, constitutive belief systems and social identity, and
the

political system of the New Deal state.

These connections

show that race has played a more independent and
more

widely implicated role in recent legitimation problems
than
that attributed to it by liberal, Marxist, and hermeneutic

theories of legitimacy

— though

indeed each of these per-

spectives contributes something to our understanding of
these connections.
My work provides new support to the analysis of

American race relations as a quasi-nationalist form of
social relations

— that

it

is a "precipitate" of capitalism

and patriarchy not reducible to either.

Others, like

Robert Allen, have adopted the (semi) nationalist position
not only out of the persuasiveness of the "internal colo-

nies" argument, but also out of deep frustration with

white reformers.

It

is argued that Afro-American politics

must have an independent organizational basis, in part, to

counteract the ever-present tendency of white reformers to

subordinate racial reform to other considerations, to see
racial justice as the inevitable outcome of their own
agenda, and generally to reproduce the racism of the cul-

ture in their organizations.

But the contribution of

sexual racism, and of racial-sexual interaction generally,
to these problems remains a public secret and an explosive
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source of discord in racial coalitions
on the left.
The
historical neglect of sexual inequality
per se by a maledominated left is clearly a source of these
racial divisions.
Moreover, I suspect that my analysis will
scarcely
provide comfort to advocates of black nationalism,
com-

plexly tied as black nationalism is to assertions
of black
manhood assertions often blatantly misogynist.
Yet a

public recognition of sexual racism by all parties
is essential to transcending the destructive barriers it
expresses,
not only for non-whites, but for the entire spectrum
of

left interests.
In fact,

race, sex,

and class may be so deeply inter-

twined in the American situation that no progress beyond

a

certain point is possible on any of them without progress
on all of them.

For instance, if my arguments about the

debt of racial nationalisms to sexuality are correct, then

they have significant implications for an account of working class formation in the U.S.

I

would be prepared to

argue that the relative failure of working class politics
in this country has had a great deal to do with the common

cultural-sexual ground that could be articulated across the
white class structure, especially with respect to race.
The failure to apprehend and struggle around this source of

underdevelopment rests not only on a male-identified left's
neglect of sexual politics, but also on a rigidly
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reductionists, antipsychological stance
towards culture
prevalent on the left.
In virtually the only place where
Marx discussed

class as a sociological concept, he spoke
of class as a
potential to which shared community and culture
were essential.
ans,

The most perceptive of contemporary Marxist
histori-

Raymond Williams and

E.

P.

convincingly illustrated this in
the hermeneutic principles

I

Thompson among others, have
a

way quite congenial to

have employed.

But in compari-

son to Western European counterparts, the U.S.
working class

has not as fully developed this distinct culture.

The racial source of this "cultural underdevelopment
I

think,

,

is immanent in the gender relations and alienated

sensuality of any capitalist patriarchy.

But U.S. demog-

raphy has always been distinguished from that of European

countries by the physical presence of significant numbers
of non-Europeans— a situation reflective of our colonial

origins.

This "material" difference, in Aristotle's sense,

allowed the racial potential in American capitalist patriarchy to flourish, a potential realized in successful claims
to racial solidarity across the white class structure.

Captured in the opposition between civilized and barbarian
peoples, such solidarity is an alternate form of community
to that of class.

While class identification has existed

and does exist among the U.S. working class, racial divi -

sions have consistently hindered its struggles, and

a

sense
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of fundamental class opposition has always
been surrounded

and often stunted by the cultural envelope of
racial commu-

nity with other classes.
l±y. e

•

The analysis developed in this dissertation goes
some

distance in clarifying contemporary political developments.
In the first place,
a vast direct

the past ten years or so have witnessed

politicization of family and sexual issues.

Middle class white women confronted their own subordinate
status in male-dominated civil rights and anti-war movements,

arriving at liberal and radical feminist critiques of

society.

Their challenge to sex roles tapped into widely

felt experience of oppression among women, yet neglected

crucial class and racial differences in this experience.

They have also shared with later left feminists the fright-

ening image

— sometimes

deserved, often the result of a

— of

neglect which allowed this caricature

being anti-family.

New Right men and women have rushed into this partial

vaccum around the family, expressing and trading on the
aspirations and worst fears of those who find kinship

a

source of identity and of comfort in a troubled world, of
those who find this anchor of personal life threatened by
an array of forces.

The New Right has tellingly used,

partly through default on the left

a

perceived threat to

the family as a major focus of social analysis--of crime,

pornography, violence against women, schools which are
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troubled and failing and teaching the wrong
values.

Blind

or cynical about the capitalist and
patriarchal sources of
these problems, New Right leadership mobilizes
a fearful

public against what it and its cadres are inclined
to see
as the major sources of pressure against the

government and the liberal left.

family— the

Thus New Right propaganda

stresses liberal and feminist "plans" for a federal Department of Family Affairs to coordinate the state’s challenge
to parental authority.

The overt politicization of family and sexual life
has clearly been fed by the less-explicit ly acknowledged

sexual politics of integration.

When the right speaks of

troubled schools, sexually-based fears of integration are
high on its list; in this it addresses a potentially vast
audience.

The left has not yet focused on or sought to

defuse this source of support for the right.

Not that it

would be easy; but surely things would be worse left unsaid.
My analysis also helps us see how racism and a resur-

gence of racist violence, even when not directly manipulated
by political-economic elites, are an all-too-obvious outlet

for the fears wrapped up in a crisis of, or challenge to,

capitalism and patriarchy.

Race unites the mores of these

modes of domination; always perceived as threats, blacks
serve once again in a time of crisis as mirrors for the

development of capitalist patriarchy's culture.
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The continuing process of cultural
erosion which
Habermas focuses on feeds the potential for
nationalist
politics, it provides the very material
required for

nationalism's nostalgic appeals.

Thus both racism and

threatened machismo are essential to the rhetoric
and convictions of the right's international stance.
Descriptions
of third world challenges to U.S.

hegemony as barbaric and

uncivilized clearly call on and reinforce domestic racist
sentiments.

There is a strong streak of plantation men-

tality visible in the right's attitude toward the third
world:

the only tolerable third world nations are those

led by pliant and civilized

"house servants"

j

indigenous

challenges to their rule are interpreted here in the

metropolis as both imported (trouble-makers in the ghetto)
and as a threat to American manhood (the pitiful giant

syndrome)

With the virtual abandonment of integration, and the

continued ghettoized confinement of non-whites, this colonial attitude is now being blatantly re-introduced to

domestic U.S. race relations.

Plans for urban "free enter-

prise" zones resemble nothing so much as the U.S. client

states in which American capital exploits the local population free of state restraints (recognized unions, minimum

wage laws, health and safety measures), and with the aid
of violent repression.

This proposal has substantial sup-

port not just on the right, but potentially among white
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politicians who are abandoning or moderating their
support
for welfare liberalism.
The left cannot successfully meet these challenges

without an understanding of their roots.

Nor can it meet

them without addressing the related racial and sexual divi-

sions which dilute its own strength.

contributes
It

a

My analysis,

I

think,

beginning to this sorely-needed clarification.

also gives additional reasons, if any more are needed,

why plausible visions of an alternative society are essential to the left's success:

work life, of

a

visions of a non-repressive

diversity of roles open to men and to

women, of a society which prizes human interaction and

culture as objects in themselves, and of

a

society which

respects ethnic diversity without erecting ethnic barriers.
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